Why RSF gains in Sudan unnerve Egypt

The RSF’s complete control of Darfur could facilitate smuggling, terrorism, and mass displacement, potentially giving Egypt a big problem on its southern border

This image grab taken from handout video footage released on Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces Telegram account on 26 October 2025, shows RSF fighters celebrating in the streets of el-Fasher.
Rapid Support Forces (RSF) / AFP
This image grab taken from handout video footage released on Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces Telegram account on 26 October 2025, shows RSF fighters celebrating in the streets of el-Fasher.

Why RSF gains in Sudan unnerve Egypt

From Egypt’s perspective, there is no good news coming out of Sudan, where civil war has raged since April 2023. In recent days, that has only been underlined by the fall of el-Fasher, the army’s last stronghold in Darfur, Sudan’s giant western region. Given that Egypt and Sudan share a 1,270km border, these developments are of acute interest in Cairo.

El-Fasher fell to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) at the end of October, with atrocities widely reported despite a communications blackout. Satellite images appear to show piles of bodies, as RSF soldiers finally entered a city to which they had laid siege for 500 days.

The city’s capture will make Sudan’s humanitarian catastrophe far worse. Among the reported RSF atrocities has been the ethnic cleansing of non-Arab groups and the blocking of safe evacuations for up to 300,000 civilians trapped in the city.

Unwelcome developments

The RSF’s establishment of a de facto separate state in Darfur is a dismal prospect for Egypt, which lies only 350km away. It amplifies Egypt’s vulnerabilities in security, migration, and diplomacy. On 28 October, Egypt said it opposed the partition of Sudan and called for a humanitarian ceasefire.

Cairo has backed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) politically and diplomatically but has avoided direct military involvement. RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti) has nevertheless accused Egypt of airstrikes against his forces on behalf of the SAF.

AFP
In this file photo taken on June 22, 2019 Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, leader of the large and heavily-armed paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), attends a rally in the village of Abraq.

The capture of el-Fasher completes RSF control over western Sudan, including over a strategic border area in Sudan’s north-western corner, between Sudan, Egypt, and Libya, and not far from Chad. In June this year, the RSF occupied the area, creating a militia-dominated corridor between the four states that facilitates arms smuggling and human trafficking. It also enables militant incursions directly into Egypt’s Western Desert—a vast, porous frontier.

The situation is already strained by instability in Libya. Egypt’s 1,115km border with Libya is now an arms smuggling hotspot, with some weapons ending up in the hands of jihadist groups like Islamic State (IS), which fought the Egyptian army in Sinai for years. The RSF nurtures ties with jihadists in Africa, so Cairo will fear an increase in terrorism.

It will also be concerned about displacement. Around 12 million Sudanese have been forced from their homes by war, with 1.5 million making their way to Egypt to join an estimated 3.5 million refugees from Libya, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and elsewhere who are already living there.

Sudanese refugees live around cities such as Cairo and Alexandria, sharing underfunded public services with Egyptians. Transport, healthcare, education, and social services are under severe strain, yet the fall of el-Fasher has triggered a new exodus, with tens of thousands fleeing the RSF inferno.

The RSF nurtures ties with jihadists in Africa, so Cairo will fear an increase in terrorism

A changing picture

With Egypt facing a raft of problems, including inflation and water scarcity from the Nile River, it is trying to leverage its burgeoning refugee community to secure financial support from the international community, especially Europe, which shudders at the prospect of millions of refugees crossing the Mediterranean.

Egypt's support to the SAF has been consistent with its policy of backing state institutions, as opposed to militias and non-state actors. This was observed in places such as Lebanon, Libya, and even Syria. SAF commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has been a frequent visitor to Egypt and always gets a red carpet welcome, but Egypt is well aware that other states in the Middle East back the RSF (despite their denials).

The RSF's capture of el-Fasher potentially splits Sudan into an SAF-controlled east, which includes the capital, Khartoum, and an RSF-controlled west, which includes Darfur. This division weakens Egypt's leverage in Nile Basin politics, where Sudan was once an ally in the face of Ethiopia's policy of damming the Nile, thus controlling its flow to both Egypt and Sudan.

shutterstock
An aerial view of the Nile River.

The RSF's enhanced access to Libyan supplies, including fuel and arms, will now prolong the war and potentially draw in more external actors, further destabilising the Sahel region, where terrorist groups are increasingly active. For Egypt, this is a matter of national security.

Analysts wonder whether the civil war in Sudan could reach a point at which Egypt intervenes, particularly if the RSF extends its territorial control beyond Darfur and into Sudan's Northern State, just 177km from Egypt's border. This distance would put Egyptian territory within range of RSF drones.

Egypt continues to call for a ceasefire, as do the United Nations and the United States; however, these calls have fallen on deaf ears. The capture of el-Fasher will likely bolster the RSF and its backers, prompting hopes of further gains. With Darfur now in full RSF control, Egypt's path to mitigating impacts from Sudan's war looks narrower than ever.

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