Could the 1974 Golan pact be a model for Gaza and Lebanon?

The key issues at the time included the depth of the buffer zone, the boundaries of demilitarised areas, the role of UN forces, and the fate of Palestinian factions in the Golan Heights. The discussions were intense, often stretching everyone's patience.

A classified transcript from a meeting on 19 May between al-Assad and Kissinger captures a pivotal moment. After two hours of talks that seemed to be going nowhere, al-Assad unexpectedly broke the deadlock. 

"I don't want to disrupt the agreement," he said. "I agree to the separation line." Astonished at this sudden and surprise concession, Kissinger requested a moment with his advisors, and in his excitement, he stumbled and fell as he moved towards them.

Read more: Hafez al-Assad "shocked" Kissinger by agreeing to separation line

Carving out a zone

Militarily, the agreement outlined a highly strategic division of the 1,860 sq. km Golan, two-thirds of which had been under Israeli occupation since 1967. Signed in late May 1974, it called for an 80km triple-layered buffer zone. 

The first segment—up to 10km wide, covering 235 sq. km along the Syrian side of the Golan—notably excluded the city of Quneitra, left as a powerful symbol of Syrian "liberation" and "Israeli destruction". In the second, also 10km wide, the Syrian army had 350 tanks and 3,000 lightly armed soldiers. In the third, between 10-20km wide, the Syrian army stationed up to 650 tanks, 4,500 soldiers, and limited artillery with a restricted range.

Ever since it was signed, the Golan has remained neutralised from direct military engagement by both Syrians and Palestinians, meaning that the importance of this agreement transcends its written terms.  The 1,250-strong UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), in cooperation with the Syrian military police and army, has been key to upholding this neutrality, monitoring the quantity of weaponry and preventing the infiltration of militants. As a result, the Golan front has remained calm.

Replicating the principles

The essence of this agreement is being considered for other Israeli borders, albeit with a modern twist. In Gaza, that is seen in Israeli General Giora Eiland's so-called "generals' plan," proposed to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in September 2024.

This envisions the displacement of residents from northern Gaza, the imposition of a blockade, and the conversion of the area into a "closed military zone" that would be fortified, emptied of militants, and cleared of tunnels, to reduce the risk of attack.

In southern Lebanon, aerial bombing and ground operations are carving out a 3km buffer. The idea is to follow this with a much wider demilitarised zone policed by a strengthened Lebanese army and a reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) south of the Litani River. 

Their mission would be to disarm what is left of Hezbollah and control the movement of militants across a fortified 30km zone across southern Lebanon. Again, this would be emptied of militants and cleared of tunnels, to reduce the risk of attack on Israel that has defined the conflict for years.

While these plans take shape, talks are underway to update the Golan disengagement agreement to prevent another 7 October 2023, but across the Syrian plateau. The Israeli army has recently expanded its buffer zone and launched ground incursions aimed at thwarting tunnel construction in response to the expanding presence of Hezbollah and Iranian militias in the Golan.

Read more: Why Russia is reasserting itself in Syria

Today's changing dynamics

A US-Russian agreement in 2018 sought to address this by moving Iranian militias 140km east of the Jordanian border (and away from the Golan separation line) and 85km closer to Damascus. It also called for the withdrawal of 1,050 fighters, 24 rocket launchers, and 145 units of Iranian weaponry and military technology from the area. 

In the 1970s, Kissinger was the central negotiator dealing with two authoritative leaders (al-Assad and Meir). Kissinger even managed to sideline Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who frequently visited Damascus to participate in the talks. 

Today, the landscape is radically different. Global dynamics have shifted, and so have leadership styles. Interlocutors lack the authority they once had in areas of war and peace, and negotiations often feature more non-state actors. 

In Washington and Tel Aviv, Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu seem disinterested in diplomacy—the latter because he is pursuing a long list of personal and existential objectives for Israel. Amidst all this, as ever, it is the civilians—whether in Gaza, or southern Lebanon, or Syria—who get caught in the crossfire.