Politics

Ethiopia’s psychological campaign for Red Sea access

For Addis Ababa, using Djibouti’s port for trade is not enough; it wants its own sovereign access to international waters. However, this first needs the consent of suspicious neighbours.

MARCO SIMONCELLI / AFP Photo by MARCO SIMONCELLI / AFP Voters check their voter registration cards outside Shalla Park polling station in Addis Ababa on 1 June 2026, during the 2026 Ethiopian parliamentary elections.

Ethiopia’s psychological campaign for Red Sea access

Amr Emam

last update on 04 Jun 2026

As Ethiopians went to the polls last week, politicians in the landlocked country stepped up their push for Red Sea access, citing its right to the waters and Egypt’s hostile encirclement in neighbouring states. Africa’s second-most populous country is ruled by the Prosperity Party of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who came to power in 2018 and is expected to win again (voting is suspended in the northern Tigray region owing to security concerns).

Ahmed, who wants to lead Ethiopia with its 138 million population for another five years, said he expected the new generation of Ethiopians to succeed in reaching the sea if today’s generation could not do so through “reasonable” and “fair” means. Geographically, Ethiopia has been hemmed in since Eritrea’s independence in 1993 and can only gain a foothold on the Red Sea by consent. Yet despite having no legal right, officials in Addis Ababa often invoke Red Sea access using a mix of coercive threats, framing access as a prerequisite for regional stability in the Horn of Africa.

Escalating its campaign ahead of last week's polls, Ethiopia aimed to create an illusory truth effect by normalising its claims to Red Sea access through repetition. For Addis Ababa, there are strong links between access to international waters and its development aspirations. By repeatedly criticising Egypt, it aims to scare littoral states away from challenging its rights claims. It shows that Ethiopia sees itself as far bigger than it actually is.

It appears to be part of Ethiopia’s struggle for relevance in the Horn of Africa, a region that is changing quickly and dramatically. In recent months, the security of global seaborne trade has topped almost every agenda, after Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz. The Red Sea, and therefore the Bab el-Mandeb Strait that acts as a gateway, are also crucial for maritime commerce.

Ethiopia’s broader standoff with Egypt is centred on the former’s newfound control of Egypt’s freshwater supplies from the Nile River, following the recent construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a gigantic hydroelectric structure in Ethiopia built across the Blue Nile. The Nile is formed when the Blue Nile and the White Nile meet, providing Egypt with over 95% of its freshwater needs.

Luis TATO / AFP — Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed delivers his remarks during the official inauguration ceremony of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in Guba, on 9 September 2025.

Cause for concern

Now operational and generating electricity, the dam responds to Ethiopia’s development needs, providing much-needed electrical power to a huge population. This makes Ethiopia a regional powerhouse and a water superpower. Egypt worries that rules regulating water distribution from transboundary rivers, including a ban on monopolising these rivers, have been ignored by Ethiopia, which has denied the water rights of downstream states like Egypt and Sudan. This could exacerbate water poverty.

To make matters worse, Ethiopia is constructing a series of other dams to further utilise the river’s waters, a move that Egypt fears will cause more significant harm to downstream states. The two countries negotiated over the dam for a decade, seeking to agree its operational rules, but Cairo finally gave up in December 2023, accusing Addis Ababa of delaying tactics.

In response, the Egyptians are increasing their influence in Ethiopia’s immediate vicinity by enhancing its security cooperation with its neighbours. Cairo would also like to establish a presence in the Red Sea ports of countries like Eritrea and Djibouti, so it becomes a party Ethiopia needs to secure agreement from if it wants access to the sea.

The GERD took Ethiopia 14 years to build, and successive governments have used both the dam and Egyptian opposition to it as a unifying point. Similarly, Addis Ababa is turning its quest for Red Sea access into a public-diplomacy tool.

Neighbours are suspicious over Ethiopia's Red Sea ambitions, given that Israel hopes to establish a naval presence in Somaliland

Difficult times

For analysts, the timing cannot be overlooked—the country faces some big economic, security, and political threats. Reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund have led to growth of up to 10% in the Ethiopian economy, attracting investment to key sectors, yet they have also translated into hardship for tens of millions of Ethiopians. The poverty rate is now 43%, up from 33% almost a decade earlier, but the Prosperity Party government allows no expression of opposition to its policies, with press freedom significantly curtailed.

The country faces serious security challenges in three of its most populous regions, which together account for almost 54% of its 1.1 million square kilometres of land area. The brutal two-year war in the northern Tigray region (2020-22) left over 600,000 people dead by some estimates. Ethiopia also faces insurgencies in the northern region of Amhara and the western region of Oromo. Some fear a violent fragmentation not unlike Yugoslavia after the Cold War.

Red Sea access, therefore, fits the strategic framing as a 'national' ambition, but unlike the GERD, this ambition does not begin and end in Ethiopia, because neighbouring littoral states must give their consent. This leads to the nub of the issue: the type of access Ethiopia wants. Djibouti already provides access to the Red Sea, with almost 95% of Ethiopia's imports and exports utilising Djibouti's ports, but this costs Ethiopia hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

Rather than be required to pay to use someone else's ports and territory, Ethiopia wants its own sovereign access to the sea, as opposed to the freedom of transit that it already has. This would-be Red Sea foothold offers insights into Ethiopia's plan to impose its physical authority on the coast. Ethiopia has suggested that it can even play a role in Red Sea security.

Farhan Aleli / AFP — This aerial view shows residents waving Somaliland flags as they gather to celebrate Israel's announcement recognising Somaliland's statehood in downtown Hargeisa, on 26 December 2025.

Distrusting neighbours

Neighbours are suspicious, given Ethiopia's possible recognition of the breakaway Somali region of Somaliland, where Israel hopes to establish a naval presence (Israel became the first UN member state to recognise Somaliland as a sovereign and independent state late last year).

For Cairo, this heightens the risks associated with Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea. To overcome these suspicions, Addis Ababa needs not only to change its rhetoric but also to build trust with regional parties regarding its ultimate intentions. This can only be done over time, and will be based on actions, not words.

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