For decades, Lebanon has endured a succession of fragile settlements and recurring wars, with nothing having closed the chapter on conflict once and for all. Earlier efforts in hindsight amounted to crisis management, rather than a genuine search for solutions. Yet as talks with Israel progress, could it be different this time?
There is a sense that the entire region is moving towards ‘final settlements’ and Lebanon is not outside this process. The main obstacle to peace has long been Hezbollah’s weapons, its repercussions extending across the Arab world. The flow of weapons affects the borders, security, and stability of other states.
Hezbollah now justifies its weaponry as necessary to protect Lebanon’s Shiite community, the group’s rationale having gradually moved beyond conflict with Israel. This shows that Hezbollah seems determined to remain armed to influence Lebanon’s internal politics, regardless of the fate of the conflict with Israel.
Laying the groundwork
When Lebanese President Joseph Aoun visited Washington this month to meet US President Donald Trump, he linked the confinement of weapons to the Lebanese state to three conditions that would remove Hezbollah’s stated justifications for retaining its arms: an end to the Israeli occupation, state authority exercised (through the army) across all Lebanese territory, and much-needed reconstruction efforts.
All three conditions have previously been achieved or pursued. The sticking point has always been the second; extending state authority across the country. In practical terms, this means a generational change, away from compromise and evasive balancing, towards the full and bold assertion of state sovereignty. It means getting rid of the illegal weapons that became intertwined with the structure of the state, and redefining the relationship between security and sovereignty in accordance with the requirements of statehood and Lebanon’s national interests.
Without a clear and practical mechanism for eliminating illegal weapons, any settlement will remain fragile. It may halt the fighting temporarily, but violence will return when circumstances permit. Such precarious stability is no longer acceptable regionally, internationally, or within Lebanon itself.
At this point, external factors emerge as a principal determinant of the settlement’s course. Lebanon cannot afford to ignore Israel’s demands or its concerns regarding security and borders. Broader regional calculations, particularly those involving Iran, also mean that the continued existence of Hezbollah’s weapons is tied to balances of influence, rather than merely to an internal political decision.
Facing facts
Iran does not seem ready to relinquish its strategic assets (such as Hezbollah) before a final settlement is reached that safeguards its interests, particularly if it is not being forced to end its support for militias. Meanwhile, for Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his political priorities appear closely linked to the security promises he made to Israeli voters, and Hezbollah will continue to be a threat.
This explains the growing importance of adopting a practical approach to Hezbollah’s weapons. Any settlement that fails to address the fundamental security dimension of this issue will remain vulnerable to collapse. Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump’s suggestion that Syria disarm Hezbollah can be understood (Damascus rejected these calls and Aoun confirmed Lebanon’s opposition to them during his meeting with Trump).
