As the dust settles after the 2024 military campaign that finally unseated the Assad family from Damascus, Syria’s interim Defence Minister Maj. Gen. Murhaf Abu Qasra is emerging as one of the leading figures of this transformative era.
He was integral to the operation that began on 27 November and ended on 8 December after a coalition of anti-Assad fighters led by the Idlib-based Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group took Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and the capital.
Abu Qasra played a significant role in planning the operation and overseeing training, armament, and strategy under the leadership of HTS commander Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. Abu Qasra, previously known as Abu Hasan 600, led HTS’s military wing.
In the second and last instalment of his interview with Al Majalla, Abu Qasra talks about the battle that won back Syria and his subsequent efforts to establish a new Syrian army, dissolve the multitude of armed factions in the country, and address threats from abroad, not least from Israel to the south.
His primary job is to replace al-Assad’s army, formally named the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), which effectively dissolved as HTS-led fighters barrelled through the country at the end of last year. “The Syrian people hate the SAA very much,” he said, adding his own message to the population: “This army (that he is creating) is your army.”
All systems go
Looking back at the November 2024 operation that finally unseated Bashar al-Assad from Damascus, Abu Qasra said the decision to do so was reached “approximately 3-4 months prior,” adding: “It was a definitive choice. The regime’s allies were preoccupied.” Russia was still fighting in Ukraine, and as of April 2024, Iran was in a direct fight with Israel.
“The idea for such an operation emerged a year earlier, but active preparations began a few months ago,” he said, speaking to Al Majalla from his office in Damascus. “Discussions about the operation began and, in response, the regime started mobilising. To counteract this, we issued directives to de-escalate tension and distract the enemy, creating the impression that the operation had been called off.
“Calm followed, during which we mobilised covertly. Our troop movements were disguised as civilian activities. For instance, we used public buses to reposition our forces. This was instrumental in achieving our objectives. We orchestrated a deliberate lull. Neither the regime nor the public believed an operation was imminent. All the while, we were steadfastly advancing our preparations.”
The HTS-led operation was due to begin around 20 November but was delayed "due to logistics, including malfunctions in aircraft and tracked vehicles," said Abu Qasra. "We had to postpone to address issues like tank repairs. While postponing for another year might have allowed us to strengthen our capabilities, the strategic window of opportunity would likely have diminished."