Politics

Hezbollah’s dilemma: Shift the war or stick to rules of engagement?

The Lebanon-based group does not have Iran’s blessing to move against Israel after the Hamas attacks from Gaza – now it has difficult choices to make

AFP

Israeli army soldiers patrol an undisclosed area in northern Israel bordering Lebanon on October 15, 2023.

Hezbollah’s dilemma: Shift the war or stick to rules of engagement?

Khaled Hamadeh

last update on 18 Oct 2023

Since Hamas launched Operation Al-Aqsa Flood against Israel on 7 October, it has caught global attention and become a rallying cry for the Palestinian cause, which shows no sign of fading.

As it reverberates, there will be far-reaching implications for international stability and security in critical parts of the region and the world.

It could mean that the regional and international relations which have evolved since the Camp David agreement – including agreed settlements – now need to be re-evaluated in transformed circumstances.

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood took Palestinian fighters into Israel from land, sea and air. It undermined the idea that the Israeli Defence Force is invincible, echoing the surprise inflicted in the October War of 1973.

Amid widespread surprise – which even reached allies in Iran – the attack has rekindled a latent Arab memory of a bygone era of struggle — an era which once looked irretrievably forgotten.

That period – characterised by unwavering commitment and sacrifices throughout the 1960s and 1970s – transcended the boundaries that subdivided Arabs along sectarian, denominational, racial, and political lines.

It was a time when resistance efforts were not confined to any specific group or regime. They united supporters of the Palestinian cause under a common banner.

When there were setbacks, organisations and factions competed to present a resistance model capable of confronting challenges and restoring confidence in Arab capabilities.

AFP — Peacekeepers of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) man their armoured vehicle in Lebanon's southern town of Naqoura near the border with Israel, on October 15, 2023.

This sense of unity – absent for so long from the official statements of leaders, literature, and rhetoric – has now returned, and with it comes the idea of collective Arab action. And this renewed will to fight may create demand to revisit the terms of Arab-Israeli agreements.

Amid widespread surprise, Hamas's attack has rekindled a latent Arab memory of a bygone era of struggle — an era which once looked irretrievably forgotten. A sense of unity – absent for so long – has now returned, and with it comes the idea of collective Arab action.

All eyes on Hezbollah

Within hours of the attack on Israel, attention in the Arab world and the wider global community shifted from Gaza to southern Lebanon.

There was close monitoring of Hezbollah's position along its southern border with Israel and its possible response to the Hamas operation.

Here, the members of the so-called Axis of Resistance – including Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas, from various capitals, including Beirut – may test a concept described as "the unity of the areas".

Such groups were particularly on watch for support for Hamas' actions from Iran, the main sponsor of this axis. It was possible that Tehran would urge Hezbollah, the group in Lebanon it influences, to take military action of its own to divert the Israeli army's attention during the initial aftermath of the Hamas operation.

Reuters — An Israeli soldier adjusts his rifle as he stands on a tank near Israel's border with Lebanon in northern Israel, October 16, 2023.

It now appears that Tehran does not want Hezbollah to enter the fight.

The first surprise came when US President Joe Biden said: "There is no evidence of Iran's involvement in the events in Gaza."

In response, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasised that the Al-Aqsa Flood operation is a Palestinian initiative, and some attempt to implicate Iran in it.

He added: "Supporters of the (Israeli) regime, as well as some individuals from the usurping regime, have been making baseless claims over the past few days, including falsely accusing the Islamic Republic of Iran of being behind this movement."

The Iranian leadership's stance – which vacillates between aligning with the US position and maintaining influence on the decisions of its allies while controlling the Axis leaders – was also communicated to Beirut by Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian.

During a press conference held at the Iranian embassy, he considered various scenarios before placing the responsibility for decision-making squarely on Hezbollah and the resistance factions.

Amir-Abdollahian said: "In the event that the conflict escalates, it will be the Lebanese resistance that determines its course... The leaders of the resistance are committed and coordinate exceptionally well."

