In a wide-ranging sitdown interview with Al Majalla, AANES Foreign Affairs Chief Ilham Ahmed lays out the lingering points of contention with Damascus and the way forward
Al Majalla spoke with Ilham Ahmed, Head of Foreign Affairs for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), about the ongoing negotiations with the Syrian government. The conversation addressed her recent meetings with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, the principal points of contention between both sides, the role of US envoy Tom Barrack, the visit of US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Brad Cooper to Qamishli and Damascus, his meeting with President Ahmed al-Sharaa, and Türkiye’s potential role in facilitating future agreements.
A full transcript of the interview was published in three parts on Al Majalla’s Arabic website. Below is an abridged version of the discussion held at our London office.
Can you speak about the recent round of negotiations that took place in Damascus at the end of August, during your meeting with Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani?
The meetings were designed to narrow gaps in the documents and proposals exchanged. Many issues remain contentious, but the essential question is how they will be addressed and within what framework. We presented our position, and both sides agreed to establish a timeline for joint committees. These committees will examine all matters in detail and are expected to continue until consensus is reached, after which the outcomes will be announced.
What are the key points of contention?
There are several. Damascus’s stance remains ambiguous on many of the proposals. Everything has now been referred to technical committees for detailed examination. Chief among the disputed issues are: first, the future of the military—particularly the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the national army and the mechanisms for doing so—and second, the shape of governance in Syria: what form it will take and how it will function. These two matters are the most sensitive and will require extensive technical discussions to reconcile divergent visions.
So the two central disputes are the future relationship between the SDF and the restructured Syrian army, and the fate of the Autonomous Administration, essentially the balance between centralisation and decentralisation?
Yes.
Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi during the signing of the agreement to integrate the SDF into state institutions, Damascus, March 10, 2025.
Has the AANES been offered positions in the Syrian government? Some reports allege that international actors are pushing for General Mazloum Abdi to assume the post of Chief of Staff or Minister of Defence. Is that true?
Such proposals have indeed been raised, and it is natural that outside powers would consider them. For us, what matters is that our region is represented in the national government, reflecting Syria’s cultural diversity. Securing constitutional guarantees is also a priority. We welcome such ideas and are open to studying them, but they must be accompanied by firm constitutional safeguards.
So someone from the SDF could actually become Chief of Staff or even Minister of Defence?
It is possible that a member of the SDF could serve as Chief of Staff. We are open to that and have conveyed our position. But no formal response has been given. As I mentioned, clear understandings must first be reached on the military and administrative systems, including the terms of integration. Only then can institutional participation be properly addressed.
What is the current size of the SDF?
Roughly 100,000 personnel, including internal security forces.
Do you envisage the SDF as a unified bloc, structurally distinct from the national army?
This remains a matter for negotiation. According to the draft constitutional declaration, the army could be organised into corps, within which joint units and coordination committees would certainly be established.
Since we are still in a transitional phase, integration must be gradual rather than immediate. Sudden changes to existing formations and operational structures could have negative consequences. To prevent this, integration should proceed step by step—beginning with joint units and liaison committees, for example, in counter-terrorism operations or in maintaining security across Syria. Within this framework, phased integration is both practical and necessary.
Barrack's initial approach was hasty, but now the US role is far more constructive, and it supports a gradual, step-by-step process towards integration
It has been reported that during your recent meeting with Minister Shaibani in Damascus, you proposed amendments to the Syrian constitutional declaration. Can you share your vision for these changes?
We are advocating a decentralised system, which we consider essential in this transitional period. It will preserve Syria's unity while providing guarantees to all Syrians, across communities and cultures. We must learn from the experience of the former regime, which imposed a centralised model that erased local identities and curtailed political participation—even in matters of development.
At the very least, there must now be a decentralised framework between the central government and the provinces, with clearly defined and substantial powers devolved to the regions or governorates. In our view, the constitutional declaration should explicitly enshrine this principle. Parliament, for instance, could be bicameral—one chamber representing the provinces, the other representing the people.
Equally vital is the right to education in one's mother tongue. This must be a guaranteed constitutional right. Women's representation in decision-making bodies is also key. Ensuring women's participation would reassure Syrians that the country is moving towards a genuinely inclusive future. These are not extensive demands, but they are foundational pillars upon which a new Syrian state can be built.
Would it be fair to say that reaching an agreement on Syria's future political system is your top priority before moving to other aspects of the negotiations?
