As Israel continues to assassinate one Hezbollah officer after another, the question of how Hezbollah will respond becomes increasingly important.
There is widespread concern about the war between Israel and Hamas spilling over into Lebanon, but so far, Hezbollah’s reaction has been measured. But this is not because Hezbollah is scheming, the way Hamas did before its surprise attack on Israel on 7 October.
The war began at a time when the Lebanese militant group was already facing challenges both in Lebanon and more broadly and has further exposed Hezbollah’s weaknesses on multiple fronts. In many ways, the war underpins the beginning of the end of Hezbollah.
The intensity of Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah officers is remarkable. Israel has killed at least 166 members of Hezbollah since the 7 October war began. This is a huge number considering that Hezbollah and Israel are technically not engaged in all-out war like they were in 2006.
Back then, in 33 days of intense fighting, Israel killed more than 1,000 Hezbollah fighters. This is the first time that Israel has gone after particular Hezbollah individuals in a rapid sequence of assassinations.
What is also notable is that Israel continues to target senior Hezbollah military officers rather than just regular fighters involved in active combat.
Assassinations of such officers have happened as the individuals were in buildings in residential areas and while riding in moving vehicles. This illustrates the high level of intelligence that Israel has over Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Despite this sparking public debate in Lebanon about the potential presence of pro-Israel agents within Hezbollah’s ranks and the holes that must exist in its communications network and security arrangements, Hezbollah seems unable to safeguard itself against such attacks.
Instead, it is resorting to hollow PR stunts. Pro-Hezbollah media outlets continue to repeat the same allegations about other Lebanese media outlets that are covering the events, implying that those rival media channels are traitors propagating an Israeli narrative about Hezbollah’s vulnerability.
Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has stepped up the number of speeches he has given since the war began. But this is a far cry from the speeches he used to deliver at the height of the 2006 war.
Back then, Nasrallah’s speeches were defiant and carefully staged as a tool of psychological warfare that aimed to threaten Israel and rally the masses around Hezbollah across the Arab world.
The speech he delivered on 14 July 2006, during which he asked viewers to watch an Israeli warship burn only for the camera to cut to a scene of the warship after being hit by an Iranian-made missile, was a landmark moment in Hezbollah’s communication strategy, which stands in sharp contrast to the group’s lacklustre messaging of today.
Early on in the current war, there was mass panic in Lebanon about Hezbollah getting involved in aiding Hamas militarily, but Nasrallah’s speeches — ripe with empty propaganda — seem to have lost their value.