"They have jointly envisioned all possible scenarios and hold their fingers on the trigger... If the occupier's crimes persist, the announcement of a zero-hour for any future action rests with the Lebanese resistance."

Furthermore, he emphasised that the response from the resistance would lead to remorse for the "Entity", a reference to Israel, and would reshape the map of Israeli-occupied territories.

Tehran's stance has vacillated between aligning with the US position and maintaining influence on the decisions of its allies while controlling the Axis leaders.

Regarding what happens next, Hezbollah's Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah will play a pivotal role. He is known for his hands-on approach to securing Lebanon and the region.

Amir-Abdollahian noted: "Any step the resistance (Hezbollah) will take will cause a huge earthquake in the Zionist entity."

Iran's position

In the face of escalating Israeli aggression against Gaza, supported by the West, Iran's position has two notable aspects.

Firstly, Tehran appears to be deliberately distancing itself from any direct involvement in the Al-Aqsa Flood operation and its consequences in the field, whether through Hezbollah or one of its proxies in Syria. This means Iran has a mutual interest with the US to avoid direct military engagement spreading beyond Gaza.

Secondly, Iran seems reluctant to participate actively but is prepared to act as a mediator and negotiator. It can guide groups seen as its proxy forces and influence their decisions.

AFP — US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (R) and Israel's Defence Minister Yoav Gallant make brief statements to the media at the Israeli Ministry of Defence on Tel Aviv, on October 16, 2023.

Amir-Abdollahian's visit to the region coincided with the visit of US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. That was a clear signal of the delineation of boundaries in the US-Iranian engagement in the region, at least from Tehran's perspective.

Iran has a mutual interest with the US to avoid direct military engagement spreading beyond Gaza. But while it is reluctant to participate actively, it is prepared to act as a mediator and negotiator.

Rules of engagement

Nasrallah has been clear on the group's intentions on numerous occasions. He has emphasised the group's formidable military strength and capabilities in the face of any potential Israeli aggression against Lebanon.

Furthermore, he has consistently pledged that any such confrontation unfolds on the occupied territory of Palestine, with the possibility of extending the battle to the villages of Galilee as one of the viable options.

Hezbollah's stronghold in South Lebanon was long seen as the likely source of any attack against Israel. In the end, it came from Hamas in Gaza. The significant victory has far-reaching implications across the Axis of Resistance, while also complicating the picture for the US, which must acknowledge Israel's vulnerability and its failures.

While the attack may have surprised Iran, it and other regional powers now know that Israel's planned ground incursion into Gaza to dismantle Hamas requires Washington's approval, and it has many reasons to discourage Israel from going through with it.

The White House is cautious about jeopardising its alliances with Arab nations and its recently restored relations with the Arab Gulf states and Egypt, while simultaneously addressing challenges posed by Russia, Chinese expansionism, and the growing influence of other international alliances, including the BRICS bloc of nations.

Simultaneously, Washington strongly believes that Israel finds itself increasingly unable to safeguard its own interests and a ground operation in Gaza is fraught with peril and may not even succeed.

AFP — Israeli troops in tanks and other armoured vehicles amass in a field near the southern Israeli city of Ashkelon on October 14, 2023.

Consequently, the question arises: what lies beyond the Gaza invasion? Can Israel, which seems incapable of ensuring its own security, contemplate territorial expansion?

Israel's planned ground incursion into Gaza to dismantle Hamas requires Washington's approval, and it has many reasons to discourage Israel from going through with it. It doesn't want to jeopardise its restored relations with Arab Gulf states and Egypt while simultaneously addressing challenges posed by Russia and Chinese expansionism.

Focus on diplomacy

At least for the moment, as Israel prepares a potential ground operation, diplomacy remains the primary focus.

The international community is increasingly vocal in condemning Israel's aerial retaliation in Gaza, pressing for unimpeded humanitarian aid access and meaningful progress towards a lasting resolution to the Palestinian conflict.

