Sweida must be a warning, not a blueprint for northeast Syria

General mobilisation

As political tensions escalate, tribal leaders opposed to the SDF have begun declaring a state of general mobilisation. Leading the charge is Sheikh Faraj al-Hamoud al-Salama of the Al-Nasser tribe, who represents the influential Boushaaban alliance.

Tribes such as Al-Saab, Al-Boubna, and Al-Boujaber have followed suit, emphasising tribal unity and expressing a shared determination to fight until the SDF is defeated. Calls for mobilisation have even extended beyond the northeast, with several sub-clans of the Al-Bou Shaaban in the Turkish-controlled 'Peace Spring' zone declaring their readiness to join the campaign.

Despite increasingly inflammatory rhetoric from tribal leaders, Damascus has remained conspicuously silent—heightening the risk of a major confrontation in northeast Syria. This silence, both during the Sweida offensive and now, has played a key role in enabling tribal mobilisation. In Sweida, the government stood by for nearly two days, allowing tribal leaders to mobilise and swiftly deploy tens of thousands of fighters from across the country.

When Damascus eventually intervened—under mounting international pressure—officials stopped short of condemning the attack. Some even praised the tribes' actions, reinforcing their sense of legitimacy. By framing tribal fighters as defenders of the emerging state—as some officials have suggested—Damascus risks encouraging further mobilisation elsewhere. This dynamic is already visible in the northeast, where tribal leaders are rallying under the banner of 'liberating  al-Jazira under Syria's umbrella.'

If clashes erupt between tribal forces and the SDF, a repeat of the Sweida playbook is not only possible but likely. In such a scenario, Damascus may initially adopt a hands-off approach, later stepping in to restore order by deploying troops to areas of active fighting—particularly in Arab-majority regions. While framed as a peacekeeping mission, such intervention would ultimately serve the government's interests by reestablishing a foothold and expanding its authority in territories currently outside its control.

Dangerous gamble

For some within the government, such infighting may even be viewed as an opportunity. The more widespread the clashes, the greater the potential for Damascus to reclaim territory. Escalating violence could also serve to weaken the SDF's negotiating position, especially amid stalled political talks.

However, expanding control through tribal forces is a dangerously short-sighted strategy. A tribal offensive— especially if perceived as state-sanctioned—would likely destroy any remaining prospects for dialogue with the Autonomous Administration, deepen Kurdish mistrust, and inflame already fragile Arab-Kurdish relations.

Given the SDF's considerable military capacity, any tribal offensive is unlikely to yield quick results. A prolonged conflict in the north-east would risk unravelling existing security arrangements, triggering mass displacement, and creating openings for extremist groups like the Islamic State (IS) to regroup and resurge. Continued instability would also deter foreign investment and humanitarian aid—both vital to Syria's recovery.

As the warning signs grow increasingly undeniable, the Syrian government now faces another defining test: it can either allow tribal mobilisation to spiral into open conflict or reassert its leadership through de-escalation and inclusive dialogue.

The government's failure to prevent the violence in Sweida must not only be remembered, but it must serve as a warning. In this moment of mounting danger, Damascus's silence in the face of tribal mobilisation risks being seen as complicity. The government must act swiftly and decisively to avert further bloodshed

True leadership now requires not just strength, but vision, restraint, and the political maturity to prevent a war that no one can win.