Hezbollah's arms and the rejection of the Lebanese state

Many want to disarm the Iran-backed militia, but the country's Shiite leaders keep blocking moves to do so. With US pressure and growing frustration within the country, is this a moment of reckoning?

Hezbollah's arms and the rejection of the Lebanese state

The increasingly pressing question of Hezbollah’s armed status is now formally on the agenda of Lebanon’s Council of Ministers, after US and Israeli pressure finally led the country’s new president and prime minister to come up with a plan. Yet this goes far beyond a response to international or domestic demands. The inability to date to disarm Hezbollah, which has steadily built an arsenal since the 1980s, exposes the deep failure of the Lebanese state project.

Hezbollah’s weaponry, much of it supplied by Iran, has at times been justified as a means of resisting Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, but in practice it has also functioned as a forward deterrent in defence of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with units supposedly capable of crossing into the Galilee should Iran come under Israeli attack. Above all, Hezbollah’s missiles and armed units have been used to impose a political trajectory aligned with the agenda of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ stretching from Beirut to Tehran via Damascus and Baghdad, with a satellite branch in Yemen.

Working in tandem

When the Israel-Hezbollah war ended on 24 November 2024, Israel had destroyed much of Hezbollah’s communications systems, combat capabilities, missile force, and leadership (both political and military), but the outcome was still not seen as a resounding defeat warranting any reassessment. Instead, Hezbollah conceded only that the fighting had ended, as it sought to shore up its political influence.

Fast forward to today, and despite some tactical differences between Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, its sole remaining political partner, led by Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, the two Shiite groups still work in tandem, forming a political Shiite bloc not dissimilar to Iraq’s Coordination Framework.

Both Amal and Hezbollah categorically reject the idea of forced disarmament or submitting to American demands and refuse to recognise the expanded obligations embedded in the latest ceasefire agreement, which imposes constraints beyond those outlined in UN Resolution 1701, which called for the withdrawal of all armed groups from Lebanese territory south of the Litani River and, further, for their full disarmament.

Paradoxically, rejecting the very foundations of statehood—from sovereignty and neutrality to administrative and fiscal reform—has become the ultimate expression of 'resistance.'

The 'Shiite Duo' now echo familiar refrains: that weapons are needed to defend Lebanon against threats, and that weapons are a strategic asset in any future confrontation. Yet the debate over Hezbollah's weapons is not merely a contest between a weakened domestic state and an assertive non-state actor, but about the entrenched role of weapons in Lebanese power dynamics.

Armed or nothing

Weapons represent the very essence of the role Hezbollah seeks to preserve for itself (and Amal) in Lebanon's institutions, society, public spaces, and media. Those who speak for Hezbollah argue that, without its arms, the Shiite community would be cast out of the "paradise" of the state and its institutions, and that these weapons give the community a position long denied since Lebanon's independence in 1943, essentially guaranteeing its rights.

The US is acutely aware of the tight link between Hezbollah's weapons and the question of Lebanese sovereignty, yet its primary focus is Israel's security—not Lebanon's stability. Herein lies the deeper paradox: whenever the idea of building a strong and capable state is invoked as a national imperative, the 'Shiite Duo' sounds supportive. Yet when it comes to the action, prevarication and delay are the tactics.

It is Hezbollah's peculiar misfortune that the US now demands what most Lebanese also want: the establishment of a capable, sovereign Lebanese state to reclaim its rightful place in the Arab and international community. And so, paradoxically, rejecting the very foundations of statehood—from sovereignty and neutrality to administrative and fiscal reform—has become the ultimate expression of 'resistance.'

By their logic, a state is no state at all unless it has a domestic arsenal entrusted to one group that it alone decides what constitutes the national interest, and dictates Lebanon's future.

font change