Opening a new door: Trump, the Gulf, and ‘America First’

The Gulf states are showing that their security is indivisible and that they will pursue their defence from any that offer it, creating a new 'strategic autonomy' borne of the Trump era.

US President Donald Trump welcomes Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the White House on 18 November 2025, in Washington, DC.
Win McNamee / Getty
US President Donald Trump welcomes Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the White House on 18 November 2025, in Washington, DC.

Opening a new door: Trump, the Gulf, and ‘America First’

US President Donald Trump's first presidential term (2017-21) was not simply a shift in the trajectory of American foreign policy; it marked a profound geopolitical transformation that reassessed the very structure of international alliances. It left a clear impact on the world’s most sensitive regions, chief among them the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This term represented a necessary break from the diplomatic traditions Washington had established, traditions rooted in balancing interests and maintaining a complex web of commitments.

In their place, the Trump administration introduced a political synthesis based on new criteria: strengthening personal relationships with leaders, embracing overt commercial pragmatism, and reframing alliances through the lens of a direct ‘deal’—where success was measured according to profit and loss. The language of direct interests dominated diplomatic discourse, personal relationships sometimes superseded bureaucratic channels, and the ‘America First’ doctrine took centre stage, imposing a new reality on both allies and adversaries. This was not merely a change in style; it was a fundamental shift in the philosophy guiding America’s relationship with the world, particularly its GCC allies.

Trump did not see the region solely as an ally for global energy security, but as a commercial partner that should bear a greater share of mutual security costs. Through six interconnected axes, the Trump administration re-engineered alliances, interests, and priorities in the GCC during its first term.

This article will explore these axes in detail and project the future of these relationships in light of his second term, which began in January 2025, amid a changing geopolitical landscape where the Arab Gulf states are emerging as more independent actors. The outcomes of the 46th GCC Summit in Manama (December 2025) strongly confirmed the Gulf’s assimilation of this lesson, moving beyond merely reactive policies to initiate a new collective strategy, manifested in the call for joint defence shields and the acceleration of economic integration.

Diplomacy and institutions

The most prominent feature of Trump’s foreign policy was his clear preference for personal relationships over institutional channels, shaped by his business background and deep suspicion of what he considered the ‘deep state’ and its complex bureaucratic processes. Trump viewed international relations through the lens of bilateral deals, where personal trust and direct understandings between decision-makers outweighed procedural diplomacy. This approach found fertile ground in the GCC, where systems of governance allow for swift decision-making at the highest levels.

This orientation transformed strategic alliances into what often resembled commercial transactions, with investments, arms sales, and financial figures serving as metrics for the relationship’s strength. His choice of Riyadh as his first foreign destination in May 2017 explicitly signalled this doctrine. The visit sought to reassure GCC allies, deter Iran, and mark a decisive departure from the tension that characterised US-GCC relations during the Obama years, particularly in the wake of the Iranian nuclear agreement, which deeply concerned the region’s leaders.

Brendan Smialowski / AFP
US President Donald Trump addresses a meeting of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders in Riyadh on 14 May 2025.

The Riyadh summit was more than a ceremonial event; it was a grand showcase of economic and military deals worth billions of dollars. To his domestic audience, Trump’s message was unequivocal: US foreign partnerships must yield tangible economic benefits, measured in jobs and direct gains for the American economy. This personalised diplomacy was reinforced by frequent visits from his inner circle—particularly his son-in-law and senior adviser Jared Kushner—who fostered direct and influential channels with decision-makers in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

By bypassing traditional intermediaries such as the State Department, this model granted GCC leaders unprecedented access to the core of decision-making in Washington. The effect was apparent in several key moments when Trump relied on his personal rapport with leaders, revealing the essence of his foreign policy doctrine: alliances were grounded less in shared political principles and more in mutual, quantifiable interests.

Confronting Iran

The maximum pressure campaign against Iran formed the backbone of Trump’s Middle East strategy during his first term. His unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018 marked the most decisive step in this policy reorientation. From Trump’s perspective, the agreement was fundamentally flawed—not only because it failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile programme, but also due to its sunset clauses, which he saw as temporary constraints that empowered Tehran in the long run.

He believed the deal enabled Iran to expand its regional influence under the guise of diplomacy. Consequently, his administration pursued a comprehensive strategy to weaken the Iranian regime through sweeping economic sanctions, a campaign of diplomatic isolation, and calibrated displays of military strength, culminating in the January 2020 assassination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.

