Challenges

Establishing a direct relationship with Israel is not Riyadh's primary goal. Rather, it is trying to secure major security guarantees.

In response to Saudi Arabia's shift toward China and Russia, the United States has put forth a series of proposals. A long-standing US ally, Saudi Arabia's new approach surprised Washington, even though the relationship was tested during President Joe Biden's early term in office. During this period, Washington ceased military assistance for Saudi Arabia's military campaign in Yemen and scaled back intelligence cooperation.

Since then, however, two developments have redirected Biden's attention to Saudi Arabia: the deliberate and systematic effort to strengthen ties with China and the eruption of the Ukraine conflict involving Russia. His mid-July visit there marked the beginning of an American reassessment aligned with Saudi expectations.

Among the notable pledges from the United States, the most significant entails granting Saudi Arabia a defence agreement that resembles the enduring Nato alliance, which has safeguarded Europe since World War II. Furthermore, an American commitment involves establishing a comprehensive civil nuclear energy programme in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, aligning with its Vision 2030 initiative. 

Many have profound doubts regarding the current US administration's ability to secure congressional approval for this accord. Convincing his own party within Congress to accept this proposal will require a substantial effort from the Biden administration.

However, any commitment by the administration pertaining to Saudi Arabia's relationship with Israel, the resolution of the Palestinian issue, and the reduction of strategic military ties with China could grease the wheels for congressional approval.

Are we going to see negotiations with Israel soon?

Recent reports in the Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and Israeli newspapers such as The Times of Israel, Yediot Ahronoth, and Haaretz have indicated that the road to a normalisation agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia is long and challenging.

John Kirby, US Director of Strategic Communications at the National Security Council, reiterated this, saying that the process is still premature and that "there's no agreed framework to codify normalisation or any of the other security considerations that we and our friends have in the region." Kirby also denied the Wall Street Journal's account that an agreement could be reached within 9 to 12 months.

The news of a possible normalisation agreement is not necessarily good news for Israel — especially for the current government led by Benjamin Netanyahu.

Any agreement of this magnitude would require negotiations with the Palestinians, which would likely lead to the collapse of Netanyahu's coalition government. Netanyahu would then have to either find moderate partners to form a new government willing to negotiate with the Palestinians, resign, or abandon the Saudi-American project.

Aside from the challenges related to forging a relationship with Riyadh, Israel also harbours apprehensions regarding any nuclear initiatives within the Middle East.

While the acquisition of advanced weaponry by Saudi Arabia might initially neutralise the threat posed by Iranian ballistic missiles, it simultaneously raises concerns in Tel Aviv. Israel views this development as potentially empowering Riyadh with enhanced military capabilities that could challenge its own aircraft and missile system, as outlined in an Israeli analysis.

The relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv is typically strong, and the two states share similar views foreign policy views. However, at present, the relationship between the Biden administration and the Netanyahu government is the most strained it has been in decades.

Read more: Will Netanyahu's antagonism jeapordise US support?

This complicates the prospects of reaching a deal. Saudi Arabia — as indicated by analyses in American newspapers that consistently highlight its significance and pivotal role in regional geopolitics and global oil policies — appears to lack confidence in the Netanyahu government's capability to secure enduring commitments concerning the Palestinian cause.

The Netanyahu government was also irritated by Saudi Arabia's decision to designate its ambassador to Jordan, Nayef Al-Sudairi, as a non-resident ambassador to Palestine, followed by the announcement that the ambassador would also serve as the Consul General in East Jerusalem rather than in Ramallah, where the Palestinian Authority is headquartered.

This move irked the Israeli government, prompting them to issue a statement that diplomats in Jerusalem are only acknowledged through official channels.

The Israeli government is dominated by ultra-religious right-wing extremists opposed to a Palestinian state. It will be difficult to persuade these hardliners to accept a settlement that promises an independent, fully sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Read more: Israel's 'Netanyahuism' runs deeper than judicial reform

The prospect of negotiations could also throw a stone into stagnant Palestinian waters and rehash festering problems. It will test the Palestinian position currently divided between a weak leadership in Ramallah and armed factions in Gaza who are content with their hegemony over the territory and their closeness to Iran.

On its part, Iran has been suspiciously silent, but it is likely to try to disrupt any efforts that change the balance of power in the region. Iran has a history of sabotaging peace negotiations between Israel and the Arabs — and it is likely to do so again if it believes that its interests are threatened.

The US administration has yet to clarify the price it is willing to pay to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Some believe such an agreement would bring about a qualitative change in the politics and economy of the Middle East and that its importance will dwarf previous Arab-Israeli agreements. 

However, it's not enough to just weigh the pros and cons of reaching such an agreement. The issue is extremely complex and requires a deep understanding of religious, historical, and human rights considerations. Nonetheless, if these negotiations continue, it could potentially redraw the map of the Middle East in the 21st century.

Saudi options

Riyadh now has several options to choose from, and it will select what best aligns with its policy objectives. But what is clear is that the Biden administration has done a complete 180 by proposing a revamped relationship with Riyadh that could potentially bring the two nations closer than ever before. As mentioned before, this about-face is mainly about countering China.

Saudi Arabia's importance as a global player has been demonstrated on multiple fronts. It can now secure substantial military and strategic benefits from the US, while also maintaining strong economic ties with China.

Alternatively, Saudi Arabia could decide to keep its relationship with the United States in neutral and instead pursue a diplomatic strategy aimed at building trust with Iran, easing regional tensions, and forging a strategic partnership with China.

Timeline: Milestones in Arab-Israeli peace initiatives

1979: The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the first between an Arab country and Israel. 

1982: Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev announces a peace plan between the Arabs and Israel. 

1989: Egypt regains Taba, the last part of its territory from Israel.  

1990: The Security Council supports the convening of an international peace conference between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

1991: Madrid Peace Conference.

1993: Oslo I Accords based on the principle of "land for peace."

1994: Agreement on the Autonomy of Gaza and Jericho.

1994: The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

1994: Morocco and Israel decide to open liaison offices in the two countries.

1994: Tunisia and Israel open commercial representation offices.

1994: Djibouti and Israel agree to normalise relations.

1995: Oslo II Agreement to expand the scope of self-rule (Gaza Strip and the West Bank).

1996: The Palestine Liberation Organisation revokes all articles that did not recognise Israel from its national charter.

1998: The "Wye Plantation" agreement arranges Israel's withdrawal from 13% of the occupied West Bank.

1999: Normalisation of relations between Israel and Mauritania.

2000: Camp David negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel under the auspices of US President Bill Clinton.

2000: Ehud Barak meets with Syrian foreign minister Farouk al-Sharaa.

2002: Arab summit in Beirut endorses the Arab peace initiative.

2003: A road map for peace proposed by the Quartet: The United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations.

2005: Sharm El Sheikh Summit involving Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.

2020: Signing of the Abraham Accords at the White House (Israel, UAE, and Bahrain).

2021: Morocco joins and decides to resume relations with Israel.

2021: Sudan signs a decision to normalise relations with Israel.