Nearly 18 months after the fall of the Assad regime, Russia has lost the privileged military and security position it had worked to consolidate for more than a decade. Syria has entered a new phase in which the former Russian and Iranian camp retains far less authority and fewer privileges than it enjoyed under Assad.
On 9 August, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Damascus and Moscow that redefined the future of Russia’s last military strongholds in Syria—the Hmeimim and Tartus bases. The agreement will see Syria take control of civilian facilities at the Hmeimim airbase and the commercial section of Tartus port. The military facilities, meanwhile, will be transformed into joint training and capacity-building centres, with the transition expected to be completed within three months.
For 18 months, the Syrian government worked to gradually neutralise the security and economic flashpoints that Russia could have exploited as its authority and decades of investment in Syria came under threat. The process began with conditional acceptance of Russia’s presence and agreements aimed at protecting its bases and personnel in Syria under Syrian supervision.
This marked a departure from the Assad era, when the Syrian presidency, army, and security services were unable to intervene in the affairs of Russian bases or personnel.
Before 8 December 2024, Russia had three bases in Syria: Qamishli airport, east of the Euphrates; Hmeimim airport, in the Qardaha countryside; and Tartus port. Russia also maintained military command centres in the capital, Damascus, and military positions across several Syrian regions, most notably in southern and northwestern Syria.
Russia also exercised authority over military formations outside its formal armed forces, including non-Syrian forces such as Wagner, as well as local forces operating both within and outside the Syrian army. These included some National Defence Forces groups, the Tiger Forces (Quwwat al-Nimr), the Fifth Corps, ISIS Hunters, the Eighth Brigade, and others.
With Assad’s fall, Russia lost its other military positions and its local and foreign-affiliated forces, leaving it with only the three main bases in Qamishli, Hmeimim, and Tartus. Russian control over Qamishli did not last long. Russia withdrew last January after repeated messages from the Syrian authorities that its presence in Qamishli was unsafe and threatened Syria’s efforts to unify its territory and establish security.
Carving out a foothold
Following its military intervention in Syria in late 2015, Russia spent years seeking to establish a presence that would secure broad geopolitical, military, and economic gains. The military agreements signed with the Assad regime went far beyond ordinary arrangements. They gave Russia unprecedented authority over Syrian territory within its bases, limiting the ability of Assad and his regime to intervene in Russian affairs and activities there. At one stage, this effectively deprived Syria of sovereignty over parts of its territory.
The Qamishli base, located at Qamishli airport, gave Russia a political and military card with which to pressure the international coalition and the US. It sought to exploit Arab hostility towards the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the international coalition, while presenting itself to the SDF as a potential mediator between Damascus and the group. Russia also convinced the SDF that its relationship with Türkiye enabled it to reach understandings with Ankara and open channels of communication.
From 2021 to 2024, Russian and SDF officials held weekly meetings at Qamishli airport, while Russia also transported SDF leaders to Hmeimim and Damascus for meetings with the Assad regime.
In Latakia, the situation had a different dimension. Hmeimim was effectively Russian territory on Syrian soil, where the Assad regime could exercise no authority. The base became one of Russia’s largest in the region and a source of political and military leverage over the Syrian opposition and Türkiye. Its proximity to northern Syria allowed Moscow to threaten military action against opposition-held areas and exploit Turkish fears of another wave of Syrian displacement.
The benefits of Hmeimim airport extended beyond geopolitical influence in the Middle East. It also became a departure point for the recruitment and transport of thousands of Syrians to Libya and Russia, including recruits who were later sent to Ukraine to fight for the Russian army.
In Tartus, the Russian base served as Moscow’s foothold in warm waters, demonstrating Russia’s return to the region and giving it political, economic, and naval influence. To strengthen its power and influence, Russia signed several agreements with the Assad regime relating to Syria’s oil and energy sectors, including contracts linked to oil in Syrian waters. The base also allowed Russia to deploy naval vessels and maintain a permanent military presence in the Mediterranean.
Together, these bases gave Russia a combination of military reach, political leverage, and economic influence that made Syria one of Moscow’s most important strategic gains in the Middle East since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Defining the contours of a new era
Since the fall of the Assad regime, the Syrian authorities have dealt with Russia delicately. Over the following 18 months, the Syrian government sought to create conditions that could slowly squeeze Moscow out.
Less than a month after the fall of the Assad regime, a Russian delegation headed by Mikhail Bogdanov, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy to the Middle East, arrived in Damascus. During that visit, Moscow received positive but conditional messages from Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The new Syria was open to relations with Moscow, provided Russia respected the will and interests of the Syrian people.
Less than two months later, in mid-February 2025, al-Sharaa held his first official call with Putin. During the conversation, Putin expressed Russia’s readiness to reconsider the Syrian-Russian agreements signed under the Assad regime.
