Erdoğan’s recipe for success is rooted in a history laced with contradictions

An onion that didn't cut through

The opposition focused on Turkey's economic setbacks and scandals associated with the government and its leaders. But enough of the voters looked at the political options in front of them from a different angle and concentrated on other matters.

And these were areas mastered by Erdoğan to hone his own political offering: identity, culture, relationships with both domestic and international communities, and the recognition sought by parts of society that had long felt marginalised.

The problems over inflation and the currency –  one of the main areas of attack from the opposition candidate, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu – turned out to be secondary concerns, even when presented to voters in an accessible way.

Kılıçdaroğlu, deferred to the "onion issue", using higher prices for the popular vegetable to demonstrate the impact of the economic crisis on households.

But this issue didn't cut through with voters in the way Erdoğan's alternative did.

Erdoğan's distinctive approach

The president has taken his distinctive approach ever since assuming the mayorship of Istanbul in the 1990s, representing the Islamic Welfare Party.

Erdoğan took clear aim at addressing what many Turkish politicians saw as a significant challenge: reconciling the perceived contradiction between an identity that encompasses Islamic religious elements and the Ottoman heritage, and the legacy of strict secularism established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The former, traditional sense of identity has connections to the Arab-Islamic East and holds deep significance for many Turks — especially those in rural areas and lower socioeconomic classes.

Meanwhile, Kemalism served as the foundational principle for the Turkish Republic established a century ago. Erdogan's approach aimed to find common ground and bridge the divide between them.

Secularism comes to "the sick man of Europe"

Turkish secularism did not come out of nowhere, and as the tensions it helped develop continue to define the country's politics, Al Majalla looks at the history that shaped it.

Secularism is the result of discussions and crises that may have begun as early as the mid-19th century when Russian Tsar Nicholas I called the Ottoman Sultanate "the sick man of Europe." Nicholas aspired to grab more of its lands and annex them to his empire.

Then, Nicholas II became a "hero" of one of the harshest wars waged by Russia against the Ottoman Sultanate in Crimea, which – paradoxically – is still a matter of dispute to this day.

Back then, the West, represented by France and Britain, stood by the Ottomans to prevent Russian expansion to the south and to prevent Russian hegemony over the Christian minorities in the Sultanate.

European countries also believed that dealing with the Ottomans was easier than confronting the limitless ambitions of the Russian Tsar.

One of the reasons for naming Turkey as the sick man – a term that European governments and newspapers would later adopt – was a deep structural difference between two ruling methods that could no longer coexist.

Industrial revolution hits the Ottoman Empire

With the industrial revolution, the emergence of capitalism, and the developments of nationalist movements and the nation-state, pressure on the Sultanate increased, not least through the emergence of national consciousness among the European peoples within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.

Such patterns were to have a major impact on the Ottoman Empire. They included the exit of Greece from the Sultanate, followed by a series of wars in the Balkans involving Serbian nationalists, Bulgarians, and others, with extensive European support for the independence of Christian peoples in Eastern Europe.

These events led to the adoption of Tanzimat (reforms) by the Ottomans, which officially recognised non-Muslims as citizens for the first time and granted their communities autonomy in internal affairs, separate from Ottoman authority.

The establishment of legal recognition and protection for some religious groups – the Ottoman millet system – faced strong opposition internally.

This system — influenced by similar developments in previous Islamic empires like the Umayyad State and the Mughal Empire in India — allowed non-Muslims to govern their own personal and internal matters through their religious bodies.

It became an official aspect of feudal rule integrated into the imperial context, taking into account the religious, sectarian, and ethnic diversity within the Ottoman Sultanate.

Every empire, by definition, is a political entity that transcends ethnic, religious, and national borders, encompassing various cultural and sectarian components under a single rule, which can be either central or federal.

The degrees of justice, tyranny, and fairness experienced by the various components of any empire vary throughout history.

An empire's decline and violent repression

However, the implementation of the Tanzimat and the millet system could not prevent the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The governance formula, administration methods, and economic crises faced by the Sultanate had taken it into stagnation.

Attempts at reforms were unsuccessful in countering the Western colonial ambitions, which sought to exert political influence by providing economic aid, and loans, and acquiring shares in financially troubled Turkish institutions.

This influence was first sought within the Sultan's Palace in Topkapi and the Sadrazam, the headquarters of the Great Vizier, and later extended to non-Muslim communities that enjoyed significant patronage.

The futility of repeated Ottoman modernisation attempts since the time of Sultan Mahmud II led, eventually, to factionalism and violent repression.

