After a brief lull, the debate over bringing all weapons in Iraq under state control has returned to the fore, having first erupted after 30 September. The battle pits Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's government against an array of Iran-backed militias. Some take their orders from Tehran; some have arsenals that rival those of states. These armed factions have been asked to turn in their weapons. For those who refuse, al-Zaidi has turned to Plan B: pressuring them through their financial interests.
The disorder that has gripped Iraqi politics since 2003 has produced a system sustained by three closely intertwined forces: corruption, armed power, and political money. So deeply connected are these three pillars of the ruling order that it is hard to separate them. Iraq's economy, resources, and institutions have been carved into fiefdoms controlled by political parties and powerful families. Politicians have extended their grip on public wealth, initially assisted in their arrangements by armed groups.
Alliances between political actors and armed factions became a means of accumulating wealth. The growing relationship between weapons and money gave rise to a new form of kleptocratic rule, a phenomenon examined by the American journalist Robert F. Worth in The New York Times on 6 August 2020. Kleptocracy (which literally translates as ‘rule by thieves’) describes a system in which those holding political and administrative office exploit their authority to appropriate public and private wealth.
In a kleptocracy, corruption and the systematic plunder of public resources are the defining features of government, and in his investigative article, Worth offered a revealing account of Iraqi political corruption as it might appear to outsiders. He observed that Iraqi politics could outwardly resemble gang warfare, yet the theft taking place beneath the surface of those conflicts in fact proceeded remarkably quietly.
Divide and rule
The Iraqi government appears to be bringing weapons under state control through a strategy of divide-and-rule, adopting a different approach to the three different categories of armed factions. The first category is being enticed into government with positions commensurate with groups’ political strength after the latest elections. The second group is being dealt with through somewhat secretive agreements. This approach has been applied to Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, which objects to the failure to enact the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) law. The PMF is an umbrella group of mainly Shiite militias, and the law incorporates it into the state.
The third category comprises Kataib Hezbollah. Having maintained its weapons and confrontational stance, government pressure is now being directed at its investments and commercial activities, which some say are aided by the coercive power of its weapons and fighters.
Al Majalla has learnt that parties to the Coordination Framework (or CF, a council of major Iraqi Shiite parties) recently met with al-Zaidi but did not reach an agreement on the steps required to bring weapons under state control. Even armed factions within the CF that secured government ministries seem unwilling to reconsider the role of their weapons should war break out again between the US and Iran.
According to leaked minutes, al-Zaidi’s threat to use force against any armed group challenging the government’s war-fighting authority received no support from the CF. Moreover, the CF parties threatened to open a military front in support of Iran if war resumed. If accurate, this undermines the understandings reportedly reached after 30 September, including with factions that continue to reject disarmament.
