US-China summit: did Xi get what he wanted?

Why the Chinese president's visit to Washington could be considered a success, despite no big movement on trade, Taiwan, and technology

US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping view portraits of former US presidents at the White House, Washington, DC, on 24 September 2026.
Reuters
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping view portraits of former US presidents at the White House, Washington, DC, on 24 September 2026.

US-China summit: did Xi get what he wanted?

During his visit to Washington last week, Chinese leader Xi Jinping tried to step outside his usual diplomatic style and bring a more personal note to his relationship with US President Donald Trump, who is known for prioritising image and political optics. In Beijing, leaders also use symbolism and protocol, placing considerable weight on appearances and the messages they convey, so the logic felt familiar.

Despite his formal demeanour, Xi exchanged smiles and laughter with Trump and, at one point, patted him on the shoulder. He joined Trump for a tour of Marine One at the new White House landing pad, while China’s first lady, Peng Liyuan, was given a prominent role during the visit, in contrast to the discretion that has traditionally characterised the public appearances of Chinese leaders’ wives.

Earlier, the US president had broken with protocol by personally receiving Xi on the tarmac at Joint Base Andrews, a rare gesture not seen since the 1960s. Xi thus became the first Chinese president to be greeted at the airport by his US counterpart. Yet Beijing had already secured a significant symbolic gain after lengthy negotiations to ensure that Xi’s trip would be formally designated a state visit, with all the status and emphasis that entails, regardless of the practical results of their meeting.

The careful choreography helps explain why two of the summit’s most significant practical outcomes were announced in advance. Two days before Xi arrived, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that the US-China trade truce would be extended until January, following negotiations in New York with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng. They also agreed to establish a communication mechanism to address artificial intelligence (AI) incidents that could affect national security.

REUTERS
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi shares a moment with Russian President Vladimir Putin as Chinese President Xi Jinping looks on during day two of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi, India, on 13 September 2026.

Missed opportunity

Xi’s visit to Washington stirred hopes of a bilateral breakthrough. He had just finished a tour that included Bishkek, Cairo, and New Delhi, while Trump had held a series of diplomatic meetings on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. The visit also coincided with the start of local Communist Party conferences in China ahead of the 21st National Congress next year, where Xi is expected to secure a fifth term.

Trump’s popularity has been declining ahead of mid-term elections in November that will shape the second half of his final term. This political imbalance appeared to open the door to compromise, prompting some observers to see it as a missed opportunity for key breakthroughs. Yet strategic competition between the US and China seems to have limited what the summit could achieve. Trump needs agreements but knows that concessions could make him look weak.

Beijing's objective was not to resolve disputes over tariffs, chip exports and Taiwan, but to avoid hostility

Controlled cooperation

As warmth and ceremony served as compensation, Beijing prioritised avoiding confrontation as it sought to establish a more structured framework for the two states' relationship that could allow for controlled cooperation. Chinese writer and political researcher Zhao Zhi Jun told Al Majalla that Beijing's objective was not to resolve disputes over tariffs, restrictions on chip exports and Taiwan all at once, but to build on a model established at the Beijing summit: no conflict or confrontation to avoid hostility. By that measure, Zhao said, the Chinese achieved their objectives.

Taiwan was again on the agenda. Washington handled the issue cautiously and opposed 'independence'. The trade war was limited to a truce, avoiding escalation. The overall feeling was to give the US-China relationship new substance, with Beijing having introduced the concept of 'constructive strategic stability' at the May summit as a framework for relations. In Washington, Xi added substance to that framework, saying it was based on three principles: mutual respect, fairness, and reciprocity.

The formula appeared in both the White House factsheet and the Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on the summit's outcomes. Both documents said that Trump and Xi had agreed to "establish a constructive relationship characterised by strategic stability and based on respect, fairness, and reciprocity". For China, this is the benchmark for judging Washington's conduct. US pressure, containment policies, or efforts to impose agendas will be seen as a breach of the understanding reached.

Reuters
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping before Xi delivered a speech during a state dinner at the White House in Washington, DC, on 24 September 2026.

