Politics

Between hope and doubt: the making of Syria’s new Parliament

While sham elections have been seen before, a genuinely representative elected legislature has not. The opportunity is huge, and early signs are good, but there are still far too many questions.

Reuters

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa with Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra and others in Damascus on 21 December 2024. They are now trying to create a parliament.

Between hope and doubt: the making of Syria’s new Parliament

Haid Haid

last update on 13 Jul 2025

The recent formation of a Supreme Committee to establish a legislative body marks a significant development in Syria’s political transition. After more than a decade of war, fragmentation, and stalled peace efforts, the prospect of reviving parliamentary life offers both a critical turning point and a glimmer of hope.

The initiative demonstrates modest but noteworthy improvements over previous transitional efforts. It includes a more diverse committee, more consultative phases, mechanisms to revise procedures and contest decisions, and an effort to increase women’s participation. Yet despite the promising elements, there are structural ambiguities, procedural gaps, and no robust safeguards.

Concerns persist around how electoral sub-committees will be selected, who will make the decisions, what criteria will their decisions be based on, how representation quotas will be enforced, and how the process will be independently monitored to ensure fairness and legitimacy. Unless there is genuine openness and transparency, the process risks becoming yet another top-down exercise that will reinforce the very public cynicism it seeks to overcome.

Blueprint for selection

At the centre of this political experiment is the Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections, established under Presidential Decree No. 66. This 11-member body is responsible for designing and overseeing the process to select a new 150-member legislative assembly. Of these, two-thirds will be chosen through a committee-led electoral process, while the remaining one-third will be appointed directly by the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Louai Beshara/AFP — Syria's interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa unveils the new national emblem on 3 July 2025. Questions remain over how the country's representatives will be chosen.

Structurally, the process will unfold in two phases. First, the Supreme Committee will form two-member electoral subcommittees at the provincial level. A central subcommittee will oversee operations at the governorate level, while the remaining subcommittees will work at the district level to manage local implementation.

Each district-level subcommittee will select up to 50 individuals to form electoral bodies within their respective areas. These electoral bodies will have the authority to nominate and elect the candidates to represent their districts in the new parliament. Seat distribution at both governorate and district levels will be based on population figures from the 2010 census. The selections are due by 22 August.

Cautious progress

The High Committee’s composition and relatively participatory approach appear to be a step forward compared to previous transitional bodies, in that it moves away from a single dominant actor—Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—that defined earlier initiatives.

The current 11-member committee features a more diverse makeup: seven members formerly affiliated with the formal opposition, two linked to the former HTS-led Salvation Government, and two independent civic actors. While the inclusion of two women remains far from equitable, it represents a modest step toward.

How will electoral sub-committees be selected, who will make the decisions and based on what criteria, how will representation quotas be enforced, and how the process will be independently monitored?

The committee, which wants to ensure at least 20% female participation, appears to have adopted a more transparent and consultative stance than many of its predecessors, holding public forums and provincial outreach meetings to present its proposed electoral framework and solicit input, stressing that the draft electoral law is provisional and open to public revision.

Procedural safeguards have also been introduced. These include a designated period for submitting objections related to the selection and nomination of electoral body members, as well as the formation of independent appeals committees. But beneath the surface, the process is clouded with ambiguities.

Selection questions

Despite the committee's public outreach efforts, the Supreme Committee has yet to clarify several critical aspects, not least the selection of the two-member electoral subcommittees. While these subcommittees will supposedly be neutral and thoroughly vetted, how their members are chosen is still a mystery. Who selects them? How are they nominated? How will their independence be assessed?

The small size of these two-member subcommittees is also a point of concern. Given the breadth of their responsibilities—reviewing candidates and consulting with local communities—limiting membership to two individuals for a task within such a tight timeframe raises doubts about the process.

These subcommittees wield considerable authority, since they select members of the district-level electoral bodies, so their small size makes the two members more vulnerable to manipulation, with factional loyalties and regional power dynamics still deeply entrenched. If the selectors are themselves politically aligned or handpicked by vested interests, the entire process could be compromised.

AFP — Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa chairs the first meeting of the new government in Damascus on 7 April 2025.

Will subcommittee members be allowed to nominate themselves as parliamentary candidates? If so, this would present a clear conflict of interest—placing the same individuals in charge of both organising and contesting the election. This would raise serious concerns about fairness and the integrity of the overall process.

Quota dilemmas

Of additional concern is how representation quotas will be enforced. The process currently gives significant discretion to district electoral bodies to nominate and choose candidates, so how will quotas (such as 20% women) be met without external interference or restrictions?

Given existing social and political dynamics, it is unlikely that women will reach the 20% threshold through direct voting alone. The one-third of seats reserved for presidential appointments could help address some of these imbalances, but that may prove insufficient if traditional elites dominate the elected two-thirds.

If presidential appointments are needed to 'correct' the process, this reduces the space available to bring in those with technical expertise, thus weakening the assembly's functional capacity in favour of meeting representational benchmarks with limited flexibility.

Perhaps the most glaring gap is the lack of clarity around monitoring

Perhaps the most glaring gap is the lack of clarity around monitoring. While observers may still be permitted to oversee the process, their identity is still unclear, as is their selection and training. Another question is which stages of the process they will be allowed to observe. If observers only see the final stage (i.e. internal voting within the electoral bodies), their role will be largely symbolic.

Potential for manipulation

In practice, the early phases of the process—such as the formation of subcommittees and district-level electoral bodies—are where foundational decisions are made and where the potential for manipulation is greatest. These initial stages require the same level of oversight and scrutiny as the final vote.

For monitoring to be effective, observers must be genuinely independent, appointed well in advance, be well trained, and have full access to every phase of the process. Without robust and impartial oversight, the legitimacy of the entire process will remain in question.

Syria's legislative reboot is a test, not just of process but of political will. The success or failure of this experiment will depend on the transparency of its procedures, the integrity of those leading it, and the inclusiveness of its outcomes. It could either legitimize a fragile transition or deepen long-standing public cynicism.

Syrians have lived through staged elections before, yet a truly representative parliament with real authority would be new to them. There is cautious but genuine interest in reclaiming national institutions that can serve the public good, legislate with purpose, and hold power to account, but rhetoric alone will not suffice. For this process to be meaningful, it must centre on inclusivity, fairness, and accountability.

Anything less and it will be a hollow box-ticking exercise, another symbolic gesture, rather than a genuine step toward rebuilding public trust in the state. If Syrians are to believe that the transitional authorities can chart a new course, this process must prove that it is not simply about filling seats but about laying the groundwork for a state that serves all its citizens.

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