How Trump and Harris compare on Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran

The easiest way to understand where there is common ground between the two candidates in the US presidential election toward the ‘triumvirate’ of Middle Eastern powers – Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran – is the usage of three words. They are: ally, partner, and foe. Whoever wins November’s election will inherit those labels, applied to those nations in that order.

The next president will take office in January and will be faced with the overarching interests and longstanding political, security and economic relations that have already shaped how those relations have developed. But whoever takes office in 2025 will also have vital choices to make at a time of great geopolitical change.

This article examines each country to see how and why its status with Washington has developed and considers what may lie ahead when a new White House emerges in a turbulent world.

Israel – ally

Washington and Tel Aviv have no formal defence treaty but have effectively been close allies for decades. The US has channelled over $150bn of military aid to Israel, even without a formal accord. And the alliance swiftly kicked into action after the Hamas attacks of 7 October. Since then, all those billions of dollars of military aid have flowed into Israel throughout its subsequent war on Gaza and, now, its assault on Lebanon.

The alliance was once anchored in the strategic logic of the Cold War, as were similar ones with Turkey and Iran before its Islamic revolution. However, in the current world, the close ties between the US and Israel have a more straightforward motivation. They are anchored in a strong majoritarian political commitment to unstinting support for Israel’s security in the US body politic, Congress, and much of the media.

Nonetheless, there may be signs of change. A younger generation is arising in the US, and it is asking serious questions about the absolute American commitment to Israel. This new voice is louder among young members of the Democratic Party, although it will probably need another decade or two to begin to have a real political impact.

Read more: AIPAC contends with an increasingly critical American left

Saudi Arabia – partner

The US partnership with Saudi Arabia is even older, anchored in a strategically pivotal meeting between President Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz in 1945. When the US and Saudi Arabia worked together to combat Soviet power, it had some elements of an alliance. The US rolled out the Carter Doctrine, named after the president who helped shield Washington’s friend in the Arab world from potential threats. Later, Washington sent troops to push Saddam out of Kuwait and away from Saudi Arabia’s oil fields.

But the US went on to become a net energy exporter, and without the strong domestic support that Israel enjoys in America, Washington’s closeness with Riyadh slipped. For example, when Saudi oil fields came under attack in 2019 or when the Iranian-backed Houthi militias maintained a barrage of missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia, the US did little.

Nonetheless, both Republican and Democratic administrations of recent years recognise that Saudi Arabia is a key US partner on several levels. The list is significant, from managing global energy markets and a smooth energy transition to combatting religious extremism and terrorism.

It also includes maintaining a stable global economy and the primacy of the US dollar, managing competition with China, containing Iran and its proxies, and leading a moderate Arab and Middle Eastern block of countries. These are the nations which are encouraging de-escalation in the Arab Israeli conflict and normalisation with Israel in the context of a two-state solution to the Palestinian crisis.

Importantly, a mutual defence treaty between the US and Saudi Arabia will be back on the table, whichever administration takes control of the White House. Both Trump and Harris are expected to pursue a tripartite deal between the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Part of it – on the insistence of Saudi Arabia – would include some form of formal agreement on defence. That is the point at which the relationship between the Kingdom and the US could move from being a partnership to an alliance.

Iran – foe

Iran and the US have been foes for 45 years, ever since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. This hostility has been a consistent choice in Tehran rather than Washington. The US statesman Henry Kissinger noted in the past that as far as national interests are concerned, the US and Iran should be natural allies.

But for the Iranian leadership, the hostility is anchored in the memories of the US-sponsored coup to oust Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953, when he was prime minister. Later came other serious issues, including US support for Saddam in Iran’s war with Iraq, US sanctions against Iran and backing for Israel for the duration of the Islamic Republic’s life.

