They say there are no such things as permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. Still, the transience of Lebanese political friendships can often seem more fleeting than elsewhere.
This has been on show in recent days, when those who would never normally criticise Hezbollah or its benefactor Iran have done so publicly, raising eyebrows. Analysts have taken note, as has Hezbollah—or what remains of it. Critics of the group have likened it to rats abandoning a sinking ship.
Had Hezbollah a naval force, one suspects it would have been sunk by now. The group has been hit hard in every aspect, experiencing a particularly nightmarish fortnight across the end of September and early October.
Taking a pounding
On 17 September, Hezbollah’s pagers simultaneously exploded across Lebanon, maiming thousands and killing several. Moreover, it quite literally blew up the group’s main communications system. The next day, wireless radios Hezbollah used exploded in synch, injuring hundreds more.
The following day, an Israeli air strike targeted a building in Beirut’s southern suburbs with powerful bunker-busting bombs. It decimated most of the leadership of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Unit.
A week later, on 27 September, Hezbollah’s iconic Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was killed in another Israeli air strike at the group’s leadership headquarters in Haret Hreik, along with several senior leaders. On 3 October, another Israeli air strike killed Nasrallah’s successor, Hashem Safieddine, and 25 other senior leaders.
Hezbollah's decapitation had begun two months earlier, on 30 July, when an Israeli air strike killed Hezbollah's top military commander, Fouad Shukr, in the heart of Dahiyeh. He was Nasrallah's military advisor and the main link to Iran. In between, Israel has killed around 550 Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon and Beqaa.
Shattered illusions
Ever since Hezbollah began attacking Israel on 8 October 2023 in support of Hamas in Gaza, the group's Lebanese allies have maintained an uncomfortable silence. After all, Hezbollah was still projecting strength, and Israel's relative restraint while it focused on Gaza suggested to some that it was deterred from doing more.
Between 8 October 2023 and 30 July 2024, Hezbollah maintained an image of strength and dominance on the battlefield, successfully maintaining a strategic balance with Israel.
This balance kept the dynamics of the Lebanese political landscape largely in place for a year. Those supportive of Hezbollah remained supportive, while those opposed remained opposed. It was still regarded as the most powerful force in the country, and most felt that neither side would take things further.
As recent history has shown, they miscalculated. Hezbollah's drubbing has been both public and humiliating. It is now evident to all that Israel did not seek simply to repatriate its citizens to its northern border and deal a blow to Hezbollah but rather to eliminate Hezbollah entirely. In this, it has achieved substantial success.
