In Moscow, Syria's new president said he wants to restore and redefine relations with Russia—a former foe. But is this a genuine olive branch or a message to Washington?
Alexander Zemlianichenko / AFP
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa hold a meeting at the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow on October 15, 2025.
On 15 October, Syrian President Ahmed al‑Sharaa met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow—the first face-to-face meeting between the two since al‑Sharaa took power in December 2024. During the meeting, al‑Sharaa said Syria was keen to “restore and redefine ties” with Moscow, assuring Putin that Damascus would honour all past agreements with Moscow.
“We are trying to restore and redefine relations with Russia in a way that safeguards Syria's sovereignty, stability and territorial integrity,” he said.
Putin, too, was keen to put the past behind them, hailing decades of “special relations” between the two countries and praising Syria’s recent parliamentary elections.
“I believe that this is a great success for you, because it leads to the consolidation of society, and despite the fact that Syria is currently going through difficult times, it will nevertheless strengthen ties and cooperation between all political forces in Syria,” said Putin of Syria’s recent elections.
While the positive signals from Damascus and Moscow suggest a willingness on both sides to build relations founded on mutual respect and shared interests, simply turning the page on Russia’s political and military alignment against the revolution is, however difficult, unlikely to be sufficient for restoring relations to their previous standing.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa hold a meeting at the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow on October 15, 2025.
For the first time since the 1960s, Syria appears to have stepped out of the Soviet, and later, Russian sphere of influence. This year has revealed broader signs of waning Russian clout across the Middle East, not only due to the collapse of its most important regional ally, but also as a result of sweeping changes following the October 7 attack and the subsequent unravelling of the Iranian axis.
While it may be said that Russia is willing but unable to play a decisive role in Syria’s future, it remains unclear whether the new leadership in Damascus is either willing or able to establish strong ties with Moscow.
Recent visits and statements by Syrian officials may largely serve as signals to Washington and Brussels—a reminder of alternative alignments should Western support for reconstruction, economic recovery, or deterrence against Israel’s aggression fail to materialise.
Recent Syrian statements serve as a reminder of alternative alignments should Western support for reconstruction, economic recovery, or deterrence against Israel's aggression fail to materialise
The origins of hostilities
Moscow viewed the wave of Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 as an extension of Western-backed 'colour revolutions' aimed at weakening Russia, but largely stayed on the sidelines, with the exception of Syria.
Its first anti-government protests began in March 2011. By 2012, Russian diplomacy contributed to drafting and endorsing the Geneva I Communiqué on 30 June, based on UN envoy Kofi Annan's plan. The communiqué called for the formation of a transitional governing body with full executive powers, the holding of new elections, and the drafting of a new constitution under Syrian auspices. Russia endorsed the agreement in the UN Security Council, presenting it as a possible framework for resolving the Syrian conflict.
However, Moscow's interpretation of the communiqué and the mechanisms it proposed for its implementation undermined Annan's efforts and those of his successors, ultimately obstructing meaningful progress.
Following chemical weapons attacks on Eastern Ghouta in 2013, Russia stood firmly by the Assad regime. In its view, Western media and Western-backed media were carrying out an agenda aimed at portraying all regime violations as fabricated provocations aimed at justifying foreign intervention and regime change. It succeeded in brokering a deal with the administration of US President Barack Obama to dismantle Syria's chemical weapons stockpile, without holding Assad's regime to account.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (2nd-R) and his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad (2nd-L) preside over a military parade in the Russian air base in Hmeimim in the northwestern Syrian province of Latakia. December 11, 2017.
As the regime lost control over most of Syria's territory and opposition forces advanced to the outskirts of Damascus, Russia launched its military intervention on 30 September 2015. The stated objective was to combat terrorist organisations and prevent them from threatening Russia's internal security.
Putin cited the presence of more than 2,000 Russian nationals fighting with extremist groups in Syria, along with thousands from Central Asian countries, warning that any success achieved by these fighters could pose a direct threat upon their return.