Trump did not see the GCC solely as an ally for global energy security, but as a commercial partner that should bear a greater share of mutual security costs

This hardline approach toward Iran extended beyond an American policy stance; it became a point of strategic convergence between Washington, the GCC states, and Israel. By defining Iran as a shared adversary, the Trump administration accelerated security and intelligence cooperation that had previously remained discreet. Confronting Tehran became the compass of regional alliances, as Gulf and Israeli leaders viewed Iran's regional ambitions with deep distrust. The administration's full embrace of this collective perception conveyed an unequivocal message of alignment with its allies. This shared prioritisation of countering Iran not only redefined regional frameworks but also laid the groundwork for the Abraham Accords, as common security imperatives came to overshadow long-standing political divisions.

Peace for prosperity

The Abraham Accords, which normalised relations between Israel and several Arab nations, are a key diplomatic achievement of Trump's first administration. These agreements were not merely a collection of treaties; they represented the culmination of a regional strategy and the emergence of a new geopolitical order. Their significance lies in their historic rupture with decades of Arab diplomatic convention by decoupling the normalisation of relations with Israel from the Palestinian issue.

Whereas the Arab consensus—embodied in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative—linked normalisation to the land-for-peace framework, the Abraham Accords advanced an alternative formula: peace-for-prosperity-and-security. Here, normalisation was grounded in shared strategic and economic interests. Cooperation could create new realities that precede, and perhaps eventually enable, traditional political settlements.

SPA
US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stand join tech executives and others at the Saudi-US Investment Forum in Washington, DC. on 19 November, 2025.

The Accords did not result from a conventional negotiation process but rather from the consolidation of a regional anti-Iran alignment. The Trump administration persuaded signatory countries that overtly engaging with Israel would yield benefits in areas such as advanced technology, cybersecurity, and intelligence. Kushner and the team helped craft and implement this diplomatic architecture, leveraging US influence and offering tailored incentives, such as F-35 fighter jets to the UAE. Thus, the Accords were not solely about peace; they redefined the regional order around pragmatic cooperation in the face of mutual threats, diminishing the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab diplomacy.

This model encountered its limits with the region's pivotal actor: Saudi Arabia. While the UAE and Bahrain embraced the new paradigm, Saudi Arabia consistently reaffirmed that any normalisation with Israel must proceed through a clear path toward establishing a Palestinian state. This position reflects not only Riyadh's historical commitment to the Palestinian cause but also its broader awareness of its dual role as the leader of both the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Evan Vucci / AP
US President Donald Trump meets Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the Oval Office of the White House on 18 November 2025.

Recognising that, the Trump administration understood that securing an agreement with Saudi Arabia would be considerably more complex and politically costly. Consequently, it refrained from exerting excessive pressure, prioritising its robust partnership with Riyadh across other critical arenas.

Security commitment

The Trump administration translated the 'America First' slogan into an explicit demand that allies assume greater financial responsibility in exchange for their security, fundamentally redefining the nature of longstanding defence alliances. What had previously been framed as a strategic partnership evolved into a more transactional arrangement, with American protection seen as a service bound by mutual obligations. Trump's recurring references to "allies" consistently reflected this view, as he exerted sustained pressure on partners to increase defence spending and prioritise the purchase of American weapons as a tangible expression of loyalty and burden-sharing.

This approach reached its peak following the 2019 Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais. Although Washington attributed responsibility to Iran, Trump's military response was intentionally limited and conditional, making clear that any US action would depend on a formal Saudi request and direction. Many observers interpreted this as a sign of hesitation to uphold traditional security guarantees. For GCC decision-makers, however, it served as a wake-up call that over-reliance on the American security umbrella could no longer be taken for granted.

What had been a strategic partnership evolved into a more transactional arrangement, with American protection seen as a service bound by mutual obligations

Yet Trump did not fully withdraw from his security role; rather, he redefined it within a framework of constructive strategic ambiguity. This approach, whether deliberately or incidentally, encouraged GCC states to pursue more self-reliant and diversified security strategies, leading to more mature and independent foreign policies.

The serious discussions surrounding the establishment of a joint missile dome and a unified defence system at the recent Manama Summit embody this. The clearest manifestation of this trend emerged in September 2025 with the signing of a security cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. This represents a crucial transition for the Gulf states, moving from the stage of purchasing individual protection to building a collective self-deterrence system.

