Darfur’s fractured politics add to the complexity and danger of Sudan’s civil war

Tangled history of conflict

The RSF is currently one of the main combatants in Darfur. This is an ironic development for the people of the area since the militia had helped control the violence when it supported al-Bashir's Islamist regime, establishing a period of relative calm.

But the RSF went on to help overthrow al-Bashir in April 2019. That was when it fought alongside the regular army to depose the Islamist regime.

But before that, the regular army and the RSF were helping Khartoum keep control of Darfur, helping set up the period of comparative peace. The era of support for al-Bahsir was rooted in another Darfur conflict in 2003.

This one came when some of the region's armed groups refused to sign a peace agreement with the central government of al-Bashir government. One was the Justice and Equality Movement, led by Gibril Ibrahim, the current Minister of Finance. The other was the Sudan Liberation Army, then led by Minni Minnawi, presently the governor of Darfur.

He changed his mind in 2008, signing the agreement before taking up a role in the authority for five years. It did not last. Minnawi resumed hostilities against the government and was back with the Sudan Liberation Army and its new leader, Abdul Wahid al-Nur.

Throughout al-Bashir's tenure, Darfur remained plagued by persistent security tensions despite the presence of a joint peacekeeping mission from the African Union and the United Nations and the world's largest of its kind, UNAMID.

Racial element

The violence got worse.

The al-Bashir government implemented a strategy of pitching Arab tribes, which were to expand into the RSF, against African groups, commonly known as the "Black" tribes.

Military intelligence and security forces armed the Arab tribes. In response, the ِBlack tribes sought their own weapons, turning Darfur into one of the most extensive arms markets in East Africa. It also set up a culture of violence that persists.

All these factors combined made the region a powder keg as a full-blown civil war returned in April.

The violence, rape, displacement and genocide that is coming back to Darfur were prominent features of the last war there — a conflict made even more bitter by its tribal and racial elements.

The world noticed.

A US organisation, Save Darfur, sought the recognition of events there as crimes against humanity and war crimes. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against al-Bashir and six of his associates.

No-fly zone and UN boots on the ground

Subsequently, a no-fly zone was imposed over Darfur, and the UN Security Council passed a resolution to deploy UNAMID in Sudan's most extensive intervention mission.

The move to prosecute al-Bashir and his associates was popular with activists and the groups that endured the hardships of war. But military confrontations continued, involving the regular army and the RSF.

After the fall of al-Bashir's regime, the Juba Peace Agreement, designed to end the violence in Darfur in 2020, was signed. It did not last, but it did help alliances develop. The regular army leader and Sovereignty Council's head found support in overthrowing the transitional government led by Abdalla Hamdok.

When that coup took place on 25 October 2021, Hamdok and a range of government ministers were arrested. But none of the Juba signatories were detained.

Instead, al-Burhan left them in their positions until the outbreak of the latest civil war on 15 April this year.  

And so, Darfur is part of a more intricate conflict involving the region's armed groups, complicated by their relationship with the army, the central authority, and neighbouring countries in the region.

Shifting dynamics

The dynamics in Darfur over its factions have shifted. The groups which backed the coup which deposed Hamdok have voiced support for the regular army, describing the RSF as "rebels" at a press conference.

These groups – most notably those led by Gibril Ibrahim and Minni Minnawi – had previously described themselves as "neutral".

Observers say the groups were coming under pressure from the regular army to show their support for it, while promises over political positions after the war were being made. But not all the members of the groups have followed their leaders, sparking a crisis for the armed factions.

Thousands of soldiers from the armed movements have effectively pledged allegiance to the RSF. This significantly complicates the situation on the ground, making it challenging for the army to operate in those areas, let alone reclaim cities and military strongholds captured by the RSF.

The shift will also bring an influx of military and logistical support to the RSF in Darfur, including via allied tribal groups in neighbouring regions. That could loosen coherent ties between the region and the central government of Sudan, both right now and in the future.

Meanwhile, the RSF's second-in-command, Abdulrahim Dagalo, has persuaded some regional leaders to align with him, separating them from the groups which pledged support for al-Burhan and the regular army.

It leaves the pattern of networks and alliances in Darfur even more fractured and complicated.

Omens for more war

Turning our attention to the ongoing second war in the Darfur region, it becomes evident that it has resurrected all the bitterness of the first war that took place during the era of the Islamist regime.

The violence that Darfur witnessed over two decades of conflict between residents and the central authority has now re-emerged with notable intensity. There is more forced population displacement, ethnic cleansing, mass killings, alarming incidents of rape against women, and the absence of ethical considerations in warfare.

It is all too familiar. And it is hitting the same areas as before: Geneina, Jebel Marra, and South Darfur.

RSF mends relations

The Darfur alliances and connections set up by Hemedti show his intention for the region to be a sanctuary for the RSF in both times of war and peace.

Despite the RSF's transgressions, he has managed to mend many sets of relations in the region. He has recruited local individuals into his forces, sharing the capabilities of his forces, providing economic resources inherited from the previous regime, and offering direct financial support to tribal leaders, villages and neighbourhoods.

When Hemedti was the deputy leader of the Sovereignty Council, he made political promises to the elites in Darfur — particularly those interested in authority — along with material assistance to secure political influence.

At the same time, the central government and the regular army have failed in its reconciliation efforts in the region.

The regular army's allies — the groups that signed the Juba Peace Agreement — also neglected to rebuild their relationships with local communities, focusing instead on the power struggle in Khartoum.

Darfur's future looks more fragile and uncertain than ever.

To avoid getting darker, much will depend on the amount of attention the region receives from the local, regional and international communities.