Absolutely. And I believe this priority is shared by the vast majority of Syrians. All Syrians have suffered under the previous regime and endured the devastating years of war. We are now at the stage of rebuilding the country, and to do so credibly, we must first agree on the political system that will govern Syria.
If we return to a centralised model, then what was the point of all the sacrifices? Why did people pay such a heavy price? There must be a genuine understanding of this transitional moment, free from authoritarian fears or centralising anxieties. It is essential that the voices of Syrian society as a whole are reflected in shaping the country's future.
An Arab media delegation, comprising directors of media institutions, editors-in-chief of Arab newspapers, and former information ministers, met with al-Sharaa at the presidential palace in Damascus, August 24, 2025.
In a meeting with an Arab media delegation in late August, President Ahmed al-Sharaa said his government is prepared to accept the highest degree of decentralisation but not partition. He stressed that decentralisation is acceptable only if it does not become a pathway to dividing Syria. What is your response?
Frankly, I don't understand where this constant anxiety about partition comes from. Why has Syria become so consumed by this fear? It seems that whoever assumes authority in Damascus immediately begins warning of fragmentation. That, in itself, is an issue that needs to be addressed. Those who equate decentralisation or federalism with division should look at international examples. Confederations have not produced partition. Federations have not produced partition. Nor has decentralised governance inherently led to the breakup of states.
What truly fuels separatist tendencies is a centralised system that regularly suppresses regions—denying them development, cultural expression, and political participation. In such cases, of course, marginalised communities may begin to call for separation. But if people feel their rights are recognised and guaranteed, why would they seek to break away? On the contrary, under a decentralised framework, they would defend their country as their own homeland and identity.
Can you clearly state that you are opposed to any project advocating for partition?
Absolutely. We are firmly against any project that seeks to divide Syria. What would partition even mean for us? If we enjoy our full rights in the regions where we live, and if we are represented fairly in state institutions, why would we pursue separation?
Some observers suggest that Arab tribes within your administration could rise in rebellion. Is that something you worry about?
We live in a participatory society. I know that there have been attempts—often backed by external actors—to exploit this narrative and sow discord. Some past clashes were indeed triggered by such provocations. But today the picture is clearer. The people of the region—tribes, intellectuals, and communities—understand these dynamics and no longer wish to see new conflicts.
Their situation, despite the shortcomings, is now relatively better than in many other parts of Syria. There is a degree of security and shared governance. I won't claim that our administration is perfect, but within the limits of our resources, we are diligently working to transform this region into a model of stability—one that can contribute to building a pluralistic new Syria.
A Syrian-Jordanian-American roadmap has been announced in Sweida. How do you view this?
We support any initiative that leads to stability and security. If our Druze brothers and sisters believe this agreement ensures their safety and well-being, then we stand with them.
The "Unity of Position" conference, held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Hasakah on August 8, 2025.
Is there coordination between your administration and theirs?
Yes, there is coordination, communication, and exchange of views.
One of the main architects of the Sweida roadmap is US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, who is also the ambassador to Türkiye. How do you feel about his role and what he is doing?
Barrack's concern is that the situation could erupt again, and this concern is widely shared by regional and international actors, as well as by us Syrians. Nobody wants Syria to descend once more into bloodshed.
Barrack is working hard, and we support his efforts. As he learns more about the conditions on the ground, he will better understand the complexities we face. He also recognises the concerns of Syria's neighbours—Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Türkiye, and Lebanon—all of whom have legitimate anxieties. Addressing these concerns while reaching timely agreements and striking a balance is essential to ensuring a credible and sustainable process.
Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi (left) watches as Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani (center) greets US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack after signing an agreement in Damascus on September 16, 2025.
Are you suggesting that he was initially hasty in his bid to secure agreements without fully grasping the complexities of the Syrian and regional context?
In the early stages, he was indeed quite hasty. But now, I believe he understands the situation better and is taking more realistic steps. We therefore support the efforts he is making to achieve progress.
On 9 July, during General Mazloum Abdi's visit to Damascus, a negotiation round was expected to involve Tom Barrack. In the end, the session took place between General Abdi's team and Minister Ahibani, with Barrack present but reportedly leaving midway. In your view, does US involvement between you and the Syrian government help to advance understandings, or does it complicate matters?
