Understanding the logic of the Saudi position on Red Sea naval force

The Kingdom is justified in questioning why its effort to secure the Red Sea as a strategic imperative wasn't taken seriously in recent years

Two men watch a ship crossing the Suez Canal towards the Red Sea in Ismailia, Egypt, 22 December 2023
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Two men watch a ship crossing the Suez Canal towards the Red Sea in Ismailia, Egypt, 22 December 2023

Understanding the logic of the Saudi position on Red Sea naval force

On November 14, the Houthis in Yemen threatened to target Israeli vessels in the Red Sea. Subsequently, they followed through on this threat by commandeering the cargo ship "Galaxy Leader," co-owned by an Israeli businessman, and taking it to the Yemeni coast. This action was in support of the Islamist movement Hamas in its war against Israel.

Subsequently, on December 9, the Houthis announced their intent to impede the transit of vessels destined for Israel, irrespective of the ownership or registration. They particularly cautioned “all ships and companies against engaging with Israeli ports.” This position was reiterated by Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi on December 19, wherein he issued a warning that his faction would confront US forces if any attempts were made to forcibly hinder their pursuit of their objectives.

The intensification of Houthi actions against Israel and their threats to the US unmistakably corresponds with Abdul-Malik al-Houthi's pronouncements on October 11. At the commencement of the Israeli war on Gaza, he declared the intention of his faction to target Israel using missiles and drones. Additionally, he outlined a gradual escalation in the confrontation with Israel, a consensus reached within the so-called "Axis of Resistance."

This escalation is contingent on various red lines, encompassing developments on the war on Gaza and direct US involvement in the war. This indicates that the Houthi escalation in the Red Sea is poised to persist until the cessation of hostilities.

Read more: Can the global economy withstand Houthi attacks on maritime trade?

The Houthi insurgents have indeed executed their warning, targeting twelve ships en route to Israel, and compelling them to alter their course. As per data from the Bloomberg website, over 180 cargo vessels have either diverted their route to the Cape of Good Hope instead of the Red Sea or have identified a nearby port for anchorage until the situation in the Red Sea stabilises.

Moreover, numerous shipping enterprises, including industry giants such as British Petroleum, Cypriot Frontline, Danish Maersk, German Hapag-Lloyd, French CMA CGM, Italian-Swiss MSC, and Taiwanese Evergreen, have suspended their maritime journeys through the Red Sea.

Additionally, the expense associated with transporting containers from Asia to Northern Europe surged by more than 40 per cent after the Houthi attacks. The bills for fuel shipments also witnessed an increase, attributable to major oil and shipping companies opting to avoid navigating through the Red Sea. Overall, there was an 85 percent reduction in ship movements at the Israeli port of Eilat following the Houthi attacks, as reported by Reuters.

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A Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) container ship crosses the Suez Canal towards the Red Sea in Ismailia, Egypt, 22 December 2023

A maritime dilemma to the US

In 1967, Israel used the closure of the Tiran Straits in the Red Sea by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to justify its military intervention against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, asserting the right to freedom of navigation. In the current scenario, Israel appears constrained in its ability to unilaterally alter the emerging circumstances. Expressing its stance, Israel has issued a military threat through its National Security Council head, Tzachi Hanegbi. He conveyed that "Netanyahu has apprised US President Joe Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz of his country's resolve to undertake military measures against the Houthis unless remedial action is taken against them."

Nevertheless, even though Israel possesses the capacity to conduct airstrikes on the Houthis or initiate long-range missile assaults, such actions are unlikely to provide a conclusive resolution to its predicament in the Red Sea. The Houthis are anticipated to persist in targeting Israeli-linked vessels and those bound for Israel. Consequently, Israel perceives the remedy to its crisis not in a direct confrontation with the Houthis but rather in the United States assuming a role on its behalf, despite the potential for Israel to directly launch military airstrikes against the Houthis.

Read more: Netanyahu’s use of the Gaza war for political gain is leaving Biden exposed

Israel perceives the remedy to its crisis not in a direct confrontation with the Houthis but rather in the United States assuming a role on its behalf, despite the potential for Israel to directly launch military airstrikes against the Houthis.

The United States, on its part, finds itself in a state of confusion. It is keen to avoid an escalation in the war in Gaza, as such an intensification would pose a dilemma: either direct participation in the conflict alongside Israel or leaving Israel to confront the situation independently.

For internal considerations, notably, the sway of the Israeli lobby in the United States, which prompts successive US administrations to embrace policies that align with Israel's interests, an escalation in the ongoing conflict implies inevitable US involvement.

Such a scenario would necessitate the deployment of tens of thousands, and conceivably even hundreds of thousands, of American troops to the region to settle the conflict. This course of action runs counter to US interests and its strategic plans to curb the rise of Chinese influence globally and counter Russian activities in Ukraine, particularly that any protracted conflict in the region could last for years, mirroring what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Consequently, the United States initially adopted a defensive strategy, intercepting Houthi drones and ballistic missiles with the US destroyer "Carney" positioned in the Red Sea. After the Houthi declaration of intent to target Israeli ships, the United States took the step of repositioning a strike group under the command of the aircraft carrier "Dwight D. Eisenhower" from the Arabian Gulf to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, to counter potential Houthi attacks against Israeli vessels.

