Why Egypt is taking its time to normalise relations with Syria

Almost a decade ago, hundreds died in Egypt and elsewhere in the battle to defeat political Islam. Indeed, Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took power from the Muslim Brotherhood (the original advocates of political Islam) in 2014 and has fought it mercilessly ever since, describing it as the "most dangerous underground organisation in the world".

The composition of Syria's new leadership suggests that political Islam (if that is what emerges in Damascus) may soon regain prominence on the Arab political stage. Egypt's government is keenly opposed to that happening and will not want to be seen to legitimise the ideology.

While fighting and outlawing the Brotherhood (and encouraging other Arab nations to do the same), el-Sisi was keen to court Egypt's Sufis and ultra-orthodox Salafists to downplay suggestions that he was in an all-out war against Islam. In short, he has already marked out his ground.

Revival in Syria

Fledgling Islamist rule in Syria threatens to upend his efforts over the past decade as regional and international capitals welcome the new rulers of Damascus. This spooks Cairo, where there are fears that HTS could offer a fresh brand of political Islam and even become a model for others to follow.

The Islamists in Syria—who have sought to reinvent themselves—aim to inspire support, including young Egyptians who may not be well-versed in the harm caused by the violent overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in mid-2013.

Furthermore, the revival of political Islam in Syria stokes security fears in Egypt, where there are tens of thousands of Syrian and Arab refugees, including jihadists who fought against the Assad regime. With that in mind, there is concern that conditions could be ripe for a resurgence in the fortunes of the Muslim Brotherhood and their like.

Cairo tightened restrictions on the entry of Syrians into Egypt after al-Assad's fall, adding a new requirement that visitors obtain security clearance from Egyptian consulates before boarding a flight. In addition to the other restrictions, this makes it increasingly difficult for Syrians to enter. 

At the same time, pro-government media in Egypt has been encouraging Syrians living in Egypt to return home to help rebuild their country. To that end, Egyptian ministers are thought to want to work with Syria's new rulers to repatriate Egyptian HTS members and members of other allied groups (most of whom are wanted by Egyptian authorities).

Al-Sharaa faces a difficult choice. If he agrees to help Egypt repatriate Syrians, he risks angering his Islamist coalition partners and undermining his own leadership. If he does not, he risks exacerbating ties with Cairo at such an early stage.

Libya and Türkiye 

Egypt also worries that political Islam may soon find a home in its troubled neighbour, Libya. Having lost its Syrian ally when al-Assad fled, analysts say Russia is now looking to eastern Libya (controlled by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army, or the LNA) as a new home for Moscow's Mediterranean military presence. Egypt knows that Libyan jihadists may object to that and use the Russians as a recruiting tool.

Egypt also distrusts Türkiye's regional intentions, even after a recent reconciliation between the two. It remembers Ankara's sponsorship of Islamist mercenaries moving from Syria to Libya six years ago to support the Türkiye-backed government in Tripoli. This feeds a lack of Egyptian trust. 

In the weeks since al-Assad's downfall, Türkiye's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has claimed credit for his country's role in bringing change to Syria. Some have interpreted that rhetoric as signalling new Turkish regional ambitions, including in oil-rich Libya. 

Türkiye is already helping Syria demarcate maritime boundaries. This follows a delimitation deal Türkiye signed with the western Libya government in November 2019, which came amid wider disputes over exploration rights between Ankara and other nations.

Egyptian unease about Türkiye's future intentions was perhaps behind a recent visit by Egypt's new intelligence chief, Hassan Rashad, to eastern Libya, where he met Haftar. 

Two days earlier, Egypt's foreign minister visited Chad amid reports that the Islamic State (IS) group was congregating in south-western Libya in preparation for an expansion. Any Islamist takeover of Libya would be a nightmare for Egypt, which has been funding the LNA in part to prevent that. 

Buffer against Iran

Al-Sharaa has firmly positioned himself and the HTS-led government of Syria as a buffer against Iran. This has helped him gain regional and international acceptance. If he can keep the Iranians out, Syria could once again become an integral part of the common Arab security framework.

It last played such a role more than 30 years ago, in 1991, when an international alliance went to war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Then, Syria sent troops and equipment to the US-led coalition. Prior to that, it played a key part in the Arab world's efforts to stand up to Israel.

Al-Sharaa may succeed in convincing Sunni regional states to invest in his administration and its plans, given that Iranian policies have addled Syria and the Middle East for decades. Such an argument would likely be of interest to Western capitals—and to Israel. 

Yet there remains the danger that Syria simply replaces one foreign sponsor (Iran) with another (Türkiye), given that Ankara's sway in Damascus is already noteworthy and only likely to increase. Regardless, Egypt will continue to eye events warily, for there is much at stake.