Dramatic developments across the Middle East are reshaping the regional landscape and affecting a wide circle of actors, both regional and international. The possible re-emergence of a centralised authority in Damascus, despite the many obstacles still ahead, Türkiye’s growing role in shaping Syria’s future, the weakening of Hezbollah and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria all offer a unique opportunity to support 'regional stabilisation' through practical initiatives. Energy cooperation is one such initiative.
Israeli gas exports to Egypt and Jordan have been a staple in its relationship with both states. The key policy question in Israel now is whether—and how— newer or re-entering actors such as Syria, Lebanon, and Türkiye can be integrated into the regional framework in ways that work to its advantage rather than its disadvantage.
Practical tool
The Arab Gas Pipeline offers a practical and near-term tool to advance that goal—not only in energy terms, but perhaps more importantly in strategic and diplomatic ones.
Stretches roughly 1,300 kilometres (with a small subsea segment between Egypt and Jordan), it was originally designed to transport Egyptian natural gas to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, with plans at one point to extend it to Türkiye. Construction toward Aqaba began in 1998 and was completed in 2003.
The Syrian section was planned to run approximately 600 kilometres from the Jordanian border through Homs and onward to Aleppo, although the Homs–Aleppo section—about 240 kilometres— was never completed. Maintenance and rehabilitation work have been carried out over the years, and as of 2021, Syrian officials reported that the Jordan–Homs segment was operational.