Competition and coordination

President Trump's energy policy established an unprecedented dual dynamic in the US-GCC relationship. On one hand, the shale oil revolution transformed the US into the world's largest oil producer, granting it a degree of relative energy independence. It made Washington not merely a consumer or security partner but a direct competitor to GCC producers for global market share. On the other hand, despite this competitive posture, Trump demonstrated a willingness to intervene personally in OPEC+ deliberations when US domestic interests were at stake.

This duality was most evident in the spring of 2020, when a price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia, coupled with the economic downturn triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, precipitated an unprecedented collapse in oil prices that threatened the American shale industry with bankruptcy. At that critical juncture, Trump applied extraordinary diplomatic pressure on both Riyadh and Moscow, ultimately brokering a historic production cut that stabilised markets and helped America's big oil companies. It underscored the pragmatic and transactional nature of his policy: Washington was both a competitor and a coordinator.

The 46th GCC Summit hosted by Bahrain in early December 2025 was a pivotal anchor point for redefining the relationship with the Trump administration. It acted as the launch of the 'United Gulf Bloc,' negotiating with Washington from a position of strength and integration, not from necessity and dependency.

The Manama Declaration sent a message to Washington: the security of the GCC states is indivisible, and any aggression against one is an aggression against all. More important were the accompanying steps, specifically the consensus to accelerate economic integration and the Common Market, and to establish a unified defence system against missile threats.

This showed that the Gulf has resolved to counter the pressures of individual bilateral deals favoured by Trump by taking refuge behind collective interests. The Summit also demonstrated a delicate balance in foreign policy. While the leaders affirmed international strategic partnerships, they renewed their commitment to the two-state solution, support for Gaza, and the rejection of the displacement of Palestinians, thereby setting clear red lines against any American attempts to circumvent the political constants of the region in exchange for economic normalisation.

Future US-GCC relations

Understanding the dynamics established during Trump's first term is no mere historical exercise. Rather, it serves as a key framework for interpreting the present and anticipating the future trajectory of US-GCC relations. With Trump's return to the White House in January 2025, an intensified and more assertive version of his earlier approach emerged.

Now unbound by the constraints of re-election, he has pursued his agenda with greater confidence and fewer inhibitions. His decision to once again select Riyadh as his first foreign destination in May 2025 reaffirmed the continuity of deal-oriented diplomacy, which finds natural resonance in Saudi Arabia's own transformation. Similarly, his 'maximum pressure' campaign against Iran illustrates the renewed prominence of hard-power foreign policy instruments.

Looking forward, it is evident that US-GCC relations will not revert to their pre-2017 form. There have been both structural and psychological shifts that reshaped how Gulf capitals perceive Washington's reliability. Broader American strategic trends—such as energy independence and competition with China—will continue to drive future administrations to insist that GCC states assume greater responsibility for their own security. Beyond Trump's personal style, the foundations of a contractual relationship are likely to persist, reflecting deeper transformations in US global priorities.

The Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, have already internalised this new reality and adapted by diversifying their foreign policies, expanding economic partnerships with major global powers such as China, maintaining pragmatic engagements with Russia, and strengthening their capacities for autonomous decision-making. The objective is no longer complete reliance on the US but the crafting of a more flexible and balanced foreign policy—one designed to manage relationships across multiple power centres rather than preserve dependence on a single partner.

Ball-gazing beyond 2028

By the time President Trump's second term concludes in 2028, US-GCC relations are likely to reach a state of mutual pragmatism. Economic deals, investment flows, and joint ventures are set to become the primary language governing this strategic partnership. The America First doctrine will mean that Washington expects regional allies contribute a larger share of security expenses.

At the same time, the intensifying US-China rivalry will pose a new challenge. By 2028, Washington is expected to exert greater pressure on Gulf states to curb their technological and economic engagement with Beijing, placing them in a delicate position as they navigate between their long-standing security partner and their most significant trade partner.

From the GCC perspective, 2028 will be a period of recalibration and preparation for the post-Trump era. After eight non-consecutive years of a foreign policy deeply shaped by the president's personal diplomacy, the region will once again face an uncertain global environment. By then, the GCC will have further entrenched its 'strategic autonomy.' In doing so, Gulf leaders will have internalised the central lesson of the Trump era: that sustaining influence and security in a shifting international order requires initiative, diversification, and the confidence to act as autonomous players.

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