Will Iran-backed militias cower from Israel's military might?

The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has sent shockwaves throughout the region

Ewan White

Iran-backed militias carefully weigh their next moves after Israel's stunning success against Hezbollah. For now, they may opt for self-preservation as they go through their most vulnerable time.

Will Iran-backed militias cower from Israel's military might?

Lina Khatib

last update on 30 Sep 2024

Hezbollah never thought the day would come when its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in a multipronged campaign by Israel targeting Hezbollah’s security and military capabilities.

Much to the surprise of many observers, Nasrallah was killed in the heart of Beirut’s southern suburb on 27 September, where he was holding an underground. Israel made a big deal of announcing that his targeting was based on verified field information. This indicates a high level of infiltration of Hezbollah through not just technology but also human intelligence.

Israel managed to reach Nasrallah’s bunker, which was several floors below the ground, which highlights the immense capability of its air power. Perhaps more crucially, Israel had taken the decision to eliminate Nasrallah after almost two decades of perceived equilibrium in the relationship between Israel and Hezbollah. But it seems that the Lebanese militant group had taken that status quo for granted while vastly overestimating its own strength and underestimating the extent to which Israel would go after it.

Nasrallah’s killing is, therefore, about more than the elimination of a leader. It reveals the level of Hezbollah’s weakness and miscalculations in the face of Israel, having been dealt a swift series of military, security, and psychological blows from which the group will not recover.

It has also instilled panic within Iran’s network of proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. That Israel managed to humiliate Hezbollah so greatly means that other Iran-backed groups will now be rethinking their own status and next steps. With the first anniversary of Hamas’s 7 October assault on Israel looming, Iran's proxies may choose to prioritise self-preservation over a flagrant display of power in support of Hamas.

AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / AFP — Iraqi Shiite pilgrims arriving from Iran rest in a tent across from portraits of slain Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr (L) and slain Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh on their way to Karbala.

Inward shift

It is plausible that Iran-backed groups were planning a symbolic display of solidarity with Hamas to commemorate the passing of one year since its unprecedented attack on Israel. But after the disarray caused by the communication device attacks on Hezbollah members, those groups began shifting their resources inwards instead. They reason that if Hezbollah—the crown jewel of Iran's "axis of resistance"—could be infiltrated and exposed, then other entities in Iran’s network which are not as strong as Hezbollah could be even more vulnerable.

This has led to growing panic among the groups regarding their own security and standing, which has only peaked following the killing of Nasrallah. Iran-backed militias are concerned about whether Israel could be planning to widen the scope of its targets once it is satisfied with the results of the campaign in Lebanon.

Hezbollah has a significant presence in Syria, and it is likely that Israel will shift its attention there afterwards. In Yemen, Hezbollah has been the Houthis’ main mentor, having more influence over the group than the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.

In Iraq, Iran has been trying to restore unity among its militias. Trust among Iraqi Shiite actors was already eroded after the discovery of an Iran-backed spy network operating within the Iraqi prime minister’s office in Baghdad and targeting politicians who Iran’s Iraqi allies consider to be opponents or competitors.

What happened in Lebanon only adds to the prevailing mistrust. A similar concern about compromised security and moles is shared across Iran’s other proxies in the region.

Iran's proxies may choose to prioritise self-preservation over a flagrant display of power in support of Hamas

Paranoia sets in

In addition to the security concerns, paranoia could affect the ability of these groups to communicate with one another, let alone trust one another. Iran's proxies have never operated as part of one theatre of war despite their and Iran's claims of constituting a formidable bloc against Israel and the US.

But the groups do support one another tactically. Some of the groups within Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) have facilitated Hezbollah's and Hamas's access to Iranian funding, with Iraqi members frequently showing up in Beirut carrying suitcases of cash sent by Tehran.

They have also sometimes helped Hezbollah acquire equipment by being part of the global supply chain of entities involved in the purchase and transport of goods. It is likely that members of Iran-backed groups other than Hezbollah played a role in purchasing the exploding communication devices as part of Hezbollah's attempt to cover up its tracks. The attacks in Lebanon cast doubt on the integrity of inter-group cooperation. Nasrallah also played the role of godfather to Iran-backed militias. His absence adds to the increasing lack of cohesion between the groups.

Infiltration risk

Iran and its proxies should have seen the risk coming. Iran often boasts about the breadth of its influence in the Middle East because of the geographical distribution of its proxies. And yet, the larger Iran's network became, the greater its exposure to infiltration.

For years, before the emergence of the PMF and the Houthis, Hezbollah maintained a tight grip on its membership. But with those groups forming, alongside myriad Shiite groups that appeared in Syria throughout the course of the Syrian conflict, Iran summoned Hezbollah—being the oldest and most experienced of the groups—to build the capacity of those newcomers and continue to mentor them.

The New York Times — Iranian-backed militias in Syria are conducting training in Hezbollah camps.

While the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) supported Hezbollah in this mission, over the years, both the IRGC's and Hezbollah's oversight loosened as the mentees multiplied. The result was that a number of people from within those Iran-backed groups were able to work as double agents for Israel or the US without being easily detected.

The IRGC and Hezbollah showed zero tolerance towards internal dissent, with the IRGC not hesitating to eliminate any members of its proxies who did not toe its line regardless of their seniority, and Hezbollah making a case of punishing harshly those who it discovered were betraying it.

But this still did not fully protect the groups from the presence of infiltrators. The exploding communication devices and Nasrallah's killing indicate the possibility of the existence of infiltrators at a high level, including those who facilitated the interception of the communication devices' supply chain.

The IRGC and Iran's proxies have been doing business with a large number of profiteers who got involved in the Syrian conflict and in the context of the fight against the Islamic State terrorist organization in both Syria and Iraq. Iran and its proxies engaged with such profiteers because they were useful for generating funds through smuggling and other illicit activities like the Captagon drug trade.

Some of those profiteers were private actors looking to make money, while others were linked with state entities in Syria and Iraq, such as customs officials and members of the Syrian Armed Forces like the Fourth Division. Unlike Hezbollah and the IRGC's core members, who observe high levels of discipline, profiteers can be lax about security and are not known for their honesty, even towards actors with which they collaborate.

Nasrallah played the role of godfather to Iran-backed militias. His absence adds to the increasing lack of cohesion between the groups.

Profiteers

As Iran's and Hezbollah's involvement in Syria grew, they became increasingly entangled in the operations of those profiteers who were sometimes deployed to act as fronts for the acquisition of foreign goods. But neither the goods nor the profiteers were always trustworthy.

At the end of May 2024, Syria.tv published an investigation showing that spying devices were found in consignments of solar panels that had arrived in Syria through Latakia Port, as well as the land border with Lebanon. The purchase was facilitated by the Fourth Division of the Syrian Army and by a relative of President Bashar al-Assad. The spying devices were discovered to be linked to Israel and intended for spying on the IRGC and Iran's proxies in Syria. But the killing of Nasrallah shows that infiltration is at a level neither anticipated nor detected by Iran-backed groups.

Instead of planning a 7 October celebration, Iran's proxies are now going to be busy reviewing incidents like the above as they try to determine if their security is breached. Nasrallah's killing will have a ripple effect limiting the ability of Iran's proxies to act and coordinate. Israel's campaign in Lebanon is, therefore, serving as a deterrent to all groups in Iran's network of proxies, which have transformed from a self-styled "axis of resistance" into an axis of paranoia.

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