A look at Turkey's geopolitics through the lens of the war in Ukraine

Ankara was clear in calling out Moscow’s invasion as an aggressive act and has since kept relations with Russia open in a careful approach to complex politics, which is not over yet

Rob Carter

Ankara has balanced its membership of Nato with a need to maintain relations with Russia, since clearly calling out the war in the early days. It has worked so far, but will have to keep at it

A look at Turkey's geopolitics through the lens of the war in Ukraine

Mitat Çelikpala

last update on 08 Jul 2023

Turkey’s response to what its close ally Russia called a “special military operation”, when Moscow sent troops into Ukraine, offered the first insight into a geopolitical juggle that Ankara has performed since February 2022.

Speaking as a full member of Nato, Turkey firmly refused to recognise what looked like an illegal annexation of Ukraine. It spoke up in defence of the former Soviet republic’s territorial integrity, within borders recognised in 1991.

Then it went further.

Almost a week later, Ankara enacted Article 19 of the Montreux Convention and closed the Turkish Straits to warships from Russia and Ukraine, as well as other nations.

Getty Images — Russian Navy's diesel-electric Kilo class submarine Rostov-on-Don sails through the Bosphorus Strait on the way to the Black Sea past the city Istanbul as Sultanahmet mosque (L) and Hagia Sophia mosque (R) are seen in the backround.

That made Turkey the first, in effect, to label the situation as a war. The move to close the Black Sea also prevented Russia from extending its naval presence there, which could have changed the balance of the conflict between two of the nations on the waterway’s shores.

These were early signs of the way in which the war in Ukraine would become the dominant factor defining the global agenda since Russian tanks rolled over the border in February 2022.

Everything that has happened since has contributed to a radical change in the world’s security architecture. It has also severely affected global economic and trading relations.

Since those first weeks, with Turkey one of the nations most directly affected by the war between its two Black Sea neighbours, its overall position has been more nuanced. Its policy of “active neutrality” – prioritising a peaceful solution between Russia and Ukraine – has involved Ankara taking on a role as a mediator and a facilitator to bring about moves toward peace.

Its policy of "active neutrality" – prioritising a peaceful solution between Russia and Ukraine – has involved Ankara taking on a role as a mediator and a facilitator to bring about moves toward peace.

Knife-edge diplomacy

This approach aligns with Turkey's traditional track record in seeking balance in how it makes foreign policy. But it is also highly sensitive and leaves the country's leaders and diplomats on a knife edge.

As Turkey seeks to balance its own relations with its two warring neighbours – while keeping open channels through which they can make contact with each other – it is also caught in a delicate and challenging set of contrasting expectations from its Western allies.

In the medium and long term, developments may go beyond Turkey's bilateral relations with Ukraine and Russia. It impacts Ankara's Black Sea policies and security at the regional level and Ankara's relations with the US and the EU at the global level, especially in the context of Finland and Sweden's Nato membership.

Russia's aggressive stance, shaped by its hegemonic approach towards almost all its neighbours, has eliminated the possibility of regional cooperation and the establishment of peaceful common security.

One post-war vision ends

And so that marks the end of a comprehensive vision of regional security and cooperation that Ankara has been persistently and patiently shaping for many years in the Black Sea. Until the current conflict, the region had been relatively stable and almost conflict-free since 1945.

Now that war has returned, Turkey's renewed regional challenge is to realistically define and protect its own interest while maintaining and improving relations with Western allies and making sure Russia is not marginalised in the process. This will require policies that are both rational and dynamic.

Turkey's renewed regional challenge is to protect its own interest while improving relations with Western allies and making sure Russia is not marginalised in the process.

There are varying views of Turkey's recent approach. Some see it as a bid to keep a foot in both camps, leaning toward its Western allies and support for Ukraine. Others look at it as being supportive-yet-ambivalent, due to its ongoing relationship with Russia.

AFP — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) meets Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Astana, on October 13, 2022.

It is, perhaps, best described as a delicate balancing act, a risky but successful strategy. As Russia becomes increasingly weakened, Turkey faces a use-it-or-lose-it moment to show regional leadership and re-engage with the West.

Following Western policy with low-profile

In this context, Turkey would be the winner when the war ends. Still, Turkey's attitude could be questioned as somewhat transactional and opportunistic or only an act protecting its national interests. Turkey is navigating a narrow path between its Nato commitments and its relationship with Russia.

By closing the Turkish Straits, supporting the strategy of its formalised allies, and providing Ukraine with combat drones and other materials, Turkey follows a pro-Ukrainian or Western policy while keeping a low profile.

Simultaneously, Turkey is attracting both attention and criticism for these deeper economic relations by not joining the sanctions against Russia and almost doubling its trade volume with Moscow.

So, Ankara risks being seen as the chief beneficiary of the current situation, not least as the conduit for trade between sanctions-hit Russia and the world. Ankara's role as a power broker or an asset for Moscow is under scrutiny in this context.

There are varying views of Turkey's recent approach. Some see it as a bid to keep a foot in both camps, leaning toward its Western allies. Others look at it as being supportive-yet-ambivalent, due to its ongoing relationship with Russia.

