Events in Syria and Lebanon suggest maps could be redrawn

War is forcing a begrudging acknowledgement that these states are broken and cannot be pieced together without radical new thinking to accommodate today’s reality

Events in Syria and Lebanon suggest maps could be redrawn

With civil war reignited in Syria and much of Lebanon still smouldering from Hezbollah’s clash with Israel, the common thread across both is the inability of these two sovereign states to repair their fractured state structures.

Syria cannot return to its pre-2011 status. Meanwhile, rifts among Lebanese communities seem to widen with every conflict. Today, neither Damascus nor Beirut can claim to fully control its sovereign territory. In both, foreign states are embedded due in part to a lack of central authority.

In Syria, initial fears were of the Islamist Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies pushing into rural areas of Idlib and Aleppo in the northwest of the country. Concern centred on potential clashes with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and threats to the safety of Christians in Aleppo.

With ethnic and sectarian dimensions, the danger of recent HTS gain is clear, yet there are also ongoing battles between the Syrian army and the SDF, adding further complexity and prompting further external interference.

Broken over years

In Lebanon, the Israeli offensive has exacerbated the long-standing estrangement among sects—a divide that has deepened over decades, particularly since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, the July 2006 war, interstate fighting in 2008, and the 17 October 2019 uprising.

The Taif Agreement, signed in 1989, ended Lebanon’s civil war, which began in 1975, and allowed for sectarian power division. Most Lebanese Shiites aligned with the Amal Movement or with Hezbollah, a ‘duo’ that came to dominate politics. Lebanese Christians now oppose a return to this dynamic and advocate for a federal system that preserves the unique characteristics of each community against demographic erosion or conflicts that do not affect most Lebanese.

Syria cannot return to its pre-2011 status, while rifts among Lebanese communities seem to widen with every conflict

Many Lebanese politicians say a path out of the current catastrophic situation centres on "revitalising Taif" and ensuring adherence to its provisions. Even Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem recently said the party would operate "under the framework of Taif," which allocates official positions equally between Christians, Sunnis, and Shiites, and grants extensive powers to the Council of Ministers as a collective entity. 

However, this rhetoric lacks substance. Almost everything since 2005—including the 2014 commitment to neutrality in Arab conflicts, the dramatic expansion of Hezbollah's military power, and the obstruction of the investigation into the 2020 Beirut Port explosion—reveal these as empty statements. 

It has also fuelled proposals for alternatives, such as federalism, or granting Christians additional constitutional guarantees, in contrast to the impracticality of returning to a centralised state governed by entrenched political dynasties that have dominated Lebanese politics for decades.

Bitten off in chunks

In Syria, similar patterns emerge. The ruling Arab Socialist Baath Party arguably cannot resume its governance, given that the model had already failed before civil war in 2011 resulted in Syria's fragmentation into a collection of semi-autonomous entities, the most prominent of which is the SDF in the north and east. 

The common thread across Syria and Lebanon is the inability of these two sovereign states to repair their fractured state structures

Then there are developments in al-Suwayda Province, with its Druze majority, or the tense anticipation in Daraa since the Russian-brokered reconciliations. Yet revisiting Syria's political system remains taboo, even for those most opposed to President Bashar al-Assad. Blood would flow if anyone tried to dismantle the Kurdish self-rule regions, which exist as de facto autonomous areas.

Syria straddles two distinct political models: one Turkish, and the other Iraqi. Turkey is a centralised national state experiencing deep ethnic unrest since the Ottoman era, initially with Armenians, then later with Kurds demanding rights. Over the decades, Turkey's centralised and nationalist state has moved from rigid secularism to tempered political Islam, yet neither has resolved the Kurdish question. 

Kurds in Iraq, by contrast, have secured constitutionally recognised autonomy, after decades of conflict with the central government in Baghdad. Although relations between Baghdad and Erbil are far from loving, there is no existential threat facing the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, at least for now.

So, with profound fractures in Lebanon and Syria, it may be time to acknowledge that clinging to outdated remedies for such chronic ailments has not healed these states in any way, shape, or form. New frameworks for governance, partnership, and power-sharing may therefore be required. 

While the path to finding effective and appropriate end outcomes remains long and requires both humility and a recognition of the region's realities, broadly the notion of 'unity' may either need to be replaced with 'plurality within unity'… or else, with an amicable separation.

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