For Americans, the hostility is anchored in the hostage crisis of 1979 to 1981. It also reflects Iranian support for extremist and terrorist groups regionally and internationally and has been exacerbated since 2023 by the coordinated attacks on Israel by Iran’s proxy network in the Middle East. More recently, there have been reports of Iranian involvement in assassination plots against Donald Trump. US public opinion, the media, the Congress, and both Washington parties have a strong and deep anti-Iran stance.

Nuanced approaches

Within the parameters of ally, partner, and foe, there is no doubt that Trump or Harris would bring their own approach and variation of policies to relations with these countries. For both potential presidents, there will be a range of important factors at work.

First, domestic policy will greatly outweigh foreign policy as it draws immediate policy priorities. This reflects the people's will as expressed in opinion polls and voting patterns. Within their global foreign policy agendas, Asia and Europe will remain the highest priorities, while the Middle East will come lower down the agenda.

Middle East policy will not necessarily receive the sustained presidential and strategic attention that it might deserve, rather it will be dealt with fitfully and often derivatively, while other issues and regions determine the main outlines of policy.

Either president will have to deal with whatever Middle East they are faced with when they take office, and whatever developments emanate from there in the ensuing months and years.

As we’ve seen in the past year, it is Hamas and Israel – or Iran and Israel – that have determined the course of events. The US administration has been largely ineffective and has generally been reacting to events, the course of which has been decided in the region. Even before that, it was Saudi Arabia and Iran—with some assistance from China—who reset their relations in 2024, and Turkey did so with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and most recently Egypt.

Netanyahu in driver's seat

Between now and January 2025, it is Benjamin Netanyahu who is in the driver’s seat to determine what type of Middle East the next president will face on taking office. Will it be a region of escalating war in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and maybe with Iran? Or will it be one in which postwar arrangements are being prepared for Gaza, the West Bank has returned to calm, a ceasefire and security arrangements have been agreed with Lebanon, and a war with Iran has been averted?

The next president will have a primary say in whether peace proposals backed by the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel will move forward since it depends on Tel Aviv committing to a two-state solution – with an independent Palestine – to achieve a lasting settlement. Netanyahu has consistently rejected this proposition.

And the Israeli prime minister will loom large over Washington politics even after January. It was Netanyahu, rather than a US president, who received over 50 standing ovations in Congress.

Amid all these constraints on Washington’s international political leeway, important differences remain between Trump and Harris. Al Majalla now looks at what each White House would look like, depending on which of them becomes president early next year.

Trump

For Trump, the contrast between friend and foe is simple and stark. In the Middle East, he has been very clear that he will be very supportive of Israel and, indeed, its right-wing government. He is very dismissive of Palestinian rights. He will be very supportive of Saudi Arabia. Trump will back deep economic ties and agreements over high-tech industries and the supply of arms.

For Iran, a Trump presidency will mean a return to maximum economic pressure. He will remind Iran that he will not hesitate to use force if Tehran crosses him. He did so when, during his first presidency, the US assassinated the leader of Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp, General Qasim Suleimani. And the fact that Trump has been briefed that Iran may have been involved in the assassination attempts against him is likely to make him all the more bellicose.

Nonetheless, any new Trump administration will have a different country as its overarching foreign policy concern: China. Trump does not consider Russia under Vladimir Putin a foe. He would prefer to settle the war in Ukraine, probably largely on Russian terms, and rebuild relations with Moscow.

He has also said publicly that he is unhappy with the extensive use of economic sanctions, as they weaken the standing of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Trump has specifically questioned why the US is maintaining economic sanctions against Russia and Iran.

Trump is transactional at heart and sees himself as a dealmaker. He will up the pressure on Iran and make threats, but if Tehran wants to make a deal with him, he will probably engage.

Harris

A Harris administration will probably bring a more nuanced approach to relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. It will lack the black-and-white view Trump is prone to take. Harris has voiced strong support for Israel and will continue to do so. But she is likely to temper it with criticism of Israel’s overaggressive actions in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon and will try to pressure the Israelis – probably unsuccessfully – to return to negotiations over a two-state solution.