Politics

How the SDF's hand was twisted into Syria integration

A decisive Syrian military campaign, coupled with diplomatic pressure from Türkiye, the US, and Israel, has forced the SDF into a far-reaching integration deal with Damascus

REUTERS/Karam al-Masri

A man holds a Syrian flag as a group of civilians smash a statue of a Syrian Democratic Forces fighter in the city of Tabqa after the Syrian army took control of it, in Tabqa, Syria, on 18 January 2026.

How the SDF's hand was twisted into Syria integration

Omer Onhon

last update on 19 Jan 2026

On 8 January, during ongoing tensions in northern Syria, the Syrian army launched an operation against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhoods of Aleppo. Within 10 days, the army had secured victory, and a 14-point Ceasefire and Full Integration Agreement between Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, leader of the SDF, had been signed.

The Syrian army has reasserted majority control over the governorates of Deir ez-Zor, Al-Raqqa, and Al-Hasakeh. In contrast, the SDF, having lost around two-thirds of the territory it controlled, has seen its presence reduced to northeastern Syria. This marks one of the most important turning points in post-Assad Syria.

Both the SDF and the People’s Defence Units (YPG), which had stalled in implementing the 10 March agreement signed between al-Sharaa and Abdi, underestimated the capabilities of the Syrian army. The 10 March agreement had outlined eight key points for the SDF’s integration into Syrian state institutions, emphasising national unity and a ceasefire. However, the SDF’s hardline stance in negotiations with Damascus and its reckless actions on the ground frustrated everyone—including the US.

The Syrian army’s operation to pressure the SDF into an agreement by force could not have been conducted as smoothly as it was without intense diplomatic activity. Agreements with key Syrian and foreign actors, including Türkiye, the US, and Israel, were critical. A US-mediated meeting between Syrian and Israeli delegations in Paris in the first week of January resulted in an agreement on a joint coordination mechanism. Additionally, Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was present in Paris, and there were unverified rumours of unannounced talks with Israel.

Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria, engaged in intensive talks in Türkiye, Syria, and with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. During these talks, he met with Türkiye’s foreign and defence ministers, al-Sharaa, Abdi, and Masrour Barzani, the prime minister of the Kurdistan Region. Red lines for the Syrian army’s operations were set, and the scope of the military operations was agreed.

Included in the Ceasefire and Full Integration Agreement is a military and political roadmap, the result of intense diplomacy. In the north, Türkiye stood with the Syrian government against the SDF, while in the south, Israel sided with the separatist Druze.

Bakr Alkasem/AFP — Israel has said it will attack Syria government forces if they threaten Druze-majority areas like Suweida, where the Druze live semi-autonomously.

The SDF's mistake

Following the success of the military operation, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called al-Sharaa. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a statement, welcoming the Syrian army’s success and expressing continued support for the Syrian government’s efforts to combat terrorism and rebuild the country.

The SDF’s failure to take Türkiye’s concerns into account has proven to be a mistake. Both Türkiye and Syria are dealing with Kurdish-related political and security challenges, and what happens on either side of the border has an impact on the other side. The link between the peace process in Türkiye and developments in Syria was made explicit by Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). In a letter to Abdi on 29 December, he stated that the implementation of the 10 March agreement would ease and accelerate the peace process in Türkiye.

The integration deal outlines 14 specific points—including ceasefires, territorial handovers, individual SDF integration, and PKK expulsions—but many of its finer details still need to be fleshed out

Recent developments in Syria have complicated efforts in Türkiye to find a solution to the Kurdish issue, which is closely linked to Erdoğan's future political plans. There has been a setback in what the Turkish government calls 'terror-free Türkiye' and what the Kurds call 'the Peace and Democratic Society'. A setback that, to a large extent, can be attributed to developments in Syria.

The Turkish government wants the SDF's wings clipped and the group integrated into the Syrian army, while pressing for a settlement in Syria that does not set an unfavourable precedent or undermine the political process in Türkiye.

In a written statement issued on 18 January, the central executive committee of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) said: "While a solution process is being pursued in Türkiye, the partisan policies pursued in north-east Syria are political hypocrisy. While the search for peace continues on the one hand, the gains of the Kurds are being targeted on the other. This contradictory stance calls sincerity into question and harms the process."

AFP — SDF soldiers attend a funeral of a soldier who was killed the previous week in the eastern Deir ez-or province, in the northeastern Syrian Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli.

Key Turkish demands

The Ceasefire and Full Integration Agreement includes a number of Türkiye's key demands. These include requirements for SDF integration into the Syrian army on an individual basis, and the expulsion of "all non-Syrian PKK leaders and members" beyond Syria's borders.

Although the integration agreement outlines 14 specific points—including ceasefires, territorial handovers, individual SDF integration, and PKK expulsions—much of its finer details still need to be fleshed out, as with the 10 March agreement. Many issues remain to be clarified, including where the borders of the 'Kurdish regions' lie and where non-Syrian PKK members are to be sent.

Article 4 of the agreement provides for special arrangements in Kurdish-majority regions, signalling recognition of a defined decentralised administration rather than full self-governance. How these arrangements are to be enshrined in the new Syrian constitution needs to be agreed. What's more, these arrangements are almost certain to prompt similar calls for accommodations from the Druze, Alawites, and other minorities, for instance, the Turkmen."

The clashes between the Syrian army and the SDF have revealed differences within the ranks of the SDF, YPG, and PKK. Abdi and the SDF are deemed more realistic, open to compromise, and much more inclined to listen to the US. However, the other groups—referred to as the PKK commanders and cadres in Qandil—have taken a hard line.

Öcalan has described these events as an attempt to undermine the peace process in Türkiye, implicating the commanders in Qandil for failing to act in line with his directives. Speaking through a DEM Party delegation that visited him in İmralı prison, Öcalan stated that he would do his part to stop the conflict.

REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi — A military personnel uses his phone at the crossing connecting the two banks of the Euphrates River, as others attempt to cross to the other side after the SDF withdrew from Deir ez-Zor province on 18 January 2026.

An upperhand

The Syrian army has proven its worth, expelling the SDF from key regions outside its northeastern stronghold, including Deir ez-Zor and its vital oil fields, which have been a major source of the SDF's finances for years. The Syrian government now has the upper hand, enabling it to pressure the SDF into signing an agreement.

Despite its setbacks and defeats, the SDF remains a force to be reckoned with, and the US is unlikely to accept its complete demise. While Washington may have Syria as an ally against the Islamic State (IS) and a partner in Erdoğan, it will likely want to keep the SDF in reserve.

The 'Kurdish Zones' referenced in the integration agreement can be interpreted as recognition by the Syrian government and other actors of an SDF-administered area operating within an agreed framework.

As important an achievement as the agreement may be for the Syrian government, it also serves to legitimise and whitewash the SDF, which has been defined as a terrorist organisation with links to the PKK. And yet, the implementation of the agreement will determine whether the ceasefire holds and leads to a permanent peace.

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