In farewell remarks to the State Department last week, then-US President Joe Biden declared that Iran “is weaker than it’s been in decades.”
Biden’s comments typified current assessments on Iran from the United States and Israel, and there are growing signs that the latter is considering exploiting Tehran’s tenuous position with strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. This comes as more hawkish figures in the Iranian government have called for modifying the country’s nuclear doctrine in the event of an existential threat—publicly flirting with the prospect of weaponisation.
But just how weakened is Iran, and does it truly have intentions of making a dash for the bomb? These are key questions for the Trump administration to consider as its foreign policy begins to take shape.
There’s no doubt that the past 15 months have been devastating to Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance. A brutal multifront war launched by Israel after the October 7, 2023, attack has left Hamas and Hezbollah, two crucial Iranian proxies, severely diminished. Both militant groups, which saw their longtime leaders killed amid the fighting, have agreed to cease-fires with Israel.
Hamas was a “strategic asset for Iran in so far as it could threaten Israel’s security from Gaza,” said Gregory Brew, a senior analyst with Eurasia Group. “That’s done. It’s over. Hamas is not an asset for Iran anymore, and it likely never will be again.”
Hezbollah has also been “reduced in such a way that it will take years to rebuild to the point that it can provide deterrence for Iran,” Brew said, adding that the Lebanese militant group has transformed from a “strategic asset” for Tehran to a “strategic liability.”
Meanwhile, Israeli strikes last October dealt a major blow to Iranian air defences and missile production. Months later, Iran has not made good on threats to retaliate—likely because it’s not in a good position to strike back.
“Striking Israel a third time would invite an Israeli counterstrike that could further embarrass and weaken Iran,” said Sanam Vakil, the director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House. Iran, which is clearly “experiencing a real pronounced and serious moment of difficulty,” will therefore try to avoid that approach “at all costs,” she added.
Israel has been very effective in decimating “much of Iran’s deterrent capacity across the region since October 7” while showcasing its “military and intelligence superiority” via its “willingness and ability to strike Iran directly,” Vakil said.
To top it all off, Tehran also lost one of its closest allies in the region with the Assad regime’s collapse in Syria last month. Iran was in a “fairly good” regional position a year ago, Brew said. “Now that position is in ruins, and it really does need to be emphasised how much Iran has lost,” he added.
Beyond the military dynamics, Iran’s economy continues to struggle under the weight of international sanctions atop systemic mismanagement, Vakil said, which has had rippling consequences across the country’s political system and society.
Iran now faces the prospect of further economic woes and increased isolation with President Donald Trump back in the White House. Trump’s advisors have called for him to reinstitute a policy of “maximum pressure”—devastating economic sanctions with the goal of squeezing Tehran into negotiating a more stringent version of the 2015 nuclear deal.
The maximum pressure approach was not successful during Trump’s first term, which also saw the United States and Iran pushed to the brink of war following the US drone strike in 2020 that killed Qasem Soleimani, who led Iran’s elite Quds Force.
Tehran’s nuclear programme is also now even more developed than it was when Trump withdrew from the Obama-era nuclear deal in 2018. Iran’s breakout time to a nuclear weapon is currently considered to be just one to two weeks. Taken together, these factors could make military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities more attractive to Trump.
But Iran’s weakened state should not be overstated—it can still cause problems for the United States and is capable of defending itself, experts said.
“Iran is considerably weakened” but still “has the capacity to inflict harm on its adversaries” through missile attacks and nonstate allies who are capable of damaging US interests and allies in the region, said Naysan Rafati, the senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group.
“There is still a military capacity. The Revolutionary Guards still exist. And the ballistic missile fleet is still there. They still have drones. They still have a naval presence in the Gulf,” Rafati added.
“Iran is not powerless,” said Brew, emphasising that it retains allies in both Iraq and Yemen. The Iran-backed Houthi rebel group in Yemen, which repeatedly attacked commercial vessels in the Red Sea in response to the war in Gaza, remains a threat despite a pledge to limit attacks following the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.
In early January, Iran launched large-scale military exercises that Rafati said demonstrated “there is still a sabre they can rattle.” One of the highlights of the exercises, which Iran’s semi-official SNN news agency said were meant to test the country’s air defences, was a simulated aerial assault on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility.
Brew said the exercises were designed to send a “very clear” message to Iran’s adversaries: “‘We have a large military. We are a large country. Maybe we don’t have the flashiest toys, but we have a lot of stuff. We have a lot of men. And we’re taking a defensive posture. We have missiles in underground cities that can withstand bombardment. We have a nuclear programme that is ringed in air defences. We are a fortress. And if you come at us, then there will be consequences.’”
Iran also demonstrated what it’s capable of last year via its drone and missile attacks on Israel. These attacks didn’t cause significant damage, but this was largely thanks to US assistance. Similar attacks in the future could present challenges for both the United States and Israel.
“It is very expensive to shoot down drones and missiles. And both the US and Israel do not have an infinite supply of air defences—anti-drone and anti-missile interceptors,” Brew said.
Along these lines, it’s possible that if Iran launches another large-scale missile and drone attack on Israel, “more projectiles will get through simply due to the fact that the US and Israel won’t be able to shoot all of them down,” Brew said. “They simply won’t have the means.”
Though Iran’s weakened status has certainly raised concerns in Washington that Tehran could pursue a nuclear weapon to reestablish deterrence and bolster both its regional and global position, there’s still “no indication that they’ve taken a decision toward weaponisation,” Rafati said.
“There are also signals coming out of Tehran that they are interested in talking to the Trump administration in some capacity,” Rafati said.
Read more: The eventuality of US-Iran negotiations
