Can China pressure Iran to stop arming the Houthis?

Extent of Iran's meddling

Iran was involved in Yemen's Sa'ada conflict, as well as the six wars that began in June 2004 between Ali Abdullah Saleh's government and the Houthis. Saleh accused Houthis of establishing an armed organisation inside the country, seeking to restore the Zaydi Imamate, and overthrow the Republic of Yemen.

Iran was involved when the Houthis entered the capital, Sana'a in 2014, when Saudi Arabia launched the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen in 2015, and now finally in this tripartite agreement under Chinese sponsorship. 

There is abundant evidence of Iran's role in supplying the Houthis with all kinds of weapons. This supply in recent times has included ballistic missiles and drones, which have contributed to the transformation of the power struggle inside Yemen, turning the conflict into a regional threat to neighbouring economies and stability. 

International reports about Iran's role in the Yemen conflict began in 2017, when former US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley revealed new evidence of Iranian weapons being delivered to the Houthis in Yemen.

In December of that year, at the Joint Base Anacostia Bolling in Washington, DC, Haley and Pentagon officials displayed images of missile parts and other Iranian-made weapon systems that were discovered in Yemen. The images showed Qasef-1 drones and anti-tank guided missiles used by the Houthis.

They met the specifications of Iranian weapons. The briefing focused on two advanced weapons in particular, the Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missile and the Shark-33 remote-guided naval drones. A hard drive was found in one of the explosive boats containing more than 90 sets of coordinates for locations in Iran, Yemen, and the Red Sea. 

Various arms and ammunition shipments were later intercepted and confiscated in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Gulf of Oman. The confiscations were carried out by US, British, and French patrols. Over the past two years, Tehran has been significantly active in providing military support to the Houthis.

The British Royal Navy announced that HMS Montrose seized, on two occasions during the year 2022, Iranian weapons from boats driven by smugglers in international waters south of Iran. Among the confiscated weapons were surface-to-air missiles and engines for cruise missiles.

The Wall Street Journal quoted French army officials saying that on 15 January, a French warship stopped a suspected smuggling ship off the Yemeni coast. It carried more than 3,000 assault rifles, half a million rounds of ammunition, and 20 anti-tank guided missiles. 

The British and US naval forces announced on March 2, 2023, the interception of an Iranian arms shipment on board a boat in the Gulf of Oman, the seventh in three months, on its way to Houthi forces in Yemen.

It contained anti-tank guided missiles and medium-range ballistic missile components, which constitutes a violation to UN Security Council Resolution No. 2216 and international law.

Strengths and weaknesses of agreement

Ardimagni sees that China's leading economic role and its equal political distance between Riyadh and Tehran has allowed Beijing to restore hope in the agreement. She argued that Saudi Arabia and Iran feel they can trust China as Beijing relies heavily on a stable Gulf for energy and maritime trade routes.

"Everyone now depends on the Gulf, which for Beijing is the gateway to European and African markets, and it is also the land and sea hub of the Belt and Road Initiative." 

The agreement seems to be centred on security. This could be seen in how the March talks took on a security, rather than diplomatic, political, or economic angle.

In fact, it was Saudi National Security Advisor Musaed Al-Aiban and Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani who signed the agreement on behalf of their nations. 

The agreement begs several important questions, but it might be premature to answer them.

Are the threats to Saudi Arabia limited to Yemeni and Iraqi attacks targeting its territories? Or do they include everything related to the cross-border activities of militias linked to Tehran, which threaten the security of the Gulf as well as the whole region?

Is the agreement a way for Iran to guarantee Saudi Arabia's neutrality in regional developments with Israel? Or is it the result of domestic protests it faced in 2022? 

Saudi Arabia adopted a de-escalation strategy in its negotiations with Tehran before they signed the agreement. The aim since 2021 has been to restore diplomatic relations. The Kingdom has made a clear effort to show its wishes to put an end to this war.

But the problem remains in how much Tehran can influence the Houthis to accept a peaceful settlement in the Yemen conflict? Some members from the Iranian side rule out Tehran doing that despite its strong influence on the group. 

Iran is the main supplier of weapons, training, and propaganda programmes to the Houthis. It can and should do a lot. But it has yes to admit that it sends them weapons. The only thing Tehran has admitted to was when it said two years ago that it provided "advisory support" to the group.

What happens if agreement proves ineffective?

A legitimate question here arises around Saudi Arabia's options in the event that Tehran fails to exert real and effective pressure on Houthis. Will this lead to the return of military strikes until the two parties return to the dialogue table where the solution remains in the hands of Tehran? 

Could Tehran's failure to convince the Houthis to agree to a political resolution to the conflict lead to Saudi Arabia's withdrawal from this issue as a whole?

If the Houthis completely take over the northern regions of the country and Yemen is left alone to flounder in its internal conflicts for years to come, multiple and hybrid conflicts will almost certainly emerge. 

A divided and troubled neighbour is not what Riyadh wants. Even a partial security agreement with the Houthis — whether with or without Iran's support — would be good for Saudi Arabia's stability, which is inherently linked to the stability of its southern neighbour.  

This does not only apply to the border regions that are controlled by Houthis. 

Indications of genuine will

The approach that Iran chooses to adopt will determine the success or failure of this diplomatic agreement. The talks reportedly followed "concrete commitments" regarding Yemen. 

But there is a sense that the two parties are genuine in their will to reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict. This was evident in the remarks of Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan at Davos in January.

