In 2015, Iran signed the nuclear agreement under Barack Obama’s administration, which separated the nuclear file from missiles and regional influence and, in practice, accepted Iran’s strategic advance in return for nuclear restrictions. That agreement was the product of an exceptional moment: an American president willing to build legal arguments and pursue diplomatic compromises, a favourable international climate, and an Iran on the rise across the region.
The agreement did not last long. Trump took office in 2017, withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018, imposed a campaign of maximum pressure, and ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020.
During Joe Biden’s presidency, Iran gambled in the 2022 Vienna talks on the assumption that the war in Ukraine would divide the West and heighten the need for alternative energy supplies to offset reduced Russian exports. It believed that this would strengthen its negotiating position and raise the value of its resources. It did not. By clinging to the remnants of the Obama approach, Iran squandered the chance of an agreement that could have eased sanctions.
During Trump’s second term, Tehran bet in June 2025 on the Muscat and Rome talks and on extending the 60-day deadline set by Trump. It sought to buy time and keep the files separate, as it had under the Obama administration, but Trump caught it off guard by bombing nuclear facilities. The negotiations and deadline were seen by many as a ruse.
Same story, bigger risks
Today, we see the same story repeating itself, but the risks are far greater. Trump’s message is clear: either an agreement that covers the nuclear issue, missiles, and Iran’s regional role within a limited timeframe, or military confrontation. An unprecedented military deployment in the region is already in place.
