Iran’s Kurds: teased by opportunity, tethered by memory

For the Kurds of Iraq, the pain came in 1975 with the Algiers Agreement between Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran. Before that, the Kurdish movement (led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani) was getting American and Iranian support in its war against Baghdad. The agreement abruptly ended that support. The rebellion collapsed, and the Kurds retreated to the mountains. For them, the lesson has been learned: do not rely on great powers. American betrayal in particular stung.

Washington provided air support for Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1990s after the first Gulf War, then toppled Saddam in 2003, strengthening the Kurds' position within the new Iraq. But the sense of abandonment resurfaced in 2017, during US President Donald Trump's first term, after the Kurdistan Region's independence referendum. When Iraqi forces advanced on Kirkuk, Washington chose neutrality. Many Kurds saw this as proof that American support was conditional on broader strategic calculations.

In Syria, the story repeated itself in Rojava (or Western Kurdistan). The United States supported Kurdish forces for years in the fight against Islamic State (IS), but Trump withdrew many American troops from north-eastern Syria in 2019, opening the door for a broad Turkish military operation against the Kurds there, who found no American protection. The pattern resurfaced at the beginning of this year, when they appealed to Trump as Syrian government forces advanced eastwards.

A US-backed Kurdish front?

With Trump now seeking Iran's "unconditional surrender," armed Kurdish forces have been discussed with a view to opening an internal front under an American-Israeli umbrella. This would be from the restive Kurdish regions of north-western Iran known as Rojhelat (or Eastern Kurdistan). In recent years, these areas have played a big role in the waves of protest that have swept Iran, not least in 2022, when the death in custody of young Kurdish-Iranian woman Mahsa Amini sparked one of the largest popular uprisings the country has ever witnessed.

Perhaps pre-emptively, Kurdish provinces have recently been targeted in airstrikes by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iranian security agencies are concerned about a supply and training route from Iraqi Kurdistan. Seen in this light, the present moment feels laden with tension. A marginalised people who have watched their kin in Iraq and Syria secure meaningful gains, Iran's Kurds may well discern in the upheaval an opening.

This would once again raise the question of nationalities within Iran and the prospect of redefining the relationship between the centre and the periphery, similar to the 21st-century developments in Syria and Iraq. Yet alliances in the Middle East seldom present opportunities without exacting a price, and Kurdish entry into the conflict could set off a chain reaction. More than 60% of Iranians are Persian; Kurds make up about 10% of the population.

Despite its preoccupation with US and Israeli attacks, Iran is unlikely to remain idle in the face of a Kurdish uprising in the north. Here, Tehran may have common ground with Ankara. Turkish leaders view any armed Kurdish movement beyond its borders with acute sensitivity, fearful that it may stir nationalist aspirations domestically.

Iraqi Kurdistan, where most Iranian Kurdish parties are based, could soon find itself in the firing line. This risks military conflict with Iraq if Erbil is seen as a hostile platform. This explains why Ankara was so quick to warn against such a scenario and why the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq distanced itself publicly from any plans to get involved. Tehran delivered its own message through drones and missiles.

Message or not, their past experiences have taught the Kurds that an alliance with a major power is usually temporary, and that the strategic interests of great states can shift in an instant. They will still be tempted to exploit Tehran's weakness in 2026, as their quest for political recognition remains ongoing, but having had their fingers burned more than once, their approach to risk is now increasingly hedged.