The United States has further initiated "Operation Prosperity Guardian" on December 19. This security initiative entails the establishment of a multinational force under the auspices of the Joint Maritime Forces, aimed at protecting the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.

As per the US statement, the multinational naval force comprises ten nations, notably the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain (though the latter has refuted its involvement in this force).

The precise nature of the tasks assigned to this force remains uncertain. It is yet to be clarified whether its responsibilities will be primarily defensive, focused on countering Houthi attacks against ships bound for Israel, or if an offensive stance will be adopted, targeting the launch sites of Houthi missiles and drones. The latter would entail active engagement in warfare against the Houthi faction. Speculative reports in the media suggest that the United States is contemplating re-designating the Houthis as a terrorist group and considering military operations against them.

Strategic significance to Saudi Arabia

Undoubtedly, the Red Sea holds significant strategic importance for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which gets 36% of its external imports via ports situated along its shores. Along its 1,830-kilometer coastline that extends from the Northern Province of Haql to the Jazan region in the south, the Kingdom is actively advancing its most important initiative aligned with Vision 2030, with the Red Sea Project assuming a pivotal role.

Unveiled in 2017, this tourism venture spans 200 kilometres between the cities of Umluj and Al-Wajh, involving the transformation of 22 islands in the Red Sea into tourist resorts. Presently, five islands are undergoing active development and construction. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has announced the anticipated opening of these resorts in 2024.

Nonetheless, the Kingdom has declined participation in the joint force established by the United States. This decision is underpinned by the Kingdom's steadfast stance that the Israeli war against Gaza must come to an immediate halt. Saudi Arabia asserts that Israel's actions in Gaza amount to a process of ethnic cleansing against the Palestinian population, with the ultimate objective of displacing them from their homeland.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia believes that the United States consistently contradicts the international consensus advocating for an immediate cessation of the war. This consensus was exemplified by the endorsement of 13 nations in the Security Council, calling for a ceasefire and the provision of humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in Gaza. Furthermore, in the United Nations General Assembly, 153 countries supported this resolution. The Kingdom, as articulated by its Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, categorically affirmed, "It will not collaborate with any nation contributing to the realization of Israel's objectives in displacing Palestinians."

The Kingdom, as articulated by its Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, categorically affirmed, "It will not collaborate with any nation contributing to the realization of Israel's objectives in displacing Palestinians."

The Kingdom also regards the matter of freedom of navigation in the Red Sea as complex. A portion of this complexity is undeniably time-sensitive and interconnected with the Israeli war against Gaza.

Therefore, the Kingdom posits that an immediate cessation of Israeli aggression would serve as a pragmatic and cost-effective resolution, in harmony with its Arab, Islamic, and humanitarian obligations. Additionally, this aligns with the decisions of the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the international community's collective aspiration for a peaceful resolution.

From the outset, Saudi Arabia has endeavoured to prevent the widening of the war. It views "Operation Prosperity Guardian" as having the potential to escalate into a war that might impede, rather than facilitate, navigation in the Red Sea.

Furthermore, the disclosure by Ali Reza Tangsiri, the Commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy, regarding the establishment of a Basij naval unit involving large boats and launches that can sail as far as Tanzania, serves as a significant indicator of the associated risks of expanding this conflict and the possible spillover into the Gulf region.

Double standards when it comes to Israel 

One could argue that the Kingdom's decision not to partake in the proposed naval force by the United States, aimed at protecting navigation in the Red Sea, stems from the perception that it is essentially a force created to protect the navigation of Israeli ships or vessels operating on behalf of Israel.  If consistent standards were universally applied, the Kingdom might not object, but the current situation raises concerns about equitable treatment.

In 2018, Saudi vessels ships were attacked by the Houthis, leading to the suspension of maritime trade for months. The situation only saw resolution when the UN special envoy for Yemen brokered an agreement with the Houthis to cease their attacks on Saudi commercial ships.

During that period, the Kingdom had sought US collaboration to establish a "coalition" for protecting commercial ships in the Red Sea and urged the re-designation of the Houthis as a terrorist group, a proposal declined by the United States. In light of these events, the Kingdom is justified in questioning why the imperative of preserving freedom of navigation was not considered crucial back then, whereas it is deemed essential today.

The Kingdom is justified in questioning why the imperative of preserving freedom of navigation was not considered crucial back then in 2018, whereas it is deemed essential today.

The answer is, of course, the double standards applied by the United States in everything related to Israel.

In conclusion, some observers associate the Kingdom's reluctance to join the US-led alliance with the evolving relations between Riyadh and Tehran and ongoing negotiations with the Houthis. This article does not seek to dispute those connections; however, it emphasizes that these factors are contributory and not the primary determinants.

In fact, I believe, for objective reasons, that even in the absence of these factors, the Kingdom's position of non-participation would remain unchanged. It is crucial to note that, for those unfamiliar, the unwavering support for the Palestinian cause stands as the only matter where Saudi Arabia and Iran share common ground without disputes over its fairness. The Kingdom's principled stance on supporting the Palestinian cause has remained steadfast and unchanged since its participation, under the decision of the late King Abdulaziz, in defending Palestine in 1948.

Just as the Kingdom steadfastly supported the Palestinians in their rightful pursuit of defending their land, themselves, and their rights in the past, it continues to stand alongside them today, advocating for a just and enduring resolution to their legitimate cause.

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