The discovery of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past 15 years has driven a series of important political developments in the region and created a fascinating regional architecture. At its core lies close cooperation between the triangle—Israel, Greece, and Cyprus—alongside the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum in January 2019, in which Egypt plays a leading role. In addition to the above states, the Forum also includes Jordan, Italy, and Palestine, with its headquarters in Cairo.
For its part, Lebanon was invited to join the Forum, but was unable to do so (even as an observer, as was suggested discreetly). Since then, the region has undergone many upheavals, yet, interestingly enough, the regional alignment has largely remained intact despite the significant tensions caused by the war in Gaza.
Importantly, Türkiye has been absent from this framework—and not by coincidence. In many ways, this regional architecture emerged as a response to Turkish policy, which most states in the region perceived as confrontational and against their interests.
Over the years, Türkiye has tried to challenge this configuration. In recent years, it has succeeded in restoring its ties with Egypt and the Gulf states (notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE), and even relations between Ankara and Athens have warmed considerably. Regional and international shifts—most notably the collapse of the Assad regime, as well as President Trump’s second term in the White House—have given Ankara renewed confidence.
Türkiye had already sought to “fight back” years earlier, signing in 2019 an agreement with Libya to demarcate their Exclusive Economic Zones. Libya, since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, has been embroiled in civil war, divided between two rival authorities: one in Tripoli (formally recognised internationally), and another in Tobruk under General Haftar. The 2019 maritime agreement was signed with Tripoli, carving up relevant portions of the Mediterranean between Türkiye and Libya—effectively disregarding the island of Crete. But neither regional states nor the wider international community recognises this agreement.
In recent months, Ankara has made notable headway with the Tobruk government, which looks increasingly likely to ratify the 2019 agreement. Greece has rushed to block this move, with the Greek Foreign Minister visiting Libya twice recently, seeking Cairo’s support (which, as noted, rejects the Turkish-Libyan maritime accord), but with little success so far.
Through calculated policy, Türkiye has strengthened its ties with General Haftar, although he has yet to ratify the maritime agreement. Ankara has exploited Egypt’s relative weakness, although Libya has traditionally held a high place in Cairo’s national priorities. With Turkish-Egyptian relations improving in recent years, Cairo appears reluctant to risk undermining this progress so quickly.