In 1826, there was a massacre, known as the "Auspicious Incident", where the Janissary army, which resisted Mahmud II's efforts to establish a new armed force, was massacred.

Similar instances occurred during the reign of Abdulmejid I, such as the Hatt-ı Șerif of Gülhane, also known as Tanzimat Fermanı, which instilled fear among the ruling elite.

The Ottoman tradition of expanding the power base and granting more authority to proponents of change, like Midhat Pasha, who died in 1884, was met with challenges. Sultan Abdulhamid II suspended the constitution and restored absolute rule, leading to a period known as the "era of tyranny."

During this time, Abdulhamid II utilised his secret police and orchestrated several other massacres against minority communities in various regions of the Ottoman Empire.

Polarisation of society

In essence, the decline of the Ottoman Empire can be attributed to its significant internal divisions.

On one side was a conservative faction comprised of the ruling Ottoman family, standing alongside the upper class of the clergy, who feared reform as it posed a risk to their power and privileges.

On the other side were more educated groups, which recognised the need for change and understood that the Ottoman state, in its existing form, could not survive the industrial revolution and the rise of the West.

The Ottoman Empire lacked crucial natural resources necessary for industrial development. Additionally, it faced successive monetary and financial crises, with the continuous devaluation of its currency.

The economy relied heavily on agriculture and traditional craft industries, which later became suppliers for European factories, particularly in textiles and silk. But the Ottoman Empire lacked the capability to transform these raw materials into finished goods that could compete with imports from European factories.

The rise of the Young Turks

Turkey's reformists and its move to secularism have complex political dynamics. They date back to the period from the emergence of the Young Ottomans in the second half of the 19th century to the formation of the "Committee of Union and Progress" – commonly known as the Young Turks or Yeni Osmanlılar.

The Young Ottomans played a significant role in initiating the first phase of reforms. Later, the Yeni Osmanlılar emerged as a prominent political force, leading a coup against Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1908. The Union and Progress Association grew out of the Yeni Osmanlılar movement and took a central role in Turkish politics.

The trajectory of the Committee of Union and Progress exemplifies the challenges faced by major reform movements in modern Turkish history.

Read more: The coup that brought down the Ottoman Empire

European ideas of equality and socialism initially influenced it and was co-founded by individuals from diverse backgrounds, including Arabs, Armenians, and Greeks.

But over time, it transformed into a nationalistic movement that propagated Turanism – which identifies people of a similar ethnic origin including Turks – and orchestrated massacres against Armenians.

This shift can be attributed to the deep crisis and challenges that Turkey confronted during that period.

The military leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress were deluded into thinking that Turkey had suffered a significant defeat in the European regions, particularly after conflicts with Bulgaria and Serbia, with such ideas possibly influenced by German advisors who had been involved in training the Turkish army since the late 19th century.

To restore Turkey's past glories, its leaders at this time argued that the country needed to seek alternative areas for expansion.

World War I and three Pashas

The outbreak of World War I led to the alignment of the Ottoman Empire with the Central Powers, comprising Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

This alliance provided Istanbul – now governed by the Three Pashas,  Enver, Cemal, and Talat –  with a perceived justification to consider seizing the eastern territories of their enemy, Russia.

Moscow, along with Paris and London, was engaged in the war as part of the Triple Entente forces in the trenches. The Ottoman Empire saw an opportunity to occupy the territories that Russia had seemingly lost due to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the subsequent Russian Civil War. The vast regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia appeared ripe for the taking.

During this time, the Committee of Union and Progress committed genocide against the Armenians, seeking to replace the influential Armenian bourgeoisie in Turkey with a national Turkish counterpart.

The rulers followed their imperial aspirations via alliances, support, and direct assistance from a wide range of conflicting and contradictory forces, ultimately aiming to reach Central Asia and Afghanistan.

It was a desperate and intriguing attempt to rewrite history, centred on a vision of an empire that would reunite the Turkic peoples, extending from Anatolia to present-day Uzbekistan, spanning the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Turkmenistan.

The actions undertaken by the members of the Committee of Union and Progress in the final years of World War I became all the more bizarre. They veered from fighting against the emerging governments of Georgia and Armenia, which sought independence from Soviet Russia, to cooperating with them and later collaborating with Uzbek and Turkmen opposition groups.

Ultimately, they aligned themselves with the authorities in Moscow and even trained a new Afghan army.

Turkey's quest for a sense of purpose following the collapse of the empire lay at the heart of these tumultuous endeavours.

Jemal Pasha met his demise in Tbilisi, while Talat Pasha was killed in Berlin as part of the Nemesis operation launched by the Armenian revolutionary movement (Tashnag) seeking vengeance for the Armenian genocide.

