Iran is taking its proxy tactics and applying them to Hormuz

Attacks by American and Iranian forces on each other, their allies, and their infrastructure shows that the short-lived truce is now a distant memory. This lets Arab nations reassess.

Iran is taking its proxy tactics and applying them to Hormuz

The memorandum of understanding between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran lasted barely a month, which showed just how much understanding there really was. On 18 June 2026, US President Donald Trump and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian signed (remotely) the Islamabad Memorandum, but within days, it had begun to unravel.

Washington accused Tehran of attacking oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz and responded with airstrikes against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). On 8 July, Trump declared the memorandum void and said the US was reverting to direct military action. It was a blow to diplomats, especially in Pakistan, which had been mediating, together with involvement from Oman.

When talks opened in Islamabad, there were hopes in some quarters that the agreement might finally end a war that had drained the region and cost tens of billions of dollars, not least in lost oil and gas exports. Amid the backslapping over a deal, however, some feared that the understandings concealed undisclosed provisions, echoing arrangements reached under former US President Barack Obama. In the end, they were proved right; the agreement lasted only a few days.

Realities, regardless

It seems that the desire to end a war many consider rash was not enough to bridge the deep strategic divide between Washington and Tehran. The White House may have been willing to overlook the anxieties of some allies, but it was not prepared to accept Iranian conditions or acquiesce to Tehran’s regional behaviour. There were also realities neither side could wish away.

The attacks of 7 October and the upheaval that followed reshaped the regional balance of power and inflicted heavy losses on Iran and its wider project. It also showed that Iran’s proxies posed a danger far beyond Israel—and that Israel was never their primary target. Today, those proxies and allies in countries like Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq have either collapsed entirely or else are significantly weakened.

The desire to end a war many consider rash was not enough to bridge the deep strategic divide between Washington and Tehran

The fall of Bashar al‑Assad's regime in Damascus has made any attempt to revive them an exceptionally difficult task. For years, these organisations served as instruments of Iran's expansionist project, levers for pressuring Arab states and the international community using a form of political intimidation. Their actions violated international law and the norms governing relations between states.

From the playbook

Tehran now seems intent on applying the same method in the Strait of Hormuz, turning one of the world's most crucial trade routes into a tool of coercion and a means of extracting political and economic concessions. Iran has also resumed its policy of targeting Gulf states, including Oman, justifying these attacks by claiming that they are striking at American interests in the region.

Meanwhile, Tehran still sees itself as the region's dominant power. It shows little regard for the sovereignty or interests of neighbouring states and appears equally indifferent to its various domestic crises. Yet its influence is becoming more fragile and the Middle East more dangerous than it was even a month ago.

During and prior to the aborted ceasefire, Iran was fighting to secure an agreement. Now, it is fighting to revive a project that has lost the conditions that once sustained it — and is holding the entire region hostage to that ambition. Will the ceasefire in Lebanon hold? What if Hezbollah chooses to launch another war in the name of support? What awaits Gaza? What of Syria, where Iranian cells remain active? And will the Houthis close the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the same way that Iran has closed Hormuz?

Range of targets

For evidence of a tonal shift, consider the message delivered by Iran's new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, at the funeral of his father, Ali Khamenei, vowing vengeance against those responsible for his father's death. More troubling, he said the perpetrators would be pursued not by Iranian agencies alone, but by "the free people of the world and the champions of freedom". This threat should be seen in the context of Iran's mounting attacks on Gulf states. Is any country outside Iran's orbit now a target?

The Arab League appears as powerless as ever, unable to adopt an effective stance or even issue a political statement commensurate with the scale of the threat. Some Arab states may still be wagering on rapprochement with Tehran; others may not yet have grasped the full danger that Iran's project poses to the region's security and identity. The moment may therefore offer the states under threat an opportunity to coordinate their positions and establish a joint mechanism to safeguard their security and interests, whether the US-Iran war continues or not.

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