Türkiye first recognised Israel in 1949, shortly after Zionist leaders like David Ben-Gurion proclaimed a Jewish state in Palestine. In so doing, it became the first Muslim-majority nation to do so (Iran was the second, its recognition coming in 1950). Six decades later, trade was booming and relations between Tel Aviv and Ankara were good. Some analysts felt that this may be the Middle East’s most important axis.
Today, relations between them are far from cordial. Instead, most describe theirs as a bitter rivalry. The decisive rupture followed Israel’s response to the attacks of 7 October 2023. Türkiye accused Israel of genocide in Gaza, while Israel increasingly sees Türkiye as a growing threat to its regional influence, particularly in Syria, the gas-rich Eastern Mediterranean, and the corridors of power in Washington.
Israeli officials now refer to Türkiye as the “new Iran,” but to-date, direct escalation has been avoided, largely due to American pressure, reinforced by the close personal relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and US President Donald Trump, who also counts Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as an ally.
Scanning for hotspots
Looking at possible flashpoints, most eyes fall on Syria, which shares a border with both Türkiye and Israel. The fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 opened the way for an intense struggle for influence. Türkiye supports the new government led by former jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa (who Trump seems to like) and favours the emergence of a strong, unified, and centralised Syrian state.
Ankara provides weapons, intelligence, and technical assistance, and planned to establish military bases in Syria before Israeli airstrikes. Türkiye also wants to establish an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement with the new Syrian authorities.
Israel, meanwhile, carried out 988 air and artillery strikes during the first seven months after Assad’s fall, three times the average recorded during the preceding years of his rule. It targeted Syrian airbases that Türkiye was preparing to use, expanded its presence in southern Syria, and offered to support Druze militias who seek autonomy. More broadly, Israel regards ‘the new Syria’ as a potential threat to its freedom of action. It therefore seeks a weak and fragmented neighbour, not a strong, independent one.
Forging alliances
Türkiye continues to pursue its ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine. After signing an EEZ agreement with Libya in 2019, it now wants something similar with Syria. Türkiye is increasingly concerned by its strategic encirclement, as military cooperation among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus deepens through joint military exercises and defence coordination. Israel is also part of regional energy alliances, most notably the East Mediterranean Gas Forum.
In Somalia, Türkiye has maintained a military base since 2017, but Israel recently became the first country to recognise the breakaway region of Somaliland as a state. According to US media reports, Israel is now building a military base on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast, not far from Yemen (from where Israel can target the Houthis) and Sudan, where a three-year civil war still rages. This widening reach has made the Turkish-Israeli competition structural, rather than temporary.
Israel has reinforced its alliances with Greece and Cyprus through military exercises and expanded defence cooperation. It has also deepened its relations with the UAE and India. Its military advantage over Iran has strengthened its regional position. After the war with Iran, Israeli defence firms are also expected to seek new markets in the Gulf.
Saudi Arabia continues to reject formal relations with Israel, maintaining that this must follow peace negotiations leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state. At the same time, Riyadh has moved closer to Ankara, including through growing cooperation in the defence sector. Together with Pakistan, the trio work closely on military matters. Türkiye has also consolidated its alliance with Qatar and avoided confronting Iran by joining several of its allies in the 2025-26 wars.
It has also expanded its military partnership with Azerbaijan, with Turkish drones having contributed significantly to Baku’s battlefield success against Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. By improving its relations with several Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Ankara has been able to present itself as a stabilising regional power, in contrast with Israel, which it portrays as increasingly unrestrained.
Arms exports
Both Israel and Türkiye are major arms exporters and their competition is especially pronounced in unmanned systems. Türkiye’s defence and aerospace exports surpassed $10bn in 2025, three times as much as 2021, with further growth in 2026. Baykar has become a leading defence firm, its Bayraktar TB2 drone now in service in more than 30 countries, including in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, and Azerbaijan.
