Border tensions, Kurdish separatists and an Iranian ultimatum

Kurds deny any action against them

Al Majalla spoke to various members of Iranian Kurdish political factions in Iraqi Kurdistan. They all denied any action had so far been taken.

They also stressed that their weapons are just for defence and the security of the camps and the people who live there. They denied any intention to stoke tension in Iran and claimed to be committed to the stability of the Kurdistan region and against friction with surrounding nations.

The Kurdish forces also repeated their allegiance to international treaties, conventions, and regulations over the "hosting state of political refugees."

In return for the legal protection, public safety and basic necessities they receive from their Iraqi hosts, the Kurds — originally from Iran — abide by a set of principles that avoid stoking conflict between Iraq and its neighbours, including Iran.

Population and politics

There are no official numbers on the size of the Kurdish population. But informal estimates suggest there are around 100,000. A minority possess light and medium weaponry for internal safety and security in the camps.

Among the Iranian Kurds, including those over the border, there are three main political currents.

Their traditional nationalist group is the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran, which traces its roots to the founders of the 1946 Kurdistan Republic in western Iran.

There is also a progressive group that combines a leftist and nationalist ideology in the Kurdish "Komala" party.

On its part, the PJAK party of cross-border leftists is aligned with Turkey's Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

These political parties are forbidden from operating within the Iranian Kurdish community, and detainees associated with these parties in Iran often face severe charges, up to the death penalty.

Relocation proposals rejected

Al Majalla talked to the official spokesperson of the Kurdistan Freedom Party's Iranian wing, Khalil Naderi, who confirmed that various groups had seen proposals to "defuse the crisis" with Iran.

Kurdish groups rejected calls to relocate the camps out of the Kurdistan region to Anbar Province in Iraq's west. Naderi said that would amount to a "political and human massacre" because it would effectively place Iranian Kurdish parties and their leadership under the "mercy" of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) — an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia with sweeping control in various regions of Iraq, outside of Kurdistan.

The PMF is affiliated with Iran, via strong links with the country's security and intelligence apparatuses.

Any such relocation would isolate tens of thousands of Iranian Kurds from their Iraqi Kurdish counterparts. Most have called the camps home for over 40 years and moving them in a second forced displacement would amount to what Naderi called a kind of "cultural and social genocide."

He also rejected an alternative he called the "Albanian solution". It was named after a previous selective relocation, when members of the Mujahideen-e Khalq, an Iranian opposition group, were moved to Albania in 2013 under the supervision of the United States.

But since that move to camps to the west of the capital, Tirana, Iran has continued to complain of interference in its internal affairs. Albania imposed strict conditions on the camps over any activity Iran could classify as "threatening national security."

Naderi rejects any similar move to the Albanian solution. He says it would turn thousands of Kurdish politicians into activists in exile, eliminating the Kurdish issue in Iran, but failing to address it for those displaced from their homeland.

Military mismatch

Iran has already launched multiple missile and air assaults on civilian institutions and the headquarters of parties in the Iranian part of the Kurdistan region.

The Kurdish parties did not retaliate and opted to absorb the shocks rather than escalate the conflict. The Kurdistan region was also in no position to take on the Iranian military and its leaders looked instead for international pressure to be put on Iran, from Europe and the United States and global institutions.

Within Iranian Kurdistan, there are means for resistance to any more radical military action against it.  The political groups are not without power. They are highly organised and have substantial internal influence.

They can also mobilise the people into a state of widespread unrest. Masha Amini, whose death after being arrested by the morality police sparked a wave of mass protests that rocked the country, was a Kurdish girl.

Read more: Mahsa Amini: The girl who was born twice

Attempts to suppress the Kurds could provoke a similar response across the Kurdistan region.

Diplomatic danger

Kurdish leaders are confident that Iran will be unable to use sustained military force against thousands of civilian refugees under the protection of international law.

Sporadic aerial attacks and missile strikes will cause casualties and could provoke temporary evacuations from the camp. Eradicating them would require an all-out conflict that would be unlikely. Even limited military action would spark a widespread global political and humanitarian outcry – and a potential international response. That would be likely to include Iraq.

Meanwhile, Iran's allegations of "external military attacks on its territories" are not backed by substantial evidence. And Iran's assets within Iraq are barred from the Kurdistan region for any direct confrontation with Kurdish positions.

And there is another potential outcome of a direct military confrontation that Iran will want to avoid at all costs: international or UN-backed intervention. It can, in effect, transform Kurds into full political actors in the conflict, as seen with the Iraqi Kurds in 1991.

Nevertheless, if Iran does take the aggressive action it has signalled, it will complicate the already delicate military and political conditions over the issue of Iranian Kurds in Iraq.

Wider consequences

No matter how well-affiliated some Iraqi political parties are to Iran, it will be difficult to accept cross-border incursions. Any attack on one minority or marginalised group will escalate tensions with others and could lead to increased calls from Azerbaijanis and the Baloch for greater recognition as a form of protection.

The US will also be keeping watch in the run-up to Tehran's September deadline, and its reaction to any action will be crucial. Washington has extended political and security commitments to the Kurdistan region since 1991.

Unlike Iran, the Kurdistan region stands as a steadfast ally of the US and any attack on its people — however near the border they may be — would look like a strike against Washington's sphere of influence.