Politics

Egypt’s Red Sea problems mount as Houthis take territory

The Iran-backed militia has seized most of western Yemen to effectively control the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the gateway to the Red Sea and therefore the Suez Canal

Al Majalla / Reuters

Amr Emam

last update on 13 Sep 2026

The Houthi militia’s advances along the western coast of Yemen in recent days pose a serious strategic challenge for Egypt. These gains mean the Iran-backed group can disrupt or even close the Bab al-Mandab Strait, effectively cutting off Egypt’s Suez Canal as a global shipping transit route.

Houthi territorial seizures along the crucial waterway are the latest Red Sea setback for Cairo. Before the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran on 28 February, Red Sea shipping was slowly beginning to return to something resembling normal levels after Houthi attacks in support of Gaza in 2023-24 led to operators choosing longer but safer routes around Africa.

Egypt was not the Houthis’ primary target, but it still felt the impact, losing billions of dollars in Suez Canal transit fees. Together with other factors, this strained Egypt’s economy and forced a bailout from international financial institutions.

Since Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in March, which prevented much of the Gulf states' oil and gas from being exported, producers have been searching for alternative outlets. Egypt offered to take oil from Saudi Arabia’s prolific eastern fields, pumped across the country via the East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu on Saudi Arabia’s western coast. That oil would then be shipped to the Egyptian Red Sea coast on the opposite side, where it would be pumped via the SUMED pipeline to the port of Sidi Kerir on Egypt’s safer Mediterranean coast, and from there, onwards to international markets.

In this way, Egypt positioned itself as an alternative energy route amid the Hormuz turmoil, in line with its aspiration to become a regional energy hub, but extended Houthi control of the narrow Bab al-Mandab is bad news for Egyptian plans and for Red Sea shipping, the global energy market, and the movement of goods between China and the West.

AFP — A commercial vessel passes through an international shipping lane off Yemen's Hanish Island in the Red Sea on 27 July 2026.

Converging threats

It seems like a long time since Cairo had any good news from the Red Sea. Foreign actors have been arriving on the Red Sea coast one after another in recent years, turning this crucial maritime corridor into a more contested and high-risk environment. Landlocked Ethiopia, Egypt’s arch-rival in the Nile Basin, wants a foothold on the Red Sea and has been eyeing an opportunity through its weaker neighbour, Somalia.

The Red Sea is a crucial economic lifeline for Egypt, given its importance to the Suez Canal, where transit fees are a vital source of foreign currency (dollars). The canal also affords Egypt geostrategic relevance as a route through which up to 15% of global trade would normally move. Ethiopia already controls Egypt’s freshwater supplies, having dammed the Nile River, and Cairo would be loath to let it control the Red Sea, too.

Israel’s recognition of the breakaway Somali region of Somaliland (on the Red Sea coast) and its reported deployment of troops and military assets there has complicated the risks for Egypt. Israeli commentators do not hide the real reason for their Somali venture: to subdue Egypt by controlling the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

Before the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran, Red Sea shipping was beginning to return to something resembling normal

Houthi control of Yemen's southern Red Sea coast, and therefore the Bab al-Mandab Strait, will deflect attention and possibly resources from Iran's actions in the Strait of Hormuz. In essence, though, it means that Iran now controls access to the Arabian Gulf, and Iran's proxy (the Houthis) now controls access to the Red Sea.

Houthi control of the western Yemen coast also complicates wider security problems in the region, such as efforts to confront a recent resurgence in piracy, which has previously been led by groups from Somalia. Some Somali non-state actors, such as al-Shabaab, are believed to have cultivated links with the Houthis. If they come together through shared interests, this combined force could further threaten maritime navigation in the region.

Reuters — A Houthi military helicopter flies over the Galaxy Leader cargo ship in the Red Sea in this photo released on 20 November,2023.

Calculated caution

Egypt has so far resisted pressure to join the war on Iran. Likewise, when the Houthis targeted Red Sea commercial shipping during Israel's war on Gaza, Egypt refused to be dragged in. Cairo considers Houthi action in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait as impacting Egypt, without being aimed at Egypt. In dealing with the new development on the western Yemeni coast, Egypt will be informed by its past experiences, national security calculations, and traditional balancing act.

Caution is advised. Egypt has bitter memories of its 1962 intervention in northern Yemen. Egypt's Free Officers turned their own monarchy into a republic ten years earlier and were keen to support their military peers seeking to end the royalist regime in north Yemen. But the initial offer of help turned into an extended war that exhausted the Egyptian army. This had dire consequences, as it left the country unprepared for the June 1967 war against Israel, which resulted in the Israeli occupation of Sinai.

Egyptian intelligentsia see the country's involvement in the 2026 conflict as the best way to drain it economically and militarily. As a result, many prefer containment to intervention. A common view is that no one can win the current upheaval, despite claims to the contrary. Will this mindset hold if the Houthis close the Bab al-Mandab Strait, hitting Egypt in the coffers? Nobody can answer that question, at least now.

Yemeni fishermen pass alongside a commercial vessel in the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait, Yemen, on 5 April 2026.

Israel has said it may join a wider war against the Houthis. Will that constrain any potential Egyptian military response? Ideally, Cairo would prefer not to line up in battle with the Israelis, given their recent conduct and obvious interests in becoming the regional hegemon. A bigger reason not to get involved, however, would be the perception that Egypt waging war on the Houthis equates to Egypt entering the war against Iran, which is known to be the main sponsor of the Yemeni group.

Cairo has spent seven months staying out of the battle with the Islamic Republic, not least because it views Iran as an important counterweight in maintaining regional balance of power. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said earlier this month that Cairo preferred de-escalation and calm, even as it copes with $11bn in losses from the Red Sea unrest. Egypt's government seems to hope that diplomacy and containment can succeed in the future, where they have failed in the past.

+ / -