It is important to clarify what actually happened at that meeting. I was there. Barrack had a scheduled appointment with President Sharaa, which he was expected to attend. The meeting began at 9:00 a.m. and continued until 3:00 p.m. Toward the end, tensions arose, and Barrack had to leave for his appointment.
Could you explain what caused the tension?
The dispute centred on Deir ez-Zor—whether the area should be handed over or integrated. But the US role in negotiations remains important. At first, we believed the Americans were intent on stabilising the internal situation in Damascus and integrating all components, and we saw considerable effort from their officials. But the key point of contention was whether integration should be immediate or gradual.
In my view, the initial approach was unrealistic. Years of war, conflict, and grievances cannot be swept under the rug. So, our view is that any sudden reset would be illusory. Today, however, the US role is far more constructive—ensuring balance and supporting a gradual, step-by-step process.
We know Türkiye has influence over decision-making centres in Damascus, but our hope is that it upholds some semblance of neutrality in its dealings
The new CENTCOM commander, General Brad Cooper, recently visited northeastern Syria, where he met with General Mazloum Abdi before travelling to Damascus to meet President Sharaa. What was the purpose of this visit?
This was his first visit since assuming command. Its purpose was to understand the SDF vision of the integration process, their demands, and how a framework of partnership could be shaped. It was also a chance to consult and to reaffirm the coalition's role and its partnership with the SDF, particularly in the fight against the Islamic State (IS). Since he was heading to Damascus, it was also an opportunity to convey messages to the Syrian leadership.
And what were those messages?
That we are ready for integration. We are prepared to form joint committees and joint units. These are preliminary steps that can help build trust, and we are ready to begin.
Do American officials—whether General Cooper or others—still remind you that they will not remain in Syria indefinitely, and that reaching understandings with Damascus is essential?
Yes, they always emphasise this, both political and military figures alike. They remind us regularly that their presence will not be permanent and that Syrians themselves must find reasonable solutions.
SDF forces participate in a joint military exercise with the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve coalition against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province on September 7, 2022.
From 2014 to 2025, the SDF was the sole Syrian partner of the international coalition against IS. Now, there is talk that Syrian government forces have been included as partners. Is this true?
I cannot confirm the accuracy of that.
What can you say about the current situation then?
Currently, for example, the US is present in Damascus, whether through its embassy or ongoing efforts to establish military arrangements. The partnership is still in the process of being built. I believe that is a more reasonable description of the current phase.
Does the prospect of such a partnership worry you?
Not at all. On the contrary, we see these efforts as an opportunity to broaden inclusion within Damascus and to reach practical solutions regarding decentralisation.
You are certainly aware that one of the US demands from Damascus is a formal and public accession to the coalition. Is that correct?
Yes, that is correct. This would mean the government in Damascus must take a clear stance—particularly on counter-terrorism and the fight against IS.
Such a move would strengthen US relations with Damascus and help legitimise and support international engagement with the Syrian government. Does that worry you?
We do not see ourselves as necessarily outside the framework of Damascus. When we speak of Damascus, we assume that it will represent all Syrians and will naturally include us.
Over the past nine months, it appears that the new Syrian government has received unprecedented diplomatic support from the Arab world, the region, and the United States. Would you agree?
There has certainly been diplomatic support, but key challenges remain. There have been positive steps on stability, security, institution-building, and broader inclusion, but many issues remain unresolved. The support is there, but what happens next isn't clear. That will depend on the negotiation process and the nature of any future partnership.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (R) and Syria's interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa shake hands during a joint press conference following their meeting at the Presidential Palace in Ankara, on 4 February 2025.
What's your view on Türkiye's role in Syria, and to what extent is it involved in the negotiations between you and Damascus?
So far, we do not see Türkiye's role in the negotiations as constructive. I believe Ankara equates the Kurdish issue in Syria with the Kurdish issue in Türkiye, insisting that any step taken in Syria must be mirrored in Türkiye—or vice versa. This linkage delays the political process.
We know Türkiye has influence over decision-making centres in Damascus and is deeply involved both politically and militarily. We realise it may never be completely neutral, but our hope is that it upholds some semblance of neutrality in its dealings.
Is it true that President Sharaa signed the agreement with General Abdi without Ankara's approval and that Türkiye was not supportive of the March agreement?
That is what we have heard, and it is certainly possible.
How do you envision Syria in the short, medium, and long term, as well as its relationship with Damascus and other key actors?
I truly hope Syria engages in deep and meaningful dialogue without falling back on violence to achieve its goals.
