Hormuz may reopen, but the deal is strewn with mines

The sanctions mine

The second mine concerns sanctions. Iran wants a swift and comprehensive lifting of sanctions, the release of frozen assets, a full return to global markets and a reconstruction fund. Washington, however, wants to link any sanctions relief to concrete and verifiable Iranian steps. The gap between the two positions remains wide. Timing is crucial here. Trump wants a quick achievement that he can present before the midterm elections in November as a personal success that ended the war and restored stability to energy markets, while the Iranians have time on their side in managing the negotiations. Previous experience indicates that major nuclear agreements are not drafted in 60 days, but over several years.

The Hormuz control mine

Then comes an issue no less important. The memorandum of understanding does not merely reopen the strait. For the first time, it gives Iran US recognition of its role in managing one of the world's most important maritime routes. Paragraph five refers to a dialogue led by Tehran with Oman and other coastal states to determine the future management of maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran emerged from the war battered: its "Supreme Leader" assassinated, key military and infrastructure assets destroyed, the conflict pushed onto its own territory, and its proxies weakened. Yet it wants to control this energy artery. More dangerously, the Trump administration implicitly accepted this new reality. What may seem like a technical clause carries far-reaching implications. The concern is not only regional, especially after a series of attacks on neighbouring states. It also sets a precedent in international relations regarding maritime routes, making global energy security part of direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran.

The Israel mine

Despite the importance of all these mines, there is another mine no less significant: Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu is not pleased with the agreement. He sees it as a deal that grants Iran immediate gains and postpones the core issues related to proxies, militias, drones and missiles to a later stage with uncertain outcomes.

The first paragraph of the memorandum of understanding provides for a halt to military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. Tehran considers this "arena" part of the agreement and believes that any final understanding must include guarantees related to Lebanon's sovereignty and the cessation of Israeli military operations.

Israel, however, shows no sign of treating Lebanon as part of the deal. Tel Aviv does not consider itself a party to the agreement and will retain, in its view, the right to act against Hezbollah whenever it deems that necessary. This is one of the central contradictions in the agreement. Any Israeli airstrike or new confrontation with Hezbollah could derail repeated ceasefire efforts and quickly turn into a crisis that threatens the entire course of negotiations. Perhaps Lebanon, not the nuclear file, will become the real test of the agreement's ability to survive.

The mistrust mine

Above all, there remains the mine of mistrust. Iran is negotiating with a US president who withdrew from the previous nuclear agreement, then waged war against it during the negotiations, killed its "Supreme Leader", and said he wanted to "change its regime" or "destroy its civilisation". Washington is negotiating with a regime that considers it the "Great Satan", has not stopped targeting it and its allies, attacking its bases and personnel, and seeks to buy time and preserve its nuclear capabilities. Israel, meanwhile, sees the agreement as a cover that gives Iran an opportunity to regroup, rebuild its leverage and reorganise its proxies.

For this reason, reopening the Strait of Hormuz may be much easier than opening the path towards a final agreement. Naval mines can be located and removed within weeks. But the political, nuclear and regional mines planted inside the agreement itself, whose detonators are held by many players, may require long months of negotiation. They may even explode before the finish line is reached. The delay in launching negotiations and the bombardment in Lebanon are only a glimpse of what may lie ahead.