Gaza at war: Will Hezbollah join the battle?

But perhaps more important than the reason for the war, is whether Hezbollah will enter the battle by either directly or indirectly participating in operations.

The Hezbollah statement also calls on "the peoples of our Arab and Islamic nation, and the free people around the world, to declare their support and backing for the Palestinian people and the resistance movements, affirming their unity in blood, word, and action."

The statement then emphasised that "the leadership of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon is closely following the critical developments in Palestine, monitoring the field conditions with utmost interest."

It also said the group was in "direct contact with the leadership of the Palestinian Resistance both domestically and abroad, constantly evaluating the events and the progress of operations."

The statement concluded with a call for "the government of the Zionist enemy to take note of the important lessons delivered by the Palestinian Resistance in the battlefield and arenas of confrontation."

Hezbollah refrained from directly responding to Deif's appeal, urging "our brothers in the resistance in Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria to join the resistance in Palestine."

This aligns with the "Unity of the arenas" doctrine, which has recently evolved into Iran's central tenet of the its so-called "Axis of Resistance" narrative push.

The Hamas offensive is the first critical test of reconciliation between Hamas and the Syrian government, facilitated by Hezbollah and Iran in September 2022. Ties had been essentially severed after the Syrian uprising in 2011, when Hamas did not support the regime's crackdown on protesters, unlike Hezbollah.

Hamas' stance marked a significant departure from the "axis".

While not directly accepting Deif's invitation to join the battle, Hezbollah did not outright dismiss the possibility of becoming involved.

This is demonstrated by its assertion that it supports Hamas with "actions, words and deeds" and that the group was monitoring events from Lebanon and maintaining direct contact with Hamas both at home and abroad.

This aligns with Hezbollah's previous declarations of support, such as during the Sword of Jerusalem battle between Hamas and Israel in 2021, which points to the existence of a joint operations control room between Hezbollah and armed Palestinian groups.

The Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, confirmed this on 25 July 2022 after Mohammed Al-Sinwar, a member of the Al-Qassam Brigades' leadership, announced on 22 May 2022, the establishment of a joint security room with the so-called Axis of 'Resistance'.

These developments predated the "unity of arenas" doctrine.

Therefore, the party's statement confirms direct coordination between Hezbollah and Hamas in the current hostilities, regardless of whether Hezbollah actively participates in the battle or not.

Any direct participation by Hezbollah will be meticulously calculated and weighed by both Hezbollah and Iran. It hinges on their readiness to go to war with Israel, in the current regional and international climate.

Lebanon's economic crises and presidential vacuum necessitate Hezbollah to calculate its options carefully. It has to ensure that the benefits outweigh the risks.

In this context, Hezbollah's appeal for " the government of the Zionist enemy to comprehend the important lessons delivered by the Palestinian Resistance on the battlefield" can be interpreted as a warning to Israel that it should exercise caution in its retaliation against Hamas, suggesting the possibility of opening a new front against Israel in its north (south of Lebanon).

The key question now is what will Hezbollah's reaction be should Israel's response against Hamas and Gaza be drastic and unproportionate. It is especially important given Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's assertion that Israel is in a "state of war, not an operation and not a round."

The scale of Israel's escalation — and whether or not Hezbollah will become directly engaged in the battle — will be the first and most critical field test of the "unity of arenas" doctrine.

This leads to more existential questions about the credibility of the doctrine. If these arenas fail to unite when faced with an opportune moment, the doctrine loses its intrinsic value.

The doctrine of responding at the "right time and place" is likely to be the one followed. Any action the Axis undertake is fundamentally contingent upon Iranian strategic calculations.  In other words, all Axis activities are tied to Iran's regional and global priorities.

However, an event as significant as the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation could potentially realign these priorities—not hastily or impulsively, but rather through deliberate and calculated options.

Read more: Gaza deals Israel yet another October surprise

One of the key considerations Hezbollah has to make is its expanded influence in Lebanon, which has drastically heightened in recent years. The group has a hold on the country, politically, militarily and economically. Iran will be cautious not to jeopardise this ally stronghold on the Mediterranean Sea. 

So it makes sense that Iran would opt for a "balance of deterrence" strategy here which aims to prevent an overt clash between two parties, which could further diminish Hezbollah's standing with the Lebanese people.

An initial analysis of the current hostilities suggests that military operations will likely be contained within Israel/Palestine. However, what happens in the coming days will determine any changes in calculations or strategies.