Operation Dawn of Yemen: a domestic fight with regional implications

Al Majalla tracks a rapidly shifting battlefield where stamina, not speed, will determine the ultimate victor

Al Majalla

Operation Dawn of Yemen: a domestic fight with regional implications

Yemen has entered a decisive battle over the state's future, with implications for regional security. On 4 October, President Dr Rashad al-Alimi announced Operation Dawn of Yemen to reverse Houthi territorial gains made in September, including along the Red Sea coast and restore state authority nationwide.

Can the Yemeni government translate military momentum, greater international support, and the Arab Coalition’s military reactivation into lasting strategic gains? Previous campaigns saw varying levels of success because of fragmented command and control, uncoordinated international military responses, competing regional and Western priorities, inconsistent external backing, and a failure to protect what had been recaptured in Sanaa, al-Jawf, Marib, and Hodeida. This year’s reconfiguration of the Presidential Leadership Council, the weakening of the Southern Transitional Council, and Riyadh's more consolidated role within the coalition offer a chance to fight more effectively. Still, this political coherence must translate into unified military planning and execution.

Since 11 September, the Houthi offensive, backed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, has reached well beyond the Tihama coast, while maintaining sustained pressure on the southern and western outskirts of Taiz, controlling much of the commanding rural terrain and threatening the route to Aden. Strangling supply lines may further divert nearby government formations but has alarmingly exposed civilians to renewed siege conditions 11 years on. Inside Taiz, Yemen’s second-most populous city outside the capital, prices of fuel and basic household items have skyrocketed.

To secure this territorial breakthrough, the Houthis launched offensives along more than 30 frontlines, deploying constant troop reinforcements under heavy, concerted drone, missile, and rocket fire cover.

Fighting is currently concentrated mostly on the frontlines of al-Aqroudh, Jabal Wahan, al-Dhabab, al-Waziáh, Kahbub, and al-Mahawela. The Houthis seek to take full control of Taiz and the approaches in Lajh to redraw the rules of engagement around Bab al-Mandab Strait. In Lahj, fighting around Kahbub, al-Madharbah, and al-Arah continues to threaten access to the coastal battlefield, while Marib remains a strategic centre of gravity for its energy, social, and military weight as the Yemeni government's last strong foothold.

Houthi outflanking manoeuvres, electronic warfare, sniper reinforcements, and fortified defences seek to control critical routes, cut supply lines, and besiege Yemeni government-aligned military formations, as seen in al-Mocha and rural Taiz, under heavy pressure, enough to erode operational momentum and disrupt the counteroffensive.

Southern Giants Brigades/Handout via REUTERS
Military vehicles travel along a road during what Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces say was an advance against the Iran-backed Houthis, near Dhubab, Taiz Governorate, in this image released 5 October 2026.

After seizing al-Mokha and Dhubab, the Houthi rebels immediately moved to fortify commanding heights, dig trenches, and lay extensive minefields to stall advances by the Yemeni Armed Forces. The government's priority was to retake Dhubab and Bab al-Mandab before the Houthis hardened those positions, taking advantage of the “kill box” where it restored control. However, advances toward al-Khokha and Hodeida will likely be slower and costlier because they require mine-clearance capacity, protected engineering assets, anti-drone defences, and secure military logistics. Stamina, not speed, will determine who prevails on the battlefield.

A stretched force

Despite relative gains, the widening battlefield is heavily testing Houthi combat and mobilisation endurance. Houthis have reportedly deployed child soldiers, senior ideologue commanders, police and security personnel to the frontlines, which indicates a fighting force that has been stretched thin. The further the Houthis advance, the more vulnerable they become to rear attacks.

None of this signals imminent collapse, as the Houthis retain substantial capacity to plan, mobilise and attack different frontlines with more secure military communication channels. But their reputation for inexhaustible manpower must not in any way be mistaken for unlimited combat power. Generating combat force is one thing; sustaining it across theatres in an expanding battlefield is another.

Despite relative gains, the widening battlefield is heavily testing Houthi combat and mobilisation endurance

Saudi escalation

Another consequential escalation lies across Yemen's northern borders. It is important to note here that Iranian weapon systems, technology, military, intelligence and technical expertise, and logistical support heavily underpin the Houthi missile and drone programme. This has allowed the Houthis to geographically expand their attacks from Saudi Arabia's southern provinces towards Riyadh, Taif, Mecca, the Eastern Region, and Yanbu, targeting especially vital energy and aviation infrastructure.

The Horizon Brief on Substack recorded at least 47 Houthi strikes into Saudi Arabia through 11 October, with a reported minimum of 20 killed and 447 injured, including Saudi, Palestinian, Jordanian, Egyptian and American nationals. On 9 September, an Iraq-based attack on the East–West Pipeline had reportedly damaged three pumping stations. In one attack on 10 October, the Houthis struck King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, killing at least 12 people and injuring 309 others. Separate official Saudi statements indicate that at least 19 people were killed and 420 others injured in attacks between 1 September and 11 October.

Subsequent attacks on Riyadh and Dammam airports sharpened the Houthi threat to civil aviation, demonstrating the operationalisation of Houthi intent to disrupt regional travel safety, expose defence vulnerabilities, and raise the cost of Riyadh's support for the Yemeni government. However, the escalation has only hardened Riyadh's resolve to eliminate the Houthi threat, instead of past efforts to contain it or diplomatically engage with the group.  

AFP
A commercial vessel anchors off Yemen's coast near Bab al-Mandab, the strait linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, on 12 September, 2026.

Aligned ambitions

The Houthi ambitions in Yemen are strategically aligned with Iran's quest to gain leverage over Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and the wider Arabian Peninsula. Parallel efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab, by Iran and the Houthis respectively, show a clear intent to choke Saudi and Gulf exports, cripple global energy trade and shipping more broadly. In Iraq, Iran-allied militias are also attacking vital Saudi infrastructure to add further pressure.

While enhanced interception and maritime naval protection are helping curb the threat, they cannot single-handedly neutralise it where territorial depth, long-range military capabilities, infrastructure, and external smuggling lines remain intact.

Growing signs of Houthi weaknesses are unlikely to automatically translate into government gains as they continue pursuing military expansion. Success depends heavily on interoperability, rapid resupply, interdiction of reinforcements, and unified military planning across frontlines, as well as integrating engineering, logistics, mine clearance, and post-capture fortification and stabilisation so advances are secured, not overextended.

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