Are Lebanon-Israel talks a mistake? The view from Cairo

Egyptian officials believe US-Israeli pressure to rapidly disarm Hezbollah could backfire and plunge Lebanon into a new civil war

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the day of the EU Leaders and Regional Partners Summit in Nicosia, Cyprus, on 24 April 2026.
Reuters
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the day of the EU Leaders and Regional Partners Summit in Nicosia, Cyprus, on 24 April 2026.

Are Lebanon-Israel talks a mistake? The view from Cairo

The shift from warmth to warning was unmistakable on Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s face as he greeted his Lebanese counterpart Joseph Aoun in Cyprus on the sidelines of a meeting of EU and Arab leaders last month. After a brief smile came a pointed finger, as Sisi spoke with Aoun about Lebanon, where Egypt has deep concerns.

The context is that Israel has been attacking Lebanon since 2024, including in recent weeks, when a ceasefire was supposed to be in place. Lebanese and Israeli officials are now talking directly about the parameters of a future peace deal, while Israeli bombs continue to strike Hezbollah sites.

Israel is also talking to the new Syrian government, and just moments before Sisi and Aoun spoke, the Egyptian leader had appeared to give the cold shoulder to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, although they later had a brief exchange as they stood together for the official group photo. Syria and Egypt do not enjoy good relations, but just days after the summit, al-Sharaa dispatched his Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to Cairo to meet his Egyptian counterpart, Badr Abdelatty.

Being pragmatic

Among the major Arab countries, Egypt is perhaps the last to openly embrace al-Sharaa after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. Still, that may soon be coming; the statement from Egypt’s foreign ministry after Abdelatty met al-Shaibani hinted at pragmatism. As a new Syria takes shape, forms fresh alliances, and grapples with its future—especially its tense relationship with Israel—Egypt appears ready to deal with the realities.

AFP
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shaibani, in the new administrative capital, Cairo on 3 May, 2026.

Egypt’s interest in Lebanon is not new, having stood by the smaller Arab state for decades, but the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has left Egyptian decision-makers uneasy, not least because Israel’s response goes well beyond southern Lebanon—known to be Hezbollah’s traditional stronghold.

Israeli fighter jets have struck deep into central Beirut, while the Israeli army has pushed into southern Lebanon, establishing what it calls the ‘Yellow Line’. For Cairo, these tactics appear similar to those Israel has used in Gaza since 2023, suggesting a long-term or even permanent Israeli presence in Lebanon. This would effectively reverse the gains given to Lebanon by UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (in 2006), which forced Israel to pull out of southern Lebanon and mandated the Lebanese army to deploy there instead.

For years, Egypt has advocated for a strong Lebanese state capable of exercising its authority over all Lebanese territories, calling for the Lebanese army and security forces to hold a monopoly over weapons and extend their control across the country, especially in the south.

Egyptian officials now think American and Israeli pressure to rapidly disarm Hezbollah could backfire, igniting clashes between the Lebanese army and the militia, which could plunge Lebanon into a new civil war. This is why Egypt advocates a broad consensus encompassing all major political forces, including Hezbollah itself. Cairo thinks this would strengthen the Lebanese army, prevent clashes with Israel, and serve domestic stability.

Egyptian negotiators have more experience working with the Israelis than their Lebanese peers, with valuable lessons drawn from 16 months of intense talks that followed the historic visit of Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in November 1977 (it ultimately led to a peace treaty in 1979), but it is understood that they have not offered advice, nor has any been sought.

AFP
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat addresses the Israeli Knesset (parliament) during his historic visit to Israel as Israeli Premier Menahem Begin (c) listens to him.

Territorial integrity

Cairo has approached Syria’s new leadership with caution, owing in part to clear ideological differences. Still, Egypt’s position has been evolving, and its new pragmatism builds on shared interests, rather than on points of contention. Despite this gradual warming, Egypt continues to firmly reject Israeli violations of Syrian sovereignty and condemns Israel’s military incursions and its occupation of parts of southern Syria.

It has repeatedly called for a full return to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, which established a demilitarised buffer zone on the occupied Golan Heights. Now, with reports of a possible Israel-Syria settlement, Egyptian officials worry that Damascus may be willing to cede territory. This has only heightened Egypt's vigilance.

Cairo believes peace can only be achieved through collective frameworks that preserve Arab leverage and avoid legitimising Israeli territorial gains

The first Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt is an important model or reference point for Lebanon and Syria, if their leaders seek to do the same. While the peace between Egypt and Israel is cold, it nevertheless continues to hold, preventing any new military confrontation between the two.

By advising states against making free concessions, Cairo rejects accusations of 'meddling'. Instead, it sees itself as defending Egyptian national security, believing this is inseparable from collective Arab security. Egypt's broader vision for resolving the conflict between Israel and Syria and between Israel and Lebanon is linked to its view of regional peace.

Khaled DESOUKI / AFP
Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa (L), accompanied by Egypt's Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty (C), arrives at an airport in El-Arish on 18 August 2025, to visit Palestinians wounded in Israel's war on Gaza.

Strength in unity

Cairo has always argued that peace cannot be achieved through fragmented bilateral agreements, but through comprehensive, collective frameworks that preserve Arab leverage and avoid legitimising Israeli territorial gains. It also believes that Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories form part of the 'frontline states' around Israel, and that when these states act with strength and coordination, they can serve as a strategic barrier against further Israeli territorial expansion.

This helps explain Cairo's sharp reaction to Israeli strikes on Syria in the immediate aftermath of Assad's fall in December 2024. Israel destroyed Syria's military assets from the air, eliminating an army from one of the frontline states to further shift the balance of power in Israel's favour.

If Lebanese and Syrian leaders accommodate Israel in Beirut and Damascus, Cairo thinks it will further weaken the traditional Arab frontline, so it is engaging pragmatically where necessary, while stubbornly defending the core principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Egypt ultimately believes that the fates of Lebanon and Syria are tied to its own fate. Whether Cairo had sufficient leverage to influence Beirut and Damascus remains to be seen.

font change

Related Articles