The trade truce

Although Beijing had hoped for a longer extension of the trade truce, it has shown that it can absorb the shock of tariffs and export restrictions while responding with countermeasures, not least by using its leverage over the rare earths needed by technology companies. Zhao said Washington rejected a longer extension because it wants to pressure Beijing to buy more American goods and open its market to more American companies.

The two-month window covers the midterm elections, the APEC summit and the G20 meeting, before Trump decides whether to approve another extension or seek a comprehensive deal. For Beijing, a continued truce (regardless of duration) is a gain since it avoids additional costs while allowing China to transform its economy, strengthen self-sufficiency, and reduce dependence on foreign technology.

China and the US also agreed to grant preferential tariff treatment to $30bn worth of non-sensitive goods in each direction, with specialised working committees set up to address barriers to investment and access to agricultural markets. They also added the principle of 'expanding the list of areas for cooperation and reducing the list of differences', in the words of China's Ministry of Commerce.

Initially neutral toward Tehran, Beijing may be slowly adjusting its position by making specific demands. Xi urged the US to return to the Islamabad MOU

Taiwan and arms sales

As expected, the Chinese side raised the issue of Taiwan (although it was not reflected in the summit's outcomes and was absent from the US factsheet). Xi urged Trump to maintain "the correct position of opposing Taiwan independence". The traditional US position is that Washington does not support Taiwanese independence, and Xi's comments triggered debate as to whether this remained the case, or whether Xi wanted him to go a step further.

Trump has previously described Taiwan as a powerful bargaining chip with Beijing and said the island could not be defended militarily. The day after Xi left, Trump said the Chinese president fully understood his position on Taiwan, without giving details. Later, US Ambassador to China David Perdue confirmed that there had been no change in Washington's policy towards the island, but observers note that Trump continues to hold up a $14bn arms sales package to Taiwan, and no final White House decision on this is anticipated before Trump's expected meetings with Xi in Shenzhen and Florida.

Unlike Taiwan, Iran featured in the summit's outcomes. The two presidents called on Iran to honour its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons and stressed their rejection of transit charges through international waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz. Initially neutral toward Tehran, Beijing may be slowly adjusting its position by making specific demands. At the White House, Xi urged the US and Iran to return to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

@Scavino47 / AFP
US President Donald Trump signs a deal to end the US-Iran war inside Château Versailles, in Versailles, southwest of Paris, on 17 June 2026.

After the summit, it was reported that Chinese diplomats offered ideas to both sides to clarify some of the memorandum's disputed provisions. Although Beijing's position does not fully align with Washington's, analysts believe Trump is unlikely to push China further on Iran. This can be regarded as a tactical gain for Beijing, which continues to hold to its red lines on the crisis, foremost among them its opposition to the use of force, violations of sovereignty, and unilateral sanctions.

Til tech us do part

As expected, artificial intelligence (AI) was also discussed, but interest in cooperation is limited, given that Trump has made 'winning the AI race' one of his administration's highest priorities. Alongside the US-China agreement to establish a communication channel for handling AI incidents, there was also a reference to 'dialogue' over the risks and benefits of the technology. After Xi left, Trump said he did not want to integrate US and Chinese efforts in AI, arguing that US firms were ahead and would seek to preserve their advantage. "When you're in the lead, you don't give the other side an opening," he said.

With news later emerging that OpenAI delayed the launch of its latest AI model because of safety concerns, Beijing does not see itself as part of the debate between Trump and the US tech community over the proposed slowdown of AI development (to allow security measures to catch up). China is confident in its governance of these technologies, with frameworks and legislation for their safe development and use. Its focus is more on using AI to transform its economy than on competing with the US.

While Xi's US visit did not produce a big breakthrough, China seems to have achieved tactical gains

While Xi's US visit can cautiously be said to have delivered tactical gains for China, it did not produce a big breakthrough in relations between the two countries. As Zhao noted, the visit produced no long-term trade agreement, no easing of restrictions on chip exports, and no change in the policy governing arms sales to Taiwan.

Zhao stressed, however, that Beijing is prioritising the relationship's trajectory and pace, establishing 'constructive strategic stability' first before building on it. The Shenzhen and Miami summits will test this approach. Whether it paves the way for compromises or remains a dispute-management framework remains to be seen.

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