Politics

An Iraqi Kurdistan without an American umbrella

As Washington's ability to protect its bases across the Middle East has been substantially weakened by the US war on Iran, Iraqi Kurds look for ways to shield themselves from further entanglement

Al Majalla

Rustum Mahmud

last update on 22 Aug 2026

On 17 August, the private office of Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and the headquarters of the region’s foreign intelligence service, Parastin, came under Iranian drone attack. It was the most serious escalation to date, and came only days after the United States began withdrawing personnel and equipment from its military bases in the Kurdistan Region, a process that the Iraqi federal government has formally said will be completed by the end of next September.

The development raises pressing questions about the future of air protection for the Kurdistan Region, which has endured more than 1,000 attacks in recent months from Iran and Iraqi factions aligned with it. It also threatens to open a new source of friction within Iraq over which authority should take control of the military facilities once they are vacated. Both questions have wider implications for the regional balance at a time when Iran and the US are engaged in open conflict.

According to detailed information obtained by Al Majalla, large C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft have, over the past two weeks, removed US Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries from the American military base adjoining Erbil International Airport and transferred them to US bases in Jordan. The aerial surveillance balloon over Erbil has also been taken down, while Britain has moved its Rapid Sentry air-defence system to Cyprus. The United States and Britain, along with Germany and France, have retained only small military contingents at the base.

The US logistics base near Erbil airport operated much like Camp Victory near Baghdad International Airport. Since 2014, it has served as a hub for surveillance, communications and logistical support for local partners involved in counterterrorism operations, as well as a coordination point with other members of the international coalition.

Nearby lies Harir military base, around 100 kilometres north of Erbil. It served as a centre for US military operations during the American presence in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. Kurdish authorities say, however, that the base has been effectively empty of military personnel for nearly a decade, with only a small number of civilian staff and limited equipment remaining to keep the site operational. Several smaller logistical centres across the Region have also remained in use since 1991.

Reuters — Kurdish officers at a ceremony for the distribution of US military aid to Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in Erbil, Iraq, on 10 November 2020.

The US military has yet to define clearly the nature of the current withdrawal. American officials have said that US forces routinely move between their various positions and that the military conflict across the Middle East has made such repositioning increasingly necessary in response to operational requirements.

Circles close to the Kurdistan Regional Government have sought to downplay the significance of the American measures, saying the transfers concern only forces moved from other parts of Iraq into the Kurdistan Region over the past year.

A senior Kurdish political source set out this view in remarks to Al Majalla. "This development isn't concerning for three reasons, although we regard the American presence as an important factor in maintaining stability in Iraq. First, the United States cannot simply abandon Iraq, particularly to regional powers hostile to Washington. Iraq remains a strategic centre of American interests and influence, above all in the security and military spheres. When the United States sought to move beyond that reality in 2011 and withdrew completely from Iraq, it returned less than three years later with even greater force after the rise of the Islamic State (IS).

"The second consideration is the Kurdistan Region’s political position towards regional conflicts, which rests on clear neutrality and a firm determination not to interfere in the affairs of any party. That will remain the Region’s principal shield and one of the foundations of its stability."

"Alongside these two factors, we are convinced that part of the international military presence will remain in Kurdistan under different designations, whether in the form of forces protecting diplomatic interests or centres for coordination, training and intelligence exchange. Those structures will themselves preserve a degree of security protection for the Region, at least in the air. Kurdistan’s geopolitical importance is simply too great for it to be left on its own."

AFP — Masrour Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, holds a press conference in Erbil, the region's capital, on 25 June 2025.

Sparring over control

Observers expect the question of who will assume control of the vacated US military and logistical facilities in the Kurdistan Region to develop into a prolonged political and media dispute between Erbil and Baghdad. The disagreement reflects competing legal and political interpretations of the rules governing the issue, although beneath them lies the more fundamental problem of persistent mistrust between the two sides.

The presence of US forces in Kurdistan dates back to mid-1991, when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688, paving the way for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Kurdish areas to protect civilians from attacks by the former Iraqi regime. Over time, that foreign military presence became an important factor in both the emergence of the Kurdistan Region and the protection of its autonomy.

Iraqi federal authorities, however, regard that chapter as belonging to the past. In their view, Kurdistan’s federal status is now safeguarded by the Iraqi constitution rather than by any external military force. According to the federal government’s stated position, the Iraqi army should assume control of the vacated bases and centres, since they fall within the structures of air defence, an area that legally and constitutionally falls under the authority of the army and the federal government. Even the Kurdistan Region’s civilian airports and land border crossings are administered by federal institutions.

