Because of Israel's singular nature, its far-right movement is rarely discussed in the context of the global wave of populism. Yet the ideology supported by the likes of Ben Gvir, Smotrich, or even Netanyahu himself has much to do with the global far-right, and their success may essentially stem from the same roots.
These affinities have even been recognised by the actors themselves; Netanyahu, for instance, has found it easier to make friends with populist figureheads like Hungary’s Victor Orban, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and Trump himself than with some other global leaders.
This is by no means a coincidence. Israel’s far-right sentiment relies on the same mechanics and the same argument: The defence of one single, untainted identity at the expense of all others, including its own democracy. At his core, Ben Gvir is a Jewish supremacist who believes that in Israel, Jews should have more rights than others. He has said so himself multiple times. His party “Jewish Power” leaves very little room for any other interpretation.
In Israel, this argument takes on a deeper meaning. Israel’s core identity is centred on its Jewish and democratic character. Yet, these two concepts don’t always blend easily together. In fact, in many ways, they contradict each other. If Israel is a Jewish State, what rights do minorities get? If Israel is a Jewish State, then should the laws of the Torah (the Jewish religious scripture) supersede those of the state—a state that does not have a constitution per se?
Supremacy trumps democracy
These contradictions have always existed, but they have taken on newfound importance over the past years. A segment of Israel’s political spectrum increasingly made a choice: If and when those two founding principles clash, priority should always be given to the country’s Jewish identity.
In Israel, undermining democracy for the sake of preserving the core identity of the country isn’t an accident of history. Neither was the alliance between Netanyahu and the far right at a time when the Israeli premier was pushing judiciary reform that would essentially dismantle the only counter-balance to the government’s power.
The two principles that portend Israel’s identity have been increasingly at odds. Israel’s populists have made their choice as to which of the two they view as more important. This choice was a no-brainer: For the likes of Smotrich or Ben Gvir, that means Israel's democracy is situational (i.e. this is just the situation Israel is in now) while its Jewish character is essential.
Netanyahu found partners happy to sap one of the state's founding principles. Incidentally, this growing attack on democracy has also awakened a dormant majority of Israelis, for whom democracy isn’t just a side note in Israel’s history that needs to bow down for the sake of greater things (or greater men). Last year’s protests came from a deeper realisation among segments of the Israeli public that Israel’s identity as a Jewish and democratic state was very much at stake.
Playing the victim card
But the similarities don’t stop there. Israel's populist wave has also relied on the same divide, pitting the “old elite” against “the people”. As his judiciary troubles intensified, Netanyahu has increasingly used arguments and rhetoric found elsewhere around the globe. Per his own statements and those of his supporters, Netanyahu was the victim of a witch hunt by elements of the “deep state” who were trying to find ways to unseat him after failing to do so democratically. He has attacked the Supreme Court for being an “unelected power”. His supporters have accused the Attorney General of being a “traitor” and a Trojan horse for Israel’s far left.
In Israel, using this classic “people against the elite” argument also has deeper echoes. Israel’s early decades, as well as the early Zionist movement, were deeply influenced by Jews from Europe (Ashkenazim Jews), who brought with them left-wing values and sensitivities. For decades, Israel was ruled by a left-wing party, with the right-wing only coming to power at the end of the 1970s. In 1948, the USSR even voted in support of Israel’s creation, hoping (not unrealistically, given Israel’s left-wing founders) that Israel would side with the emerging communist bloc.
A disappearing left
Fast forward to today, little truly remains of this left-wing dominance over the country’s first decades. The Israeli left is only a shadow of its former self, barely making it to the Knesset when it does.
There may still be an over-representation of Ashkenazim among academics and some state institutions—importantly, this includes the Supreme Court. But this is still a feature of Israel’s psyche, particularly for Arab Jews (Sefaradim or Mizrahim as they are called in Israel), who came in later after being expelled from countries across the Middle East and North Africa. They suffered from discrimination and the perception that they were “second-tier” Jews sent to live in the periphery. Even today, the issue of inequalities between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews still strikes a chord.
This is the image Netanyahu was summoning: Old left-wing Ashkenazi Jews, entrenched in an imaginary “deep state” high in their ivory tower, looking to unseat the elected prime minister. This image is certainly specific to Israel, but one that’s also similar to the rhetoric used by far-right and populist leaders around the globe.
Finally, there is the language itself. For instance, the success of Itamar Ben Gvir is just as much a result of his ideas as his theatrics. His supporters view him as a “straight-talker”, someone who “tells it like it is” and doesn't bother to be politically correct. The same has been said of pretty much all of the leading populists of this past decade. As Israel faces a complex crisis following the 7 October attacks, this will be attractive to some voters, who want simple solutions and enjoy telling the world off.
Evading accountability
After 7 October, these arguments are poised to be amplified. Domestically, Netanyahu will double down on his attempt to detach himself from realities and responsibility through divisive rhetoric. At his core, Netanyahu isn’t so much a “true believer” in far-right ideas as he is an opportunistic one. He has and will continue to use rhetoric that serves him best, no matter how bone-chilling.
In the wake of 7 October, some of Netanyahu’s supporters (including Netanyahu’s own son) have even dipped their toes in conspiracy theories—another classic tool of modern-day populist leaders—claiming that elements within the “deep state” and the army had “allowed” the Hamas attacks to happen for the sake of unseating Netanyahu.
For their part, his partners, Ben Gvir and Smotrich, face a crisis of their own, as they’ve also presided over one of Israel’s worst security debacles. They will double down on the same rhetoric Netanyahu is using, arguing that, at every turn, their ideas were stifled, watered down, and sidelined. If only they were able to go all the way, they would say. This lack of accountability is also typical of identity politics, where voters are supposed to back leaders for who they are rather than what they do.
Internationally, Netanyahu and his far-right allies will also double down on the kinship they found with far-right and populist allies across the globe. Netanyahu is clearly angling for a Trump victory despite the unprecedented support Biden has offered Israel in the wake of 7 October. This is despite Trump's recent statements indicating he would also like the Gaza war to end, as well as last year’s revelations that Trump felt betrayed by Netanyahu’s quick embrace of Biden.
More broadly, Israel is isolated, but it is still viewed as a “first line of defence” by far-right parties across the West and even beyond who feel the West is assailed by an aggressive Muslim world. This would push Israel into a dangerous slide that only leads to further divisions, toxic politics, and alliances based on shared fears rather than shared values.