Farhan said the war in Yemen must end through a consensual solution that his country was working on. He called for a political settlement and the need to "find a way to restore the armistice in Yemen, and work to turn it into a permanent ceasefire." 

Washington's position shift

Washington's position shift in this conflict is also worth pointing out. The global heavyweight has gone from supporting one side of the conflict to playing a meditating role.

US President Joe Biden announced the cessation of US support for military operations in Yemen in February 2021 when he appointed Tim Lenderking as envoy to Yemen.

In the recent Oman talks, Lenderking urged Tehran for serious signs for a positive shift in the conflict. He said the country could do this by stopping arms smuggling to the Houthis and violations of UN Security Council resolutions.

Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal quoted US officials as saying that Iran has agreed to stop sending arms shipments to its Houthi allies in Yemen as part of restoring relations with Saudi Arabia. Referring to it as a test, the officials questioned whether Iran would stick to the deal and whether that would put pressure on the Houthis to reach an agreement to end the conflict.

No war, no peace

Perhaps the most accurate description at this stage is a state of no war and no peace, following a period of truce that was extended for several months. The truce continued even after a failure to renew it in October, and relative calm, interrupted by some confrontations, ensued. 

The Houthis have intensified their grip on the areas that are under their control. The measures aim to ensure the group's survival as it continues to push its sectarian project. 

This is amid the exacerbation of the suffering of the population and the growing feelings of rejection and resistance to the set of security and economic measures that the movement is trying to impose through its de facto authority. 

Read more: Building a viable state fit for Yemeni people to return

This is in addition to the growing criticism coming from the international community.

Former South Yemen President Ali Nasir Muhammad pointed to the absurdity of the situation, saying: "There is more than one president, more than one government, more than one parliament, more than one army, more than one central bank, and more than one TV channel with the same name."

The Yemen conflict is not only a proxy war. The internal dimensions over the struggle for political power and control over resources run deep. The recent moves by the Houthis in Marib and Taiz were nothing but an attempt by the group to seize control of the oil regions.

It is true that the Houthis receive weapons and ammunition from Iran, but they are not hugely dependent on them like other militias in the region.

The Houthis control the economy of the northwest of the country, as well as informal and illegal networks. Therefore, Iran has limited sway over the group to force it to adhere to the agreement. 

Alternatively, Riyadh could reach an understanding with the Houthis strictly focused on border security. 

Iranian political analyst Hussein Roy Waran told the BBC: "Can Iran push the Houthis to do something they do not want? No, Iran will not do that, but if there is a real ground for resolving the crisis, Iran will push for it."

What next?

The calm approach with which the Yemeni crisis was dealt with during the resolution phase and the cumulative building of trust between the interlocutors is worth noting. 

The extension of the armistice, which constitutes the first stage of the agreement, will be for a year this time. The international and regional community hopes the peace agreement will be a comprehensive one, not just a ceasefire.

Read more: Reconciliation efforts bring Yemen one step closer to political solution

The basic armistice agreement will be accompanied by economic and humanitarian incentives that revolve around lifting the siege completely and withdrawing all foreign forces from Yemen. 

Al Houthis are expected to fully reopen the Houthi-controlled ports as well as Sana'a Airport, pay the salaries of government employees from oil revenues, begin reconstruction efforts, and set a timetable for the exit of foreign forces from the country, UN Special Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg told the Security Council. 

Sources say Saudi Arabia may host the signing ceremony of the agreement between representatives of the legitimate government and Houthi representatives. 

The second phase of the agreement would include a three-month negotiation period on managing the transitional phase. It will last for two years, during which a final, comprehensive, and sustainable solution to the political crisis will be negotiated between all parties.

Regardless of the success of the diplomatic track, the tripartite committee is expected to play a role. The three countries are scheduled to meet periodically to follow up on the implementation of the agreement.

Will they need international support to maximise the chances of success? Will Chinese sponsorship be sufficient in setting the rules and conditions that will have repercussions on regional and international security, stability, and navigation.

Realistically the international community will have to be present on three levels: 

Humanitarian: UN Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya said that the number of Yemenis suffering from hunger has been reduced to two million.

The food security index has dropped from the fifth degree, the highest one, down to zero. She largely attributes this to the tireless efforts of the workers in the field of relief, generous support from donors, and the armistice. 

She stresses that Yemen still represents a massive emergency, as more than 17 million people depend on aid and protection from relief agencies. The lack of resources means the UN has to coordinate with Yemeni ports to provide civilians with supplies to avoid a more serious humanitarian crisis.

Security: International solidarity is needed to stop arms smuggling to the Houthi militia and other non-state actors in the region and the world.

The tripartite committee can secure a resolution from the UN Security Council to form an international force and allocate additional resources to collect and analyse relevant intelligence data. This will help intercept arms smuggling networks. 

It will be especially useful in tracking high-value ones such as missiles and drones in the area extending from the coasts of Yemen and Oman to the coasts of Somalia and Bab al-Mandab.

This is provided that the national coast guard forces in each of the involved countries play an essential role and are accompanied by similar arrangements at airports and strict control of air navigation.

Legal: International efforts, led by Saudi Arabia, are needed to pressure the Security Council to expand the scope of the sanctions stipulated in Security Council Resolutions No. 2216 and 2266.

This will ensure the prohibition of the transfer of weapons to the Houthis and allied forces and obtain what is necessary to strengthen the international legal rules and frameworks to take real measures that go beyond condemnation against all countries that support terrorist groups.