In a meeting with military and security officials on 2 October 2015, Putin described the intervention as a pre-emptive move to prevent terrorism from reaching Russian soil. He stressed that the military assistance provided to Syria was "in line with Russian military doctrine and international law," having been launched in response to a formal request from al-Assad.
Beyond these declared goals, Russia also sought to leverage the fight against terrorism as a platform for forging an international coalition, thereby ending its isolation following the annexation of Crimea.
According to official statements, Russia tested and developed hundreds of weapons in Syria under real combat conditions. In exchange for safeguarding al-Assad, it secured a long-term strategic foothold, extending its presence at the naval base in Tartus for 49 years and establishing the Hmeimim Air Base, which it later expanded. These two installations have since become logistical centres for Russia's broader ambitions across Africa.
Russian soldiers stand aboard a ship at the Russian naval base in the Syrian Mediterranean port of Tartus on September 26, 2019.
Russian success
In a relatively short period, Russia succeeded in imposing a new reality on the ground. Amid the ruins of Aleppo, it launched the Astana Process with Türkiye and Iran to shape a political settlement outside the Geneva framework and UN mandates.
In its efforts to restore regime control over Syrian territory, Moscow brokered several agreements with Türkiye and facilitated local reconciliation deals, many of which the regime later violated once its position had been consolidated.
Alongside its Astana partners, Russia designated four de-escalation zones. By autumn 2018, however, only Idlib remained, after opposition forces had been pushed into 'settlements' in Eastern Ghouta, Qalamoun, southern Syria, northern Homs, and southern Hama—effectively forcing their withdrawal to Idlib. The remaining territory in Idlib steadily diminished under joint offensives by regime and Iranian forces. But beyond military successes, Russia was unable to forge a political settlement between the opposition and the regime.
Regardless of Moscow's true intentions regarding a political solution involving the opposition, the regime avoided any binding commitments, stalled negotiations —particularly those related to the constitutional committee—and bogged down the process with endless procedural delays. It adeptly navigated Russian and Iranian influence to maximise its own advantage.
Although Moscow succeeded in securing a measure of regional rehabilitation for the regime and provided it with a new lease of life, al-Assad's intransigence, continued alignment with Iran, and entanglement in the regional captagon trade ultimately squandered that opportunity, leaving him without external backing during the Deterrence of Aggression military campaign.
Islamist-led rebels pose for a picture with a Syria army helicopter on the tarmac at the Nayrab military airport in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on December 2, 2024, after a surprise lightning offensive on November 30.
Caught off guard
Moscow was caught off guard by the offensive and while it might have been capable of slowing the operation, it seemingly judged that neither the regime nor its Iranian allies would be able to withstand the advance. The rest is history when Bashar al-Assad fled Syria for Russia on 8 December, 2024 marking an end of 53 years of Assad family rule.
By the time Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham rebels reached Hama, they had already entered into negotiations with Moscow, according to al-Sharaa. Both parties, he said, made "commitments" and honoured them upon advancing to Homs. "When we reached Homs, the Russians stepped away from the battle," he stated.
"They withdrew entirely from the military scene, whether through airstrikes or otherwise, as part of an agreement reached between us and them. We honoured it, and so did they to this moment. They have not shown any negative interference in Syrian affairs; on the contrary, there has been positive engagement in recent periods."
Reflecting on Syria's continued engagement with Russia, and after a series of meetings, al-Sharaa added: "Russia is a major global power, arguably the world's second strongest, and it holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. There are long-standing ties between Syria and Russia that go back to Syria's founding in 1946."
"Syria has had several ties with Russia, and we have inherited these ties, so we must preserve and manage them with calm and prudence, especially in light of the many and varied sanctions Syria faces, some of which are linked to the Security Council. Russia's permanent seat means its vote must be used purposefully."
