The 9/11 attacks of 2001 ushered in a security paradigm centred on identifying and defeating a particular enemy: transnational terrorism. Twenty-five years later, security is better understood as protecting interconnected systems against multiple, overlapping forms of disruption.
September 11 transformed international security by making transnational terrorism the dominant organising threat. The resulting “war on terror” was built around a relatively straightforward strategic logic: identify hostile organisations, disrupt their networks, deny them territory, and use military, intelligence, and law-enforcement tools to defeat them. This paradigm shaped US foreign policy and much of Western security thinking for two decades, from Afghanistan and Iraq to counter-terrorism partnerships across the Middle East and Africa.
Twenty-five years after 9/11, terrorism has not disappeared, and the “war on terror” paradigm has remained relevant, as illustrated in the military defeat of the Islamic State (IS) at the hands of an international coalition.
The “war on terror” is no longer the dominant organising framework for understanding today’s security landscape. Not only have new threats appeared, but the nature of security itself has changed. Three issues now rise to the fore when thinking about security: the rise of hybrid warfare; the meaning of resilience and deterrence; and networked security.

Hybrid warfare
Hybrid warfare has become a routine instrument of geopolitical competition. Before 9/11, there was a distinction between “war” and other security threats. Over the last 25 years, the differentiation between conventional warfare (between states) and asymmetric warfare against terrorists and insurgents has eroded.
As seen in the cases of Russia and Iran, states routinely employ asymmetric instruments, from proxies to cyber operations, sabotage, information warfare, to covert action. Meanwhile, non-state actors increasingly possess capabilities once associated with states, including precision missiles, sophisticated drones, surveillance technology, and electronic warfare. Security policy can no longer focus principally on defeating an identifiable enemy on a physical battlefield. Security itself as a concept therefore needs to be regarded as hybrid.
The same hybridity applies to the concept of power, which in the twenty-first century cannot be measured primarily by military capability. Power also depends upon control of, and resilience within, technological, economic, and informational systems. As vividly seen in the context of the Iran war, AI, cyber capabilities, drones, satellites, and advanced surveillance increasingly determine states’ ability to compete and defend themselves.
In the same vein, national vulnerability increasingly arises from technological dependence. Beyond military capability and domestic and foreign policies, national security also relies on cloud computing, digital platforms and telecommunications infrastructure, alongside physical structures like undersea cables.

Resilience and deterrence
The Iran war further illustrates the centrality of economic resilience to the notion of security. Supply chains once viewed primarily through the lens of efficiency are increasingly assessed through the lens of resilience. Just as Iran and its proxies have tried to use economic disruption as part of hybrid warfare—by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz and to attack shipping in the Red Sea—the US is using economic coercion to counter Iran’s destabilisation.
This demonstrates the growing merger between economic policy and security policy. Under such conditions of disruption, security increasingly means keeping essential systems functioning. This is why Arab Gulf countries are investing in alternatives to secure their food and energy sources and global trade.
The importance of resilience to security is not limited to the economy. The traditional conception of national security is fundamentally territorial, where governments must protect borders, populations, and sovereignty from external attack. Those responsibilities remain, but the systems societies depend on have become additional security frontiers that must be resilient.