AFP — People hold signs during a rally in support of Palestinians at Copley Square in Boston, Massachusetts on October 16, 2023.

In this context, Tehran envisions mirroring its established roles in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon in Palestine. It is used to playing the role of an engaged yet non-interfering state, capable of skilfully managing conflicts through intermediaries while concurrently participating in negotiations.

But any direct military involvement from Hezbollah to support Palestine will undermine Iran's intentions for such a role. That means Hezbollah has two critical questions to answer.

The first is whether to participate in the ongoing conflict in Gaza, not least due to the impracticality of remaining neutral.

The second is how to shelter Tehran from any such direct involvement in the fighting, to prevent a direct confrontation with the US.

Hezbollah chose to engage in skirmishes with Israel in the early stages, primarily in the Shebaa Farms, a region disputed with Syria before Israel's occupation in 1967. This area has served as a symbolic battleground for fiery exchanges between Hezbollah and Israel since 2006.

Despite subsequent developments – including heightened combat, some Hezbollah fighters being killed, and casualties sustained by Israeli positions – there was no transformation from static warfare to cross-border incursions or the execution of specialised operations within the country to maintain control.

In essence, cross-border skirmishes and clashes have ingrained themselves as a cornerstone of the rules of engagement established since the adoption of Resolution 1701 in 2006.

It is probable that these engagements will persist in alignment with the faltering Israeli military operation in Gaza and the ongoing American negotiations with regional nations, aimed at achieving a lasting and direct ceasefire through political means.

Hezbollah chose to engage in skirmishes with Israel in the early stages, primarily in the Shebaa Farms, a region disputed with Syria before Israel's occupation in 1967 but there has been no transformation from static warfare to cross-border incursions.

Rules of engagement shift?

And so the question shifts: will the rules of engagement change?

Understanding what a post-Al-Aqsa Flood era may look like is difficult. It is unclear what the Palestinian leadership goals are. Even if they are set out, they must be weighed alongside a complex web of regional and international interests.

Nevertheless, a likely continuation of the conflict could involve maintaining the current status quo on the ground, with the Gaza barrier serving as a line of contact between Israel and the Palestinians. Consequently, the southern Lebanese border is expected to remain governed by daily rules of engagement aligned with events in Gaza.

Three factors should be considered:

The first is the fragility of the Israeli state and its inability to secure its borders. That may necessitate permanent settlements to curtail cross-border conflicts, including addressing the Palestinian issue.

The second is the challenge of containing the growth of Palestinian military capabilities, which have only increased and gotten more sophisticated despite the Israeli siege on Gaza. This poses an ongoing threat, potentially leading to sustained instability, particularly under unfavourable US circumstances.

Shutterstock — In response to the Hamas attack on Israel, the United States has begun moving the USS Gerald R. Ford to the eastern Mediterranean, US Defence Secretary said on 8 October 2023.

Third, continued systematic destruction in Gaza and the failure to reach concrete solutions may turn its plight into an Arab-wide phenomenon, with calls for rebellion against previously signed agreements and tearing up past agreements and accords.

Moving beyond the current rules of engagement in southern Lebanon toward more perilous options is closely linked to Tehran's failure to engage in existing diplomatic options.

It also reveals discord between Tehran's desires and the objectives of Washington and its allies. Failing to establish definitive arrangements for a viable solution over Gaza, along with the cooperation of relevant parties, could pave the way for unforeseen developments across the region, with southern Lebanon playing a pivotal role.

This raises the possibility of extending the conflict to the wider occupied territories, the Lebanese interior, and potentially even Syria.

The issue of calculating the regional balance of power surpasses the capabilities of both Hezbollah and Israel.

That is probably why the US thought it necessary to send two aircraft carrier battlegroups to the Mediterranean. Whatever else, they are likely to be there for a while, and at a state of high alert.

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