Enver Pasha was killed in Bukhara by an Armenian Bolshevik officer. The dream of uniting the Turkish people in a new empire was shattered, coinciding with another group of young Turkish officers engaged in a complex war in Anatolia.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, an army officer, emerged victorious with his forces in Anatolia and the remaining parts of Rumelia west of Istanbul after engaging in intense battles against the Allies and the Greeks.

Atatürk's realisation

However, the lessons he learned from the War of Independence contradicted the visions of the three Pashas. Atatürk realised that venturing further east held no benefits for Turkey's development or progress.

Instead, he believed that the solution lay in embracing Western political systems, social values, and the Latin script. It was crucial to distance Turkey from its past to ensure its survival.

This included conforming to secular values in areas such as religion, language, clothing, appearance, and education, all of which aligned with the standards of the new republic.

It is not surprising that those who fought to prevent the division of Turkey – which was being orchestrated by the remnants of Ottoman rule in collusion with Britain, France, and Greece – were the ones tasked with safeguarding these values.

While the West and its historical experiences influenced these values, they also acted as a defence mechanism against Western dominance over Turkey.

The Turkish army, entrusted with the modernisation of Turkey in a broad sense, became an example for Arab countries to follow.

International implications

Many former officers from the Turkish army returned to their respective countries. They assumed prominent positions, seeking to enable their troops and elites to seize power, as witnessed in the notable coups in Syria, Iraq, and other nations.

Due to its strict organisation, familiarity with modern weaponry, and role as guardian of national security, the army was considered the best entity to govern Turkey. According to some, it would also have suited the wider Arab world.

The significant changes initiated by Atatürk and continued by his successor, İsmet İnönü, a hero of the War of Independence, involved reshaping the internal relations that had formed during the collapse of the previous alliance between Turks and Kurds, represented by the Hamidiye regiments and their involvement in the Armenian genocide.

This alliance led to a series of Kurdish uprisings. The Zilan massacre in 1930, for which İsmet İnönü was personally held responsible by certain Turkish writers, exacerbated the deep and ongoing divide in Turkish-Kurdish relations.

This divide continued to deepen and solidify, resembling a bloody trajectory resembling a civil war that flared up and subsided based on the prevailing circumstances.

İnönü remained a prominent figure in Turkish politics until the mid-1960s, occupying positions such as the presidency, prime ministership, and the leadership of the Kemalist Republican People's Party. These roles symbolised the consistent pursuit of puritanical secularism, supported by the power of the military.

Nonetheless, societal movements continued to evolve.

Adnan Menderes, who achieved a sweeping victory in Turkey's first democratic elections in 1950, adopted a more tolerant approach toward Turkish social and religious customs and traditions.

His Democratic Party relaxed the strict measures imposed by the Kemalists of the Republican People's Party, allowing religious education and reinstating the call to prayer in Arabic.

Historical parallels for Erdoğan

Here, one can draw parallels between Menderes and Erdoğan. Menderes, by reducing state intervention in the economy, inadvertently contributed to a significant decline in national industrial activity, as imported goods flooded the market and financial and commercial life became chaotic. But he remained popular in rural areas.

Simultaneously, discontent grew among the Turkish urban elite due to Menderes' repression of his opponents and the deepening economic crisis. Supporters of the ruling Democratic Party were incited to attack the Greek minority in Istanbul.

Dozens were killed, and hundreds were injured, under the pretext of retaliation for false news about Greeks bombing the house where Atatürk was born in Thessaloniki, Greece. This false information was spread to provoke violence in the city.

The military coup in 1960 aimed to end the Menderes phenomenon and restore traditional authoritarian rule. However, this did not address Turkey's internal contradictions, which were becoming evident between rural and urban areas, Turks and Kurds, the past and the present, and the direction the country should take.

The 1970s presented a significant test for Turkey's contradictions. Various Marxist and Trotskyist factions of the left and the extreme right confronted each other in universities and on the streets.

This led to the emergence of armed groups and quasi-military factions on both sides. Major cities turned into battlegrounds between the left and the right.

It was a deeply divisive period within Turkish society, influenced by the rise of the new left in Europe and its interpretations of social divisions, as well as the increasing role of new business groups and implicit alliances between different mafias and political formations.

The 1980 coup attempted to reset the situation, but it only triggered another wave of widespread disturbances in 1984, this time with a focus on Kurdish rights.

This broad summary of history shows Turkey will continue to be governed by its ethnic, geopolitical, and geographical reality, seeking stability and balance between the legacies of its past and the rapid changes of the modern world.