Economic ties deepen

Turkey's policies since the beginning of the war, and perhaps even since the invasion of Crimea in 2014, have been shaped by establishing economic, political, and military relations with all parties and balancing Russia by keeping it in the system without marginalising it.

Today, Turkey and Russia have solid economic ties. The trade target set by Erdoğan and Putin before the war was to reach a trading volume of $100 billion. This goal, which seems difficult to realise under normal circumstances, has reached a different level with the relations established with Russia under sanctions.

Turkey did not join the sanctions against Russia due to the fragile state of its economy and its energy dependence on its neighbour. Ankara bought itself time by stating that it would only participate in UN-approved sanctions. Its role as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine made Western actors accept this position, at least for a while.

Then, trade volume with Russia doubled to $68 billion in 2022 from $34 billion in 2021. Imports from Russia also rose significantly, to $59 billion in 2022 from $29 billion in 2021.

Turkey's share of Russia's exports increased from 2% to 7%. Russia has become Turkey's largest trading partner, leaving China and Germany behind.

Lots of focus on Turkey-Russia trade relations. Turkey is small in terms of exports to Russia (blue). Exports rose to an all-time high in June (blue), but they are very small in absolute terms and dwarfed by Turkey's energy imports from Russia (red). With @UgrasUlkuIIF pic.twitter.com/2U78kgbNX4
— Robin Brooks (@RobinBrooksIIF) August 8, 2022

Oil and gas

As expected, oil accounted for the highest increase in Turkey's imports from Russia. Moscow, which had difficulties marketing the crude oil it produced after the imposition of Western sanctions, gave special discounts to China, India, and Turkey, offering win-win contracts.

According to the Turkish media, Urals oil, which was traded at $60.12 per barrel at the time the invasion started, fell to $37.80. That's why Turkey's crude oil imports from Russia doubled in 2022. The share of Russian oil in Turkey's imports, which was 26.6% in October 2021, rose to 51.7% a year later.

Natural gas comes into Turkey directly from Russia via theTurkStream and BlueStream pipelines. Putin's assessment that Turkey could serve as a hub for Russia to reach Western markets was welcomed in Ankara. The special discounts and postponement payments were seen as Moscow's support for the Erdoğan administration ahead of the elections.

Add cooperation over nuclear energy, and there is an impression that economic ties are deepening, despite the perceived security threat.

Sanctions remain a threat

Nevertheless, countries that break sanctions or allow Russia to circumvent them in the current tense political environment could become targets for further international measures.

US needs to see Turkey's trade with Russia drop: sanctions official - The New Arab https://t.co/Mpxu5J9Ow5
— Rusdu Saracoglu (@RusduSaracoglu) April 7, 2023

And in the event of an escalation of the war, both the scope of the sanctions and the pressure on countries not participating in the sanctions could be expanded.

If that happened, it would seem impossible for Turkey to maintain its current balancing act. Indeed, from April-May 2023, Turkey abruptly stopped the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia as the EU and the US pressured allies to support measures imposed over the invasion of Ukraine.

Turkey's careful diplomacy comes with benefits

But there have also been clear signs of the importance of Turkey's careful diplomacy and its role in the middle of the re-drawn geopolitical balance.

The grain deal that Ankara brokered brought Russian and Ukraine to talks, focused on fixing wider humanitarian problems caused by the war. It was effective. An agreement signed in July 2022 under the auspices of the EU after Ankara's initiative remains in force. To date, over 30 million tons of grain have been exported.

There have also been clear signs of the importance of Turkey's careful diplomacy and its role in the middle of the re-drawn geopolitical balance. The grain deal that Ankara brokered brought Russian and Ukraine to talks, focused on fixing wider humanitarian problems caused by the war. It was effective

During an unprecedented cost-of-living crisis, the deal helped stabilise global food markets and reduced volatility with a 20% fall in global food prices. The international community, including the US and EU, praised Turkey's role.

So, Ankara benefits from the political consequences of this agreement, which helps it justify keeping out of international sanctions, not least as the largest grain buyer among the upper-middle-income countries.

It can also be argued that this agreement helped alleviate Turkey's economic crisis by restoring relative confidence in the domestic market.

Striking the perfect balance

Nonetheless, Ankara must also strike a balance that takes the global reshaping of the security picture as well as regional changes into consideration.

Turkey occupies an important position on the eastern and southern flanks of what is known as the Euro-Atlantic security perimeter and has become one of the main actors in the new security architecture being shaped to include the Black Sea.

Given that Turkey gets to approve Nato's decisions as a member of the alliance – which has a stated intention to increase its land, naval, and air forces against Russia – Ankara needs to establish a new discourse that sets strong links between its obligations, interests, and security.

AFP — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (R) shakes hands with Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Dolmabahce Office in Istanbul, Turkey on June 4, 2023.

This poses a challenge regarding installing an economic, political, and military balance that keeps Russia in the regional system without marginalising it.

For Ankara, the way to do this is to create a common discourse that includes Russia as much as possible.

In conclusion, while it may not be possible in the short term to gather the relevant parties around a table to discuss regional security issues and cooperation, Ankara needs to achieve continuity in its relations, without being left out of the overall equation.

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