Erdoğan’s success in Syria awakens dormant alliances

Nonetheless, Erdoğan's actions in Syria will have consequences, one of which became evident on 8 January in Cairo, where the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece reinvigorated their 'Trilateral Cooperation Mechanism,' in which they work together to meet the shared challenges they face.

This mechanism was first launched in 2014 but had lain dormant for years. A principal challenge is the fight for Eastern Mediterranean gas, in which Türkiye and Israel also have both a stake and an interest.

Fight for hydrocarbons

Türkiye is trying to increase its geopolitical relevance by functioning as an energy hub, supplying gas to Europe. Now that Ukraine has stopped the flow of Russian gas through its territory to Eastern Europe, Türkiye's pipelines have become even more important.

In the rush for hydrocarbons, there have been accusations on all sides of encroachment in territorial waters, with Egypt, Greece and Cyprus accusing the Turks of straying beyond their geographical zone into theirs.

Egypt and Cyprus drew up their exclusive economic zones in 2003, and in 2020, Egypt and Greece inked theirs. These agreements let the three countries start drilling and exploring without the risk of running into problems or disputes. Their convening and agreeing meant Türkiye felt isolated.

Ankara has repeatedly tried to woo Cairo out of its alliance with Greece and Cyprus by suggesting a bilateral exclusive economic zone agreement that would give Egypt a larger slice of the continental shelf. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi—who came to power by defeating the kind of political Islam championed by Erdoğan—politely declined.

Casting an eye on Tripoli

Spurned, Türkiye turned its attention to Libya, which shed its long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. In his place, a precarious Islamist government has ruled from Tripoli—but not in western Libya, which has been controlled by army commander Khalifa Haftar for a decade.

Türkiye, Qatar, and Italy have supported the Tripoli-based government, but Haftar has had help from foreign backers, including Egypt, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Jordan, Iran, Sudan, and Israel, according to reports (some of which are disputed). 

Prior to al-Assad's departure, Cairo and Ankara had been softly rekindling relations after years of tension following el-Sisi's military overthrowing the democratically elected government of the Muslim Brotherhood, which Türkiye had supported. 

The two countries reinstated one another's ambassadors in 2023, opening the door once again to high-level diplomacy. In February and December 2024, Erdoğan visited Cairo, while in September 2024, el-Sisi visited Ankara. Their ministers have also met to discuss diverse topics.

Finding friends elsewhere

Türkiye's support for the Islamists who kicked Bashar al-Assad's regime out of power will have created shock and disquiet in Cairo, but the full impact on bilateral relations is not yet clear. It is likely that Egypt will want to better understand the composition and intentions of Syria's new rulers before making decisions. 

Given the 8 January summit and the reinvigorated Trilateral Cooperation Mechanism, it appears as if the sight of Islamists in Damascus has pushed Egypt back into the arms of its one-time Greek and Cypriot allies.

This month, the trio highlighted their common stance on issues pertaining to maritime zone delimitation based on the Law of the Sea and—in a thinly veiled warning to Ankara— urged regional actors to avoid "provocations".

If Erdoğan returns to his 'zero problems' policy regarding Türkiye's near neighbours, their concerns will be allayed. If the success of regime change in Syria emboldens him, there may be problems. The Med's gas is currently at a simmer. It may yet bubble over.