Politics

Nine years after Russian intervention, where does Syria stand?

Russia's intervention on 30 September 2015 won it a warm water port on the Mediterranean, but the political solution that was meant to follow the fighting has not yet materialised

AFP

Russian President Vladimir Putin (2nd-R) and his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad (2nd-L) preside over a military parade in the Russian air base in Hmeimim in the northwestern Syrian province of Latakia. December 11, 2017.

Nine years after Russian intervention, where does Syria stand?

Samer Elias

last update on 30 Sep 2024

On 30 September 2015, Russia launched a military intervention in Syria after a request by the Damascus regime in its fight against the Syrian opposition, which proved to be the decisive factor in a civil war that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was struggling to win. The intervention transformed Syria into a live training ground for tens of thousands of Russian soldiers, who used it to test hundreds of weapons. While the battlefield was won, Russia’s political and economic hopes for Syria have yet to transpire nine years later.

Although Russia successfully bombed anti-Assad forces, it could not restore the Syrian regime's legitimacy in the eyes of the world. Since then, its subsequent invasion of Ukraine has all but obliterated Moscow’s credibility.

In recent years, the Syrian conflict has moved from a boil to a simmer. Since 2019, the US presence has dwindled to a limited force in the resource-rich northeast, but US sanctions—notably the Caesar Act—have stymied a Syrian economic revival, giving Washington a role in any future political settlement.

Success at risk

Back in 2015, Russia successfully shifted the balance of power in favour of al-Assad at his most crucial time. Diplomatically, Moscow successfully undermined the UN-backed Geneva peace process and—alongside Turkey and Iran—moved mediation for the Syria conflict to other tracks, notably the Astana and Sochi tracks. It deftly navigated regional powers’ conflicting interests and capitalised on divisions in the Syrian opposition, making Moscow a big player in any future political settlement. But this success is now at risk for several reasons.

The Syrian economy has sunk further, Damascus remains unable to control vast swathes of its territory, al-Assad is reluctant to implement reforms that would rehabilitate Syria's image, and the diplomatic process for an inclusive Syria has ground to a halt. Having succeeded in preventing the fall of the Syrian regime, Russia's diplomats demonstrated tactical ingenuity in negotiations, framing their efforts under the priority of combating terrorist groups, particularly Islamic State (IS).

AFP — Russian soldiers stand aboard a ship at the Russian naval base in the Syrian Mediterranean port of Tartus on September 26, 2019.

Spoils of war

Russia locked in its wins with a 2017 legal agreement giving Moscow exclusive use of the Tartus naval base on Syria's Mediterranean coast free of charge for 49 years, with Russian sovereign jurisdiction over the base. Finally, Tartus is Russia's longed-for warm-water port, a goal since the time of the Tsars.

About 60km north of the Tartus base, Russia signed another agreement with Damascus to establish the Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia, also on Syria's Mediterranean coast. This treaty gives Russia free use of the base with no time limit. It is Russia's first sizeable foreign military base since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is both practical and symbolic, solidifying Russia's military presence in Syria and advancing its geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East.

Official statistics report that 184 Russian military personnel have been killed in Syria from 2015-23, but this excludes Wagner losses. Up to 300 Russian mercenaries were killed in a single day during an attack on an oil field near Deir ez-Zor in 2018. Moscow will see these casualty numbers as small—more than 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, and more than 70,000 have been killed in Ukraine, according to data analysis from the BBC last week.

In 2020, five years after Russia intervened in Syria, the then-defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, wrote in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper that it was necessary to preserve the Syrian state and to defeat IS. He added that Russian air support let the Syrian government retake 1,024 villages, bringing 88% of Syria under government control (although independent assessments suggest that Damascus controls much less than this).

Prior to Russia's intervention, 70% of Syrian territory was outside the control of Damascus, said Shoigu, but Russian aircraft conducted 44,000 combat sorties, killing 133,000 terrorists, including 4,500 Russian-speaking fighters.

