The ‘Donroe Doctrine’ makes no sense

Yes, Venezuela has the world's largest proven reserves, but its heavy crude oil is hard to extract and costly to refine. To be candid, it is just about the last oil any sensible producer would want to try to develop, and even more so given the parlous state of Venezuela's decrepit infrastructure and the low price of crude these days. And if, by some miracle, a lot of that oil arrived on world markets, it would drive down the price even more and put a bunch of marginal US shale drillers out of business.

Read more: The problem with Venezuela's oil is technical, not political

And let's not forget that no matter what Trump and the big oil companies seem to think, the world is gradually weaning itself off hydrocarbons and turning to other sources of energy, further diminishing the value of all those Venezuelan reserves. In fact, given the reality of climate change, the smartest thing one could do is leave as much of that oil in the ground as possible. So, while China is focused laser-like on dominating the green industries of the future—and gaining influence as a result—Trump and the strategic geniuses around him are doubling down on planet-threatening energy policies that are so last century.

So your confusion about the strategic rationale for this operation is understandable. The only "strategic" objective I can see here is the general idea of reestablishing US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Because Trump likes to mark his territory by putting his name on everything, this notion is now being marketed as the "Donroe Doctrine," and it was clearly telegraphed in the recent National Security Strategy (NSS). This might sound like a reasonable idea that foreign-policy realists could get behind, but it doesn't stand up to close inspection either.

The original objective of the Monroe Doctrine was to ensure that the United States did not have to worry about rival great powers interfering militarily in the Western Hemisphere. It took nearly a century to bring President James Monroe's vision to fruition, but eventually the United States managed to push all the other great powers out of the hemisphere and enjoy the benefits of what historian C. Vann Woodward called "free security."

But that's not what Trump & Co. are talking about because no great power has a significant military role in the Western Hemisphere at present or is trying to establish one. Instead, as the NSS made clear, the Trump administration wants to force as many of its neighbours as possible to do what it tells them to do on any issue that might arise. That's what they are now saying to Maduro's successors: Give us what we want, or we'll keep blockading you and maybe do something even worse. And they are hoping the rest of the region gets the message and obediently falls in line.

In particular, the administration is now insisting on the right to control neighbours' economic policies and to veto those that might be economically beneficial to these states and to countries such as China. As the NSS put it, "we want a Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets," adding that outsiders must not "own or control strategically vital assets" and the United States must make it "harder for non-Hemispheric competitors to increase their influence in the region."

Because Trump & Co. understand that some Latin American countries have been "attracted to doing business" with others by "low costs and fewer regulatory hurdles," they claim they will "induce countries to reject such assistance." Because Trump's is a predatory administration that generally opposes foreign aid and wants the lion's share of the benefits in all its bilateral relationships, however, it must rely on threats to get what it wants and not on generosity.

The problem, however, is that if the United States insists on interfering in its neighbours' economies in this way, then it becomes responsible for economic conditions there. If it tells Latin American states that they cannot buy Chinese products that are cheaper than US ones (and in some cases—such as electric cars—substantially better), consumers there aren't going to be happy. If they tell these same governments to refuse Chinese or other foreign investments that would improve infrastructure or create other opportunities, Washington will have to provide them, or it'll be blamed for keeping Latin Americans poor. Add to this the administration's penchant for blaming America's problems on migrants and refugees from the region, and its staunch commitment to deporting as many of them as possible, and you have a recipe not for stable hegemony but for growing anti-Americanism and regional instability.

The contrast with more successful US policies is obvious. After World War II, for example, the United States established highly successful partnerships in Europe and Asia (including with former foes in Germany and Japan) in part because these states perceived a common threat from the Soviet Union—but also because the United States acted benevolently in order to help its new partners recover as rapidly as possible from World War II. Trump doesn't know the meaning of the word "benevolent," however, his approach to life is "what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable."

Trying to run the Western Hemisphere at the point of a gun is not going to work any better in the future than it did in the past. Trump advisor Stephen Miller thinks one of the "iron laws of history" is that the world is governed by power; the "iron law" he left out was that leaders who think power is all that matters inevitably do a lot of stupid things.