Vanishing horizon: why Sudan’s civil war is getting harder to solve

The danger of relying on defected military commanders, or on commanders aligned with the army, is that they themselves can become warlords. Each commander may be backed separately to impose control over his tribal sphere of influence and protect it from enemies. Should the warring parties become accustomed to this pattern, Sudan will move beyond partition and instead face fragmentation, threatening the state of Sudan as it is currently known, within its recognised borders.

Participants of this war now worry that they may not get their share of post-war power, so all eyes are on the division of shares and quotas. The leaders of supporting battalions and militias claim to be fighters with a cause, who say they will lay down their weapons upon victory (as al-Misbah Abu Zeid, commander of the Islamist brigade known as the al-Baraa ibn Malik Brigades, and some of the brigade's commanders have repeatedly stated).

Growing difficulty

The leaders of both the SAF and the RSF must either meet these factional demands or face a broader, more violent war than at present. Battalions, militias, and individuals on the hunt for the spoils of war are among the most visible consequences of the conflict's prolongation. Those who may seek a resolution have a grave responsibility, and their task becomes harder with every passing day.

On 4 May, an RSF drone struck Khartoum airport, which had only recently begun receiving international flights. The Sudanese army said it was launched from Ethiopian territory. In response, Ethiopia expelled the Sudanese ambassador from the country. Around the same time, the United States presented a new negotiating paper to the two parties, setting out a new arrangement for the Quad plan.

Instead of a humanitarian truce combining a ceasefire with the delivery of aid and the protection of civilians, the new idea is for an agreed plan among the parties, centred on delivering relief and assistance while protecting civilians, but without being tied to a ceasefire.

The decision to bypass the ceasefire stems from the fact that it has become an obstacle to a settlement, compounded by the intransigence of both sides. Ceasefires are now bound up with the propaganda of war, especially for the army, which tells the public that the battle will end only with the elimination of the last RSF member. A ceasefire also requires relatively complex arrangements.

This time, the Quad is trying to make the entry point purely humanitarian, something on which they hope that both parties can agree, before moving on to a ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities. In parallel, the United States—through Trump's advisor for Middle East and African affairs, Massad Boulos—passed its Quad partners a new vision containing consensual ideas for resolving the conflict in Sudan.

Problematic composition

These ideas address the interests and concerns of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, returning to the initial framework to break the deadlock and end the country's 'closed horizon'. Yet the ideas remain limited and modest, while the Quad's composition itself is proving an obstacle, with each party reluctant to do anything other than defend its own interests.

It feels as if everyone is sat waiting for something from US President Donald Trump that will end the game of declared and hidden interests to break the deadlock, but the way to resolve the crisis has not changed since it was set out in the Jeddah platform in the first weeks of the war, that is: end the fighting, distribute aid, protect civilians, put in place security and military arrangements, and initiate a civilian democratic transition. 

Boulos has complained of 'competition' among the Quad's members and urged them to stop supporting the two warring parties. Sources have told Al Majalla that the US warnings were accompanied by precise intelligence briefings indicating renewed terrorist activity in the Red Sea region, including movement by senior Houthi commanders between Bab el-Mandeb and Port Sudan, and a high level of coordination between Iran and Sudan's Islamic Movement and Muslim Brotherhood circles.

Among the evidence cited was Washington's disclosure of details related to arms deals between Iran and the army, carried out by the Iranian Shamin Mafi, who is detained and standing trial in California. Washington is concerned that extremist religious groups in West Africa are now able to move with greater freedom in RSF-controlled areas of western Sudan, a region that links several African countries, and that terrorist groups are exploiting the war in Sudan to hide.

Islamist gains

This threat is likely to grow in line with the convictions of the Islamists now effectively controlling the battle, several of whose leaders have openly declared support for Iran in its war against America and Israel. Some think the Islamists will intensify their leverage around the Red Sea, particularly after the impact of Iran's actions in the Strait of Hormuz.

Optimists are few and far between. A UN Security Council report issued on 1 February noted that "the United States has sought to intensify its efforts to revive peace talks on Sudan" but that "a near-term breakthrough appears unlikely". Other reports highlight how each side still wants to fight to expand its sphere of influence and seize vital cities. The RSF controls Darfur, parts of Kordofan, and areas of Blue Nile, while the army controls the central, northern, and eastern states.

After three years, a military resolution seems all but impossible. Only a negotiated diplomatic settlement remains viable. Or, at least, it would be were the warring parties not so entrenched in their intransigence. Boulos has tried, but his other files include the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Western Sahara—more than enough to keep him busy. Sudan's war shows no signs of ending any time soon, its external sponsors are hunkered down, and the humanitarian crisis is already the world's worst. In this torn and battered country, hope—like everything else—is in short supply.