The Kurdish side, by contrast, points to Article 121, paragraph five, of the Iraqi constitution, which states that "the regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the Region, particularly the establishment and organisation of the internal security forces for the Region such as police, security forces and guards of the Region."

We are convinced that part of the international military presence will remain in Kurdistan under different designations, preserving a degree of security for the Region.

Senior Kurdish political source

From the Kurdish perspective, this provision entitles the Peshmerga to assume control of the bases and use them in accordance with the constitutional functions assigned to the Region's security forces.

Observers of Iraqi affairs expect some form of political accommodation between the two sides, along the lines of arrangements reached in other disputed areas such as airport administration and border security. Under such formulas, security and military structures remain administratively and financially subordinate to the federal government, the army and the relevant federal ministries, while their officers and personnel are drawn from the Kurdistan Region and are, in practice, seconded from institutions belonging to the regional government.

The question, however, extends far beyond an administrative compromise. Should Iraqi federal forces take control of these bases, they would also assume both the authority and the responsibility to provide sustained protection for the Kurdistan Region's airspace, whether from missile strikes, drone attacks or any ground incursion across its borders.

So far, the federal government has announced no comprehensive arrangements for providing such protection, beyond limited proposals concerning the defence of oil installations belonging to the central government.

AFP — Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani (left) meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Regional President Nechirvan Barzani in Erbil on 22 April 2024.

Tricky landscape

Official circles in the Kurdistan Region have confirmed leaked reports that the Region's President, Nechirvan Barzani, has been engaged in political mediation between the United States and Iran, particularly with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. According to those reports, Barzani contacted IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi and secured the "full confidence" of the United States. Observers have interpreted his initiative as an attempt by the Kurdistan Region to preserve as much neutrality as possible in the ongoing war and to avert any development that could imperil its security, or even its continued existence.

In an extended interview with Al Majalla, political science professor Nawal Ramo sets out three broad dimensions defining the present moment: the motives behind the withdrawal, the weakening of the protective umbrella, and the possible consequences.

"There was already a process under way for the withdrawal of US and international forces from Iraq, driven by domestic Iraqi pressure. Yet the United States could have found reasons and justifications for maintaining its presence had that presence continued to serve its security interests and reinforce its influence. Over the past six months, however, Washington's ability to provide comprehensive and sustained deterrence for all its facilities across the Middle East has declined unexpectedly.

"Reducing its military footprint has therefore become an additional tactical consideration within a withdrawal process that was already under way in Iraq. That withdrawal forms part of a broader regional picture in which the United States has reduced its military presence in several countries, repositioning and reorganising its forces as part of its strategy for confronting Iran in the foreseeable future. This is scarcely surprising in light of reports that its stocks of defensive munitions have been depleted, particularly air-defence systems such as Patriot. Only around six hundred interceptor missiles are produced each year, while they have been expended at an exceptional rate in recent months to defend US bases across the region."

Ramo continues: "This will have major repercussions for the Kurdistan Region because the American military presence provided a political umbrella as well as a security one. Contrary to the optimistic interpretations offered by many analysts, the disappearance of US military bases from Kurdistan will not reduce attacks by Iran and the Iraqi factions aligned with it. The absence of such bases from other parts of Iraq has done nothing to alter their approach towards central Iraq.

AFP — Smoke rises from an oil depot in the Kani Qirjala area on the outskirts of Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, following a suspected drone strike on 1 April 2026.

"For Iran and its allies, the issue reaches far beyond a political or security dispute with the United States and its military presence. They oppose that presence because it limits their ability to dominate Iraq's political, security and economic life. Iranian strategy will therefore continue to view Kurdistan as a region that remained beyond Tehran's reach because of American protection and is now losing that shield."

"That perception could produce several overlapping forms of escalation: attacks on oil installations intended to force international energy companies to leave, ground assaults on the headquarters of Iranian Kurdish parties, and even threats against the principal centres of political authority in the Region."

Ramo nevertheless points to two considerations that could restrain any Iranian move against Kurdistan. "All these assessments rest on the assumption that the American withdrawal from Kurdistan will prove lasting and final. That remains far from certain. The most consequential factor, the war with Iran, is still unresolved, and its unpredictable course and outcome could overturn existing calculations and arrangements at any moment. All parties are acutely aware of this and factor it into their decisions. There is already a precedent: in 2014, US forces returned with remarkable speed."

"The second consideration concerns the regional balance of power. An unchecked Iranian advance into Kurdistan would amount to complete Iranian domination of Iraq and, in turn, a restoration of Tehran's regional influence to something approaching the position it enjoyed before the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Many regional states would regard such an outcome as unacceptable and would clearly move to support the Kurdistan Region."

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