Will China’s ‘New Security Architecture’ deliver for the Middle East?

Beijing’s arm-round-the-shoulder approach to the region’s problems contrasts to Washington’s traditional gun-in-the-back stance. Middle East leaders seem to like it. Will they reap the rewards?

AlMajalla

Will China’s ‘New Security Architecture’ deliver for the Middle East?

In recent years, China has dipped its toes into the waters of the Middle East and has not been put off from having a swim—but is yet to dive in. On 21 September 2022, just over a year before the region changed so suddenly and fundamentally on 7 October 2023, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi addressed a forum and spoke about a New Security Architecture for the Middle East. This built upon Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative unveiled in April 2022 and highlighted how Beijing would help the Middle East unravel its problems in a non-interventionist manner.

Six months later, senior representatives of Saudi Arabia and Iran were shaking hands in Beijing after Chinese-facilitated talks ushered in a surprising détente between these two seemingly implacable regional foes. Buoyed by that success, China has put forward a four-step proposal for the political settlement of the Syrian issue and a three-point vision for implementing the ‘two-state solution’ between Palestine and Israel.

Mediation credentials

Today, the escalating Iran-Israel conflict challenges China’s newfound status as a Middle East peacemaker. China has cordial relations with both Tehran and Tel Aviv, but the extent of its influence in either capital is limited. Still, alongside its undoubted economic clout, it remains a geopolitical player, not least for its demonstrable ability to mediate. In July 2024, Wang Yi hosted 14 Palestinian factions—including Hamas and Fatah—who signed an historic reconciliation agreement known as the Beijing Declaration.

Bi Haibo, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, was less than subtle in his reference to the different Chinese and American approaches, saying: “When some other countries add oil to the fire, we try our best to bring peace.”

AFP
Mahmoud al-Aloul of Fatah, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Mussa Abu Marzuk of Hamas in China on July 24, 2024 after 14 Palestinian factions agreed to set up an "interim reconciliation government" in Gaza after the war.

As a growing power, China's vital economic and security interests are inextricably intertwined with the fate of the Middle East, a region to which it is no stranger—China has been doing business with Eurasia for almost 2,000 years.

China established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in 1990 and with Israel in 1992, while it was among the first countries to recognise the new Iranian government after the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

In the early 1990s, China became a net energy importer. Over the next three decades, it gobbled up the Middle East's oil and gas. Bilateral trade with the Gulf states and Iran in 2023 stood at over $300bn, a 48% increase from pre-Covid levels. Despite the massive expansion of renewable energy capacity, China will remain the world's largest fossil fuel importer for the foreseeable future. A fifth of its carbon imports come from Saudi Arabia.

Economic relations go deeper than trade in commodities. Over the past decade, China has become the region's largest infrastructure investor. It builds, finances, and manages ports, roads, industrial parks, free trade zones, and even new cities.

It has also become a multi-dimensional digital infrastructure provider, from the 5G/5.5G networks, submarine cables, surveillance technologies, cloud services, satellite imagery, and joint space exploration programmes. China aims to support the national development visions of regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt, most notably the former's Vision 2030. China is also the largest foreign direct investor in the region's renewable energy capacity.

Alongside its economic clout, China remains a geopolitical player, not least for its demonstrable ability to mediate

Maritime power

While China's economic and military growth is not in doubt, it is yet to rival the United States as a global maritime power able to project strength to hotspots around the world. For decades, the US military has been the security guarantor of global maritime shipping. Under this umbrella, China has expanded its commercial activities without having to pay for the military protection its trade has been afforded.

When the Houthis began attacking vessels in the Red Sea late last year, it was US ships—not Chinese—that were sent to patrol the waters to ensure safe passage of merchant shipping through a busy strait. This US security blanket protecting maritime trade is now a Chinese vulnerability, because in any direct US-China conflict, ships bringing oil and supplies to China may be blocked at strategic chokepoints like the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, or Bab al-Mandab Strait.

This has been on Chinese minds when it comes to infrastructure-building initiatives across the region and the provision of alternatives to ensure the free flow of China's vital energy interests.

For instance, China has opened its first overseas deep-water dual-purpose port in Djibouti, close to Bab al-Mandab. Along the Arabian Gulf, where 45% of Chinese oil trade flows, China wants another such port besides this vital waterway.

China's pursuit of naval security alternatives along the Arabian Peninsula is motivated by a defensive instinct, not to project power. It knows that America would use its naval advantage to try to stifle China.

China's New Architecture appeals to Middle Eastern leaders tired of America's history of imposing regime change

Facilitating dialogue

This is where Chinese mediation comes in. Beijing insists that the Middle East's security challenges must be resolved by the countries of the Middle East in ways that suit the region's history, culture, traditions, and reality.

"We believe the people of the Middle East are the masters of the Middle East," said Wang. "There is never a power vacuum, and no need for patriarchy from outside." This is China's implicit rejection of America's history of imposing regime change, invoking wars, and causing religious radicalisation.

China's New Architecture is built on a principle of non-interventionism and insists that economic development is a fundamental human right, since this brings security. America's focus, by contrast, has always been the promotion of liberal democracy. The New Architecture appeals to Middle Eastern leaders who want to ensure peace and longevity. In this way, China and the region can find common ground.

Faced with a confrontation between Israel and Iran, China has stressed that a two-state solution could be the ultimate prompt for peace in the Middle East. Devoid of Palestinian statehood, regional conflicts will simply continue to fester.

Israel may soon attack Iran's strategic assets, whether energy, military, or nuclear. Iran knows that it now has a strong incentive to expedite its nuclear weapons programme. This would act as a strategic deterrent, given that Israel is already a nuclear power. Some of the world's foremost geopolitical thinkers suggest Iran may be closer to achieving its aim than most people realise. Following Israel's dismantling of its proxy network, the incentive for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon now outweighs the costs of doing so, given that the regime's survival is at stake.

Both China and the US don't want Iran to have nuclear weapons, but Beijing favours a carrot approach to Washington's stick.

Rarely do Chinese and American interests align, but neither want Iran to possess nuclear weapons and both have sought to prevent it. Whereas Washington has used a stick approach, Beijing has preferred a carrot.

In 2022, when China inked the 25-year multi-billion dollar investment plan with Iran, it conditioned the investment scheme on restoring the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) signed in 2015. This eased Western sanctions in return for Iran winding down its nuclear programme and opening its sites up to inspections to verify compliance.

Since the JCPOA was stalled, Chinese investments in Iran have been minimal. Those investments are now sorely needed, given that China has only been buying a modest amount of oil from Iran.

The Islamic Republic's new President Masoud Pezeshkian has already shown a willingness to re-open nuclear negotiations with the US. China, meanwhile, could ensure its own vital energy interests by averting a possible oil shock caused by direct Israeli-Iranian aggression.

Some analysts think China would back Iran unconditionally in the event, just as the US has always backed Israel, but this would not be in China's interest, which ultimately lies in unifying and strengthening the Middle East.

Having warmed relations between the big Sunni and Shiite superpowers and brought the Palestinian factions together for the first time in years, China will be hopeful that its diplomacy in the Middle East can have yet more future success.

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