The “Axis of Resistance” myth

Iran's self-branding as the "axis of resistance" allows it to extend its influence in the region under the guise of liberating Palestine and confronting American aggression

Axel Rangel Garcia

The “Axis of Resistance” myth

It is time to call time on the notion of an “axis of resistance”. Throughout the 20 years of the term’s existence, it has been useful for invoking Iran’s network of proxies in the Middle East. But the term masks the realities of Iran’s and its proxies’ objectives and relationships. The current Gaza conflict has underlined that the “axis of resistance” is a myth that never existed.

In January 2002, in the buildup to the invasion of Iraq, US President George W. Bush famously used the term “axis of evil” in his State of the Union address, in which he said that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea constituted an axis harbouring and supporting terrorists. Bush’s speech painted a picture of a binary in the world, with enemies of the United States characterised as sending “other people’s children on missions of suicide and murder” and embracing “tyranny and death as a cause and a creed,” and presented the US and its allies as fighting those enemies for freedom.

Bush’s words referenced Iran’s behaviour since the 1979 Islamic revolution, of which exporting the revolution is a pillar. The rule of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini saw Iran sponsoring proxies outside its borders, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, and promoting martyrdom as a path towards liberation. Following Khomeini’s death, Iran continued to present this scenario as necessary for fighting tyranny, placing the US and Israel as the two main evils it is striving to counter.

But what was meant to be a term undermining Iran ended up giving birth to another term that Iran has been using since 2004 to upgrade its revolutionary propagation. For the last two decades, Iran has been invoking the term “axis of resistance” as the antithesis to Bush’s dichotomy.

With its connotations of legitimacy and justice, the term “axis of resistance” eventually replaced that of “exporting the revolution” in much of Iran’s public rhetoric because it proved to be more useful for achieving Iran’s objective of spreading its influence in the Middle East.

And while Bush’s words in 2002 directly opposed Iran’s revolutionary framework, Iran’s subsequent embrace of the notion of “axis of resistance” has intended not just to deflect the notion of tyranny from itself but also to show that Iran is actively standing up to the US and Israel, and that this “resistance” is not done singlehandedly but is part of a wide regional alliance.

Such an articulation became useful when Iran and Hezbollah began intervening in Syria in aid of the regime of Bashar al-Assad following the 2011 Syrian uprising. In a bid to legitimise its intervention, Iran characterised the Syrian conflict as a confrontation between the “axis of resistance” and axis enemies. Such characterisation persists. Last month, Yemeni Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi gave a statement in which he said that the Houthis would coordinate with the “Axis” in retaliation to Israel’s attack on Hodeida Port in Yemen.

An Iran-backed "axis" attack has only been invoked rhetorically, but operationally, no such attack has been planned.

Hollow reality

The main problem with using the notion of an "axis of resistance" as a shorthand for Iran and its proxies is that it risks bolstering Iran's framing. The term implies a sense of continued unity and coordination, with Iran and its proxies seemingly aligned in their objectives and operations. The reality is not as coherent.

Iran has cultivated proxies across the Middle East because such a network serves Iran's objective of advancing itself as a regional leader. Iran has boasted about being influential in various Arab capitals, building this influence by using local actors' domestic ambitions to rally them to operate under its wing in return for financial, military, and political support.

Furthermore, it has also placed Palestine as a common regional cause that all its proxies have adopted alongside their domestic objectives. But the centrality of Palestine to the notion of "axis of resistance" has revealed this term's hollowness and the primacy of the proxies' domestic objectives over most other considerations.

The Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) plays an important role in coordinating between Tehran and Iran's proxies across the Middle East. It has put in place a shared military command for the groups it supports, including Hamas and Hezbollah. Through IRGC coordination, leaders from the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah have frequently met in Lebanon. These meetings have helped funnel financial resources to the groups and support their military capabilities. The Houthis, PMF, and Hamas have all benefitted from the military expertise of Hezbollah, which has provided them with training under IRGC supervision.

In theory, this sharing of knowledge and know-how could form a significant threat to Israel. In principle, Iran could activate its various proxies to launch a coordinated multi-country military campaign against Israel. But the last time Israel faced such a multi-actor war was in 1973 when a coalition of Arab states attacked Israel.

In reality, the scenario of an Iran-backed multi-actor campaign has only been invoked rhetorically, like in speeches by al-Houthi or by Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who has described the Gaza conflict as an open war on multiple fronts.

Operationally, Iran is not coordinating its various proxies' actions so that they form a solid unified attack on Israel. Instead, Iran's non-Palestinian proxies are conducting contained military activities, which they and Iran then promote through speeches and statements as simultaneous attacks pressuring Israel from different sides, thereby saving face as part of the pro-Palestine "resistance" narrative.

AFP
A man poses with miniature flags of Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah (L) and Palestine (R) during an anti-Israeli rally to show solidarity with the Palestinian people in Tehran on October 13, 2023.

Those proxies have followed Iran's lead in merely using Palestine to grant themselves legitimacy and as an excuse to pursue their domestic political and military objectives. Their military actions against Israel have been calibrated to support those pursuits without being dragged into a regional war.

This is why none of those proxies will sacrifice itself for Palestine. And why Iran itself has been careful not to overcommit its regional resources against Israel. If anything, Iran is using the proxies' shared command for deconfliction so that Iran and its proxies protect themselves from Israel.

That axis that never was

The current context of the Gaza conflict is not the only time that the "axis of resistance" has been revealed to be a mirage. Such an axis never existed. If it had existed, Israel would have faced a significant security threat that would have resulted in the involvement of its international allies in a regional war against all actors in the axis.

What does exist is an axis of interests branded by Iran and its proxies as an "axis of resistance". Such branding allows the groups to access Iranian resources to pursue their domestic objectives and allows Iran to seek to extend its influence in the Middle East under the guise of liberating Palestine and standing up to American aggression. It also allows it to present its actions to its own domestic audience through a framework that justifies the funnelling of financial resources to its proxies even when the Iranian economy is struggling.

The notion of "axis of resistance" additionally lets both Iran and its proxies present themselves as much stronger than they actually are, because it invokes the existence of a network of allies acting as one. But the only scenario in which Iran would summon its proxies to act in this way is if Iran itself faces an existential threat.

The "axis of resistance" is therefore misleading as an analytical concept. What brings Iran and its proxies together remains a combination of intersecting interests, transactionalism, and patronage.

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