Although Russia successfully bombed anti-Assad forces, it could not restore the Syrian regime's legitimacy in the eyes of the world

Weapons testing ground

The war in Syria also served as a testing ground for Russian weaponry. In May 2021, nine months before he invaded Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin boasted about the country's advanced long-range missiles, rocket launchers, and guided bombs, saying their capabilities had been verified in combat in Syria.

Russia notably launched ballistic missiles from the Caspian Sea to strike what it identified as terrorist positions within Syria. Shoigu said Russia had tested more than 320 different models in Syria, with helicopter weapon systems enjoying significant development jumps as a result.

Syria has also been a training ground for Russian military personnel. By August 2018, Moscow reported that more than 63,000 soldiers, including 25,738 officers, 434 generals, and 4,329 specialists, had gained combat experience in Syria.

In June 2018, when asked about the Syrian intervention, Putin said it had sharpened Russia's teeth, describing it as "an unparalleled mechanism for enhancing our military capabilities, far beyond what any military exercise can offer".

Mission accomplished?

Russia was eager to declare a military victory in Syria and shift toward a political solution. In 2016, Putin reduced the Russian forces in Syria, returning half the planes at Latakia to their permanent deployment stations elsewhere. In late 2017, he announced the withdrawal of most Russian military forces from Syria, declaring victory over IS.

AFP — Soldiers of a Russian military convoy and their US counterparts exchange greetings as their patrol routes intersect in an oil field near Syria's al-Qahtaniyah town on October 8, 2022.

"In about two years, the Russian armed forces, in cooperation with the Syrian army, have largely eliminated international terrorists," he said, adding that "The goal of combating armed criminals in Syria, which required large-scale military intervention, has been fully achieved with great success." He said that Syria "has been preserved as an independent and sovereign state" but warned that "if terrorists reappear, we will strike with unprecedented force".

In October 2019, Putin declared the end of "large-scale" hostilities in Syria, stressing the need to focus on working towards a political solution, saying: "A final solution cannot be achieved through military operations alone. For this reason, we must now focus on political settlement, which we are pursuing with determination."

No alternative strategy

That never arrived, and today, Russia risks losing its grip on Syria, which is experiencing an economic and humanitarian crisis amidst societal disintegration. Moscow lacks an alternative strategy to achieve a political agreement but maintains its military presence and support for the Syrian regime.

With its war in Ukraine consuming much of Russia's diplomatic energy, Moscow feels pressured to reconsider its stance on Syria or pursue a settlement. It might be a wasted effort if it did since Damascus and Tehran seem unwilling to compromise.

Al-Assad will feel safe, given that Syrian opposition forces lack any kind of unified leadership or platform of common positions. They have yet to develop a cohesive political vision for a post-Assad Syria. Nine years on, Russia cannot indefinitely manage the contradictions within the Syrian conflict, nor can it continue to provide unconditional support to al-Assad, who returned to the Arab League in May last year.

Putin said Syria had sharpened Russia's teeth, describing it as "an unparalleled mechanism for enhancing our military capabilities"

Key Arab and regional countries are increasingly open to re-establishing relations with Damascus, and while Russia remains the main obstacle to a balanced settlement of the Syrian crisis, it also holds the key to a resolution.

Russia has consistently upheld certain principles in the Syrian context—namely, dialogue without preconditions, the facilitation of elections, and the drafting of a new constitution. Yet, as Putin stated, its top strategic priority is preserving its interests there.

"We are not worried about Bashar al-Assad in Syria," Putin said in December 2012. "We are worried about what is happening there... and we realise that this family has been in power for 40 years, and there is no doubt that changes are inevitable."

He reiterated that position in June 2017, during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, stating that Russia's primary goal is to protect the institutions of the Syrian state, not al-Assad, as he did not wish for Syria to fail like Libya, Somalia, or Afghanistan.

Fast-forward to 2024, and it is not clear if